From 6fb37f1b5829da737807e0e96042fafda35b157d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sergei Tikhomirov Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2021 18:42:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Fix a couple of typos (#11) --- spam-prevention.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/spam-prevention.md b/spam-prevention.md index 6515818..62f04f1 100644 --- a/spam-prevention.md +++ b/spam-prevention.md @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ We want to defend against attackers that have the following capabilities: * they are able to quickly create many seemingly unrelated nodes * they may already have long-lived channels (good reputation) * they might probe in real-time channel balances to adjust their spams -* they might send long-held HTLCs, those ones unobservable from the set of honest long-held HTLCs +* they might send long-held HTLCs that are indistinguishable from honest long-held HTLCs There are important properties of Lightning that we must absolutely preserve: @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ nodes and thus globally track LN payment traffic. ## Watchtower Credit Exhaustion Considering the upcoming deployment of public watchtowers, a LN node may have to pay a cost -per-channel update to avoid a watchtower ressource DoS. A malicious counterparty continously +per-channel update to avoid a watchtower resource DoS. A malicious counterparty continously updating a channel may force the victim to exhaust its watchtower credit, thus knocking-out victim revocation protection.