You can not select more than 25 topics Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.
 
 
 
 
 

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/*
This file is part of cpp-ethereum.
cpp-ethereum is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
cpp-ethereum is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with cpp-ethereum. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
/** @file Message.cpp
* @author Gav Wood <i@gavwood.com>
* @date 2014
*/
#include "Message.h"
#include "BloomFilter.h"
using namespace std;
using namespace dev;
using namespace dev::p2p;
using namespace dev::shh;
Message::Message(Envelope const& _e, Topics const& _t, Secret const& _s)
{
try
{
bytes b;
if (_s)
if (!decrypt(_s, &(_e.data()), b))
return;
else{}
else if (!openBroadcastEnvelope(_e, _t, b))
return;
if (populate(b))
if (_s)
m_to = KeyPair(_s).pub();
}
catch (...) // Invalid secret? TODO: replace ... with InvalidSecret
{
}
}
bool Message::openBroadcastEnvelope(Envelope const& _e, Topics const& _fk, bytes& o_b)
{
// retrieve the key using the known topic and topicIndex.
unsigned topicIndex = 0;
Secret topicSecret;
// determine topicSecret/topicIndex from knowledge of the collapsed topics (which give the order) and our full-size filter topic.
AbridgedTopics knownTopic = abridge(_fk);
for (unsigned ti = 0; ti < _fk.size() && !topicSecret; ++ti)
for (unsigned i = 0; i < _e.topic().size(); ++i)
if (_e.topic()[i] == knownTopic[ti])
{
topicSecret = Secret(_fk[ti]);
topicIndex = i;
break;
}
if (_e.data().size() < _e.topic().size() * h256::size)
return false;
unsigned index = topicIndex * 2;
Secret encryptedKey(bytesConstRef(&(_e.data())).cropped(h256::size * index, h256::size));
h256 salt = h256(bytesConstRef(&(_e.data())).cropped(h256::size * ++index, h256::size));
Secret key = Secret(generateGamma(topicSecret, salt).makeInsecure() ^ encryptedKey.makeInsecure());
bytesConstRef cipherText = bytesConstRef(&(_e.data())).cropped(h256::size * 2 * _e.topic().size());
return decryptSym(key, cipherText, o_b);
}
bool Message::populate(bytes const& _data)
{
if (!_data.size())
return false;
byte flags = _data[0];
if (!!(flags & ContainsSignature) && _data.size() >= sizeof(Signature) + 1) // has a signature
{
bytesConstRef payload = bytesConstRef(&_data).cropped(1, _data.size() - sizeof(Signature) - 1);
h256 h = sha3(payload);
Signature const& sig = *(Signature const*)&(_data[1 + payload.size()]);
m_from = recover(sig, h);
if (!m_from)
return false;
m_payload = payload.toBytes();
}
else
m_payload = bytesConstRef(&_data).cropped(1).toBytes();
return true;
}
Envelope Message::seal(Secret const& _from, Topics const& _fullTopics, unsigned _ttl, unsigned _workToProve) const
{
AbridgedTopics topics = abridge(_fullTopics);
Envelope ret(time(0) + _ttl, _ttl, topics);
bytes input(1 + m_payload.size());
input[0] = 0;
memcpy(input.data() + 1, m_payload.data(), m_payload.size());
if (_from) // needs a signature
{
input.resize(1 + m_payload.size() + sizeof(Signature));
input[0] |= ContainsSignature;
*(Signature*)&(input[1 + m_payload.size()]) = sign(_from, sha3(m_payload));
// If this fails, the something is wrong with the sign-recover round-trip.
assert(recover(*(Signature*)&(input[1 + m_payload.size()]), sha3(m_payload)) == KeyPair(_from).pub());
}
if (m_to)
encrypt(m_to, &input, ret.m_data);
else
{
// this message is for broadcast (could be read by anyone who knows at least one of the topics)
// create the shared secret for encrypting the payload, then encrypt the shared secret with each topic
Secret s = Secret::random();
for (h256 const& t: _fullTopics)
{
h256 salt = h256::random();
ret.m_data += (generateGamma(Secret(t), salt).makeInsecure() ^ s.makeInsecure()).ref().toBytes();
ret.m_data += salt.asBytes();
}
bytes d;
encryptSym(s, &input, d);
ret.m_data += d;
}
ret.proveWork(_workToProve);
return ret;
}
Envelope::Envelope(RLP const& _m)
{
m_expiry = _m[0].toInt<unsigned>();
m_ttl = _m[1].toInt<unsigned>();
m_topic = _m[2].toVector<FixedHash<4>>();
m_data = _m[3].toBytes();
m_nonce = _m[4].toInt<u256>();
}
Message Envelope::open(Topics const& _t, Secret const& _s) const
{
return Message(*this, _t, _s);
}
unsigned Envelope::workProved() const
{
h256 d[2];
d[0] = sha3(WithoutNonce);
d[1] = m_nonce;
return dev::sha3(bytesConstRef(d[0].data(), 64)).firstBitSet();
}
void Envelope::proveWork(unsigned _ms)
{
h256 d[2];
d[0] = sha3(WithoutNonce);
unsigned bestBitSet = 0;
bytesConstRef chuck(d[0].data(), 64);
chrono::high_resolution_clock::time_point then = chrono::high_resolution_clock::now() + chrono::milliseconds(_ms);
while (chrono::high_resolution_clock::now() < then)
// do it rounds of 1024 for efficiency
for (unsigned i = 0; i < 1024; ++i, ++d[1])
{
auto fbs = dev::sha3(chuck).firstBitSet();
if (fbs > bestBitSet)
{
bestBitSet = fbs;
m_nonce = (h256::Arith)d[1];
}
}
}
bool Envelope::matchesBloomFilter(TopicBloomFilterHash const& f) const
{
for (AbridgedTopic t: m_topic)
if (f.contains(TopicBloomFilter::bloom(t)))
return true;
return false;
}