From 876bb3d09d91fb791c0d1ce856cb0317327a0b4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antoine Riard Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2020 02:48:52 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] Fix formatting (#6) --- spam-prevention.md | 28 +++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/spam-prevention.md b/spam-prevention.md index d100b36..9400f34 100644 --- a/spam-prevention.md +++ b/spam-prevention.md @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ spamming attempts. * [Mitigation strategies available today](#mitigation-strategies-available-today) * [Threat model](#threat-model) * [Proposals](#proposals) + * [Provable Blaming](#provable-blaming) + * [Local Reputation Tracking](#local-reputation-tracking) * [Naive upfront payment](#naive-upfront-payment) * [Reverse upfront payment](#reverse-upfront-payment) * [Bidirectional upfront payment](#bidirectional-upfront-payment) @@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ And we must avoid creating opportunities for attackers to: Many ideas have been proposed over the years, exploring different trade-offs. We summarize them here with their pros and cons to help future research progress. -## Provable Blaming +### Provable Blaming The oldest [proposal](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2015-August/000135.html) discusses to provide proof of channel closures in case of misbehaving peers not failing/succeeding HTLC @@ -126,7 +128,7 @@ as a proof to Alice to clear himself from the routing failure. This scheme introduces a diverse set of concernes : requirement to understand channel types across links, privacy breakage, channel frailty, ... -## Local Reputation Tracking +### Local Reputation Tracking This [proposal](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2018-May/001232.html) discusses a reputation system for nodes. A node will keep a real-time accounting of its routing fees earned @@ -342,17 +344,17 @@ bandwidth one only. ## Mailing List (chronological order) -* [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2015-August/000135.html Loop attack -* [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2016-November/000648.html Analysis: alternative DoS prevention concept] -* [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2018-May/001232.html Mitigations for loop attacks] -* [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-November/002275.html A proposal for upfront payment] -* [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-February/002547.html A proposal for upfront payment (reverse upfront)] -* [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-April/002608.html Proof-of-closure as griefing attack mitigation] -* [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-October/002826.html Hold fees: 402 Payment Required for Lightning itself] +* [Loop attack](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2015-August/000135.html) +* [Analysis: alternative DoS prevention concept](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2016-November/000648.html) +* [Mitigations for loop attacks](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2018-May/001232.html) +* [A proposal for upfront payment](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-November/002275.html) +* [A proposal for upfront payment (reverse upfront)](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-February/002547.html) +* [Proof-of-closure as griefing attack mitigation](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-April/002608.html) +* [Hold fees: 402 Payment Required for Lightning itself](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-October/002826.html) ## Papers -* [https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.10253.pdf Discharged Payment Channels: Quantifying the Lightning Network's Resilience to Topology-Based Attacks] -* [https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1149.pdf LockDown: Balance Availability Attack Against Lightning Network Channels] -* [https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.06564.pdf Congestion Attacks in Payment Channel Networks] -* [https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.00333.pdf Probing Channel Balances in the Lightning Network] +* [Discharged Payment Channels: Quantifying the Lightning Network's Resilience to Topology-Based Attacks](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.10253.pdf) +* [LockDown: Balance Availability Attack Against Lightning Network Channels](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1149.pdf) +* [Congestion Attacks in Payment Channel Networks](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.06564.pdf) +* [Probing Channel Balances in the Lightning Network](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.00333.pdf)