bips/bip-0112.mediawiki

<pre>
  BIP: 112
  Title: CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
  Authors: BtcDrak <btcdrak@gmail.com>
           Mark Friedenbach <mark@friedenbach.org>
           Eric Lombrozo <elombrozo@gmail.com>
  Status: Draft
  Type: Standards Track
  Created: 2015-08-10
</pre>

==Abstract==

This BIP describes a new opcode (CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY) for the Bitcoin
scripting system that in combination with BIP 68 allows execution
pathways of a script to be restricted based on the age of the output
being spent.


==Summary==

CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY redefines the existing NOP3 opcode. When executed it
compares the top item on the stack to the nSequence field of the transaction
input containing the scriptSig. If it is greater than or equal to (1 << 31),
or if the transaction version is greater than or equal to 2, the transaction input
sequence is less than or equal to (1 << 31) and the top stack item is less than
the transaction input sequence, script exection continues as if a NOP was executed,
otherwise the script fails.

BIP 68's redefinition of nSequence prevents a non-final transaction
from being selected for inclusion in a block until the corresponding
input has reached the specified age, as measured in block height or
block time. By comparing the argument to CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY against
the nSequence field, we indirectly verify a desired minimum age of the
the output being spent; until that relative age has been reached any
script execution pathway including the CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY will fail
to validate, causing the transaction not to be selected for inclusion
in a block.


==Motivation==

BIP 68 repurposes the transaction nSequence field meaning by giving
sequence numbers new consensus-enforced semantics as a relative
lock-time. However, there is no way to build Bitcoin scripts to make
decisions based on this field.

By making the nSequence field accessible to script, it becomes
possible to construct code pathways that only become accessible some
minimum time after proof-of-publication. This enables a wide variety
of applications in phased protocols such as escrow, payment channels,
or bidirectional pegs.


===Contracts With Expiration Deadlines===

====Escrow with Timeout====

An escrow that times out automatically 30 days after being funded can be
established in the following way. Alice, Bob and Escrow create a 2-of-3
address with the following redeemscript.

    IF
        2 <Alice's pubkey> <Bob's pubkey> <Escrow's pubkey> 3 CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY
    ELSE
        <LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD + 30*24*60*60> CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY DROP
        <Alice's pubkey> CHECKSIGVERIFY
    ENDIF

At any time funds can be spent using signatures from any two of Alice, 
Bob or the Escrow.

After 30 days Alice can sign alone.

The clock does not start ticking until the payment to the escrow address
confirms. 


===Retroactive Invalidation===

In many instances, we would like to create contracts that can be revoked in case
of some future event. However, given the immutable nature of the blockchain, it
is practically impossible to retroactively invalidate a previous commitment that
has already confirmed. The only mechanism we really have for retroactive
invalidation is blockchain reorganization which, for fundamental security
reasons, is designed to be very hard and very expensive to deliberately pull off.

Despite this limitation, we do have a way to provide something functionally similar
using CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY. By constructing scripts with multiple branches of
execution where one or more of the branches are delayed we provide
a time window in which someone can supply an invalidation condition that allows the
output to be spent, effectively invalidating the would-be delayed branch and potentially discouraging
another party from broadcasting the transaction in the first place. If the invalidation
condition does not occur before the timeout, the delayed branch becomes spendable,
honoring the original contract.

Some more specific applications of this idea:

====Hash Time-Locked Contracts====

Hash Time-Locked Contracts (HTLCs) provide a general mechanism for offchain contract negotiation. An execution pathway can be made to require knowledge of a secret (a hash preimage) that can be presented within an invalidation time window. By sharing the secret it is possible to guarantee to the counterparty that the transaction will never be broadcast since this would allow the counterparty to claim the output immediately while one would have to wait for the time window to pass. If the secret has not been shared, the counterparty will be unable to use the instant pathway and the delayed pathway will be used instead.

====Bidirectional Payment Channels====

Scriptable relative locktime provides a predictable amount of time to respond in
the event a counterparty broadcasts a revoked transaction: Absolute locktime
necessitates closing the channel and reopen it when getting close to the timeout,
whereas with relative locktime, the clock starts ticking the moment the
transactions confirms in a block. It also provides a means to know exactly how
long to wait (in number of blocks) before funds can be pulled out of the channel
in the event of a noncooperative counterparty.


====Lightning Network====

The lightning network extends the bidirectional payment channel idea to allow for payments to be routed over multiple bidirectional payment channel hops.

These channels are based on an anchor transaction that requires a 2-of-2
multisig from Alice and Bob, and a series of revocable commitment
transactions that spend the anchor transaction.  The commitment
transaction splits the funds from the anchor between Alice and Bob and
the latest commitment transaction may be published by either party at
any time, finalising the channel.

Ideally then, a revoked commitment transaction would never be able to
be successfully spent; and the latest commitment transaction would be
able to be spent very quickly.

To allow a commitment transaction to be effectively revoked, Alice
and Bob have slightly different versions of the latest commitment
transaction. In Alice's version, any outputs in the commitment
transaction that pay Alice also include a forced delay, and an
alternative branch that allows Bob to spend the output if he knows that
transaction's revocation code. In Bob's version, payments to Bob are
similarly encumbered. When Alice and Bob negotiate new balances and
new commitment transactions, they also reveal the old revocation code,
thus committing to not relaying the old transaction.

A simple output, paying to Alice might then look like:

    OP_HASH160 <revokehash> OP_EQUAL
    OP_IF
        OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <Bob key hash> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
    OP_ELSE
        24h OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
        OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <Alice key hash> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
    OP_ENDIF

This allows Alice to publish the latest commitment transaction at any
time and spend the funds after 24 hours, but also ensures that if Alice
relays a revoked transaction, that Bob has 24 hours to claim the funds.

With CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY, this would look like:

    OP_HASH160 <revokehash> OP_EQUAL
    OP_IF
        OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <Bob key hash> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
    OP_ELSE
        2015/12/15 OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY
        OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <Alice key hash> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
    OP_ENDIF

This form of transaction would mean that if the anchor is unspent on
2015/12/16, Alice can use this commitment even if it has been revoked,
simply by spending it immediately, giving no time for Bob to claim it.

Ths means that the channel has a deadline that cannot be pushed
back without hitting the blockchain; and also that funds may not be
available until the deadline is hit. CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY allows you
to avoid making that tradeoff.

Hashed Time-Lock Contracts (HTLCs) make this slightly more complicated,
since in principle they may pay either Alice or Bob, depending on whether
Alice discovers a secret R, or a timeout is reached, but the same principle
applies -- the branch paying Alice in Alice's commitment transaction gets a
delay, and the entire output can be claimed by the other party if the
revocation secret is known. With CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY, a HTLC payable to
Alice might look like the following in Alice's commitment transaction:

    OP_HASH160 OP_DUP <revokehash> OP_EQUAL
    OP_IF
        OP_DROP OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <Bob key hash> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
    OP_ELSE
        <R hash> OP_EQUAL
        OP_IF
            "24h" OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY OP_DROP
            OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <Alice key hash> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
        OP_ELSE
            "2015/10/20 10:33" OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY OP_DROP
            OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <Bob key hash> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
        OP_ENDIF
    OP_ENDIF

and correspondingly in Bob's commitment transaction:

   OP_HASH160 OP_DUP <revokehash> OP_EQUAL
   OP_IF
       OP_DROP OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <Alice key hash> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
   OP_ELSE
       <R hash> OP_EQUAL
       OP_IF
           OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <Alice key hash> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
       OP_ELSE
           "24h" OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY OP_DROP
           "2015/10/20 10:33" OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY OP_DROP
           OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <Bob key hash> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
       OP_ENDIF
   OP_ENDIF

Note that both CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY and CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY are used in the
final branch of above to ensure Bob cannot spend the output until after both
the timeout is complete and Alice has had time to reveal the revocation
secret.

See the [https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/blob/master/doc/deployable-lightning.pdf Deployable Lightning] paper.


====2-Way Pegged Sidechains====

    OP_IF
        lockTxHeight <lockTxHash> nlocktxOut [<workAmount>] reorgBounty Hash160(<...>) <genesisHash> OP_REORGPROOFVERIFY
    OP_ELSE
        withdrawLockTime OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY OP_DROP OP_HASH160 p2shWithdrawDest OP_EQUAL
    OP_ENDIF


==Specification==

Refer to the reference implementation, reproduced below, for the precise 
semantics and detailed rationale for those semantics.

    
    /* Threshold for nSequence: below this value it is interpreted
     * as a relative lock-time, otherwise ignored. */
    static const uint32_t SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD = (1 << 31);
    
    /* Threshold for nSequence when interpreted as a relative
     * lock-time: below this value it has units of blocks, otherwise
     * seconds. */
    static const uint32_t SEQUENCE_UNITS_THRESHOLD = (1 << 30);
    
    case OP_NOP3:
    {
        if (!(flags & SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY)) {
            // not enabled; treat as a NOP3
            if (flags & SCRIPT_VERIFY_DISCOURAGE_UPGRADABLE_NOPS) {
                return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_DISCOURAGE_UPGRADABLE_NOPS);
            }
            break;
        }
        
        if (stack.size() < 1)
            return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_INVALID_STACK_OPERATION);
        
        // Note that elsewhere numeric opcodes are limited to
        // operands in the range -2**31+1 to 2**31-1, however it is
        // legal for opcodes to produce results exceeding that
        // range. This limitation is implemented by CScriptNum's
        // default 4-byte limit.
        //
        // If we kept to that limit we'd have a year 2038 problem,
        // even though the nLockTime field in transactions
        // themselves is uint32 which only becomes meaningless
        // after the year 2106.
        //
        // Thus as a special case we tell CScriptNum to accept up
        // to 5-byte bignums, which are good until 2**39-1, well
        // beyond the 2**32-1 limit of the nLockTime field itself.
        const CScriptNum nSequence(stacktop(-1), fRequireMinimal, 5);
        
        // In the rare event that the argument may be < 0 due to
        // some arithmetic being done first, you can always use
        // 0 MAX CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY.
        if (nSequence < 0)
            return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_NEGATIVE_LOCKTIME);
        
        // To provide for future soft-fork extensibility, if the
        // operand is too large to be treated as a relative lock-
        // time, CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY behaves as a NOP.
        if (nSequence >= SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD)
            break;
        
        // Actually compare the specified sequence number with the input.
        if (!CheckSequence(nSequence))
            return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_UNSATISFIED_LOCKTIME);
        
        break;
    }
    
    bool CheckSequence(const CScriptNum& nSequence) const
    {
        // Relative lock times are supported by comparing the passed
        // in operand to the sequence number of the input.
        const int64_t txToSequence = (int64_t)txTo->vin[nIn].nSequence;
        
        // Fail if the transaction's version number is not set high
        // enough to trigger BIP 68 rules.
        if (static_cast<uint32_t>(txTo->nVersion) < 2)
            return false;
        
        // Sequence numbers above SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD
        // are not consensus constrained. Testing that the transaction's
        // sequence number is not above this threshold prevents
        // using this property to get around a CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
        // check.
        if (txToSequence >= SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD)
            return false;
        
        // There are two kinds of nSequence: lock-by-blockheight
        // and lock-by-blocktime, distinguished by whether
        // nSequence < SEQUENCE_UNITS_THRESHOLD.
        //
        // We want to compare apples to apples, so fail the script
        // unless the type of nSequence being tested is the same as
        // the nSequence in the transaction.
        if (!(
            (txToSequence <  SEQUENCE_UNITS_THRESHOLD && nSequence <  SEQUENCE_UNITS_THRESHOLD) ||
            (txToSequence >= SEQUENCE_UNITS_THRESHOLD && nSequence >= SEQUENCE_UNITS_THRESHOLD)
        ))
            return false;
        
        // Now that we know we're comparing apples-to-apples, the
        // comparison is a simple numeric one.
        if (nSequence > txToSequence)
            return false;
        
        return true;
    }


==Reference Implementation==

A reference implementation is provided in the following git repository:

https://github.com/maaku/bitcoin/tree/checksequenceverify


==Deployment==

We reuse the double-threshold switchover mechanism from BIPs 34 and
66, with the same thresholds, but for nVersion = 4. The new rules are
in effect for every block (at height H) with nVersion = 4 and at least
750 out of 1000 blocks preceding it (with heights H-1000..H-1) also
have nVersion = 4. Furthermore, when 950 out of the 1000 blocks
preceding a block do have nVersion = 4, nVersion = 3 blocks become
invalid, and all further blocks enforce the new rules.

It is recommended that this soft-fork deployment trigger include other 
related proposals for improving Bitcoin's lock-time capabilities, including:

[https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0065.mediawiki BIP 65]: 
OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY, 

[https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0068.mediawiki BIP 68]: 
Consensus-enforced transaction replacement signalled via sequence numbers,

and [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0113.mediawiki BIP 113]: 
Median-Past-Time-Lock.

==Credits==

Mark Friedenbach invented the application of sequence numbers to
achieve relative lock-time, and wrote the reference implementation of
CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY.

The reference implementation and this BIP was based heavily on work
done by Peter Todd for the closely related BIP 65.

BtcDrak authored this BIP document.

Thanks to Eric Lombrozo and Anthony Towns for contributing example usecases.


==References==

[https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0068.mediawiki BIP 68] Consensus-enforced transaction replacement signalled via sequence numbers

[https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0065.mediawiki BIP 65] OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY

[https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0113.mediawiki BIP 113] Median past block time for time-lock constraints

[http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2015-July/000021.html HTLCs using OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY/OP_LOCKTIMEVERIFY and revocation hashes]

[http://lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf Lightning Network]

[https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/blob/master/doc/deployable-lightning.pdf Deployable Lightning]

[http://diyhpl.us/diyhpluswiki/transcripts/sf-bitcoin-meetup/2015-02-23-scaling-bitcoin-to-billions-of-transactions-per-day/ Scaling Bitcoin to Billions of Transactions Per Day]

[http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010396.html Softfork deployment considerations]

[https://gist.github.com/sipa/bf69659f43e763540550 Version bits]

[https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2013-April/002433.html Jeremy Spilman Micropayment Channels]


==Copyright==

This document is placed in the public domain.