diff --git a/lightningd/sphinx.c b/lightningd/sphinx.c
index a0a941451..d04f2ca30 100644
--- a/lightningd/sphinx.c
+++ b/lightningd/sphinx.c
@@ -479,16 +479,41 @@ u8 *create_onionreply(const tal_t *ctx, const struct secret *shared_secret,
 	u8 key[KEY_LEN];
 	u8 hmac[HMAC_SIZE];
 
+	/* BOLT #4:
+	 *
+	 * The node returning the message builds a return packet consisting of
+	 * the following fields:
+	 *
+	 * 1. data:
+	 *    * [`32`:`hmac`]
+	 *    * [`2`:`failure_len`]
+	 *    * [`failure_len`:`failuremsg`]
+	 *    * [`2`:`pad_len`]
+	 *    * [`pad_len`:`pad`]
+	 */
 	towire_u16(&payload, msglen);
 	towire(&payload, failure_msg, msglen);
 	towire_u16(&payload, padlen);
 	towire_pad(&payload, padlen);
+
+	/* BOLT #4:
+	 *
+	 * The node SHOULD set `pad` such that the `failure_len` plus
+	 * `pad_len` is equal to 128.  This is 28 bytes longer than then the
+	 * longest currently-defined message.
+	 */
 	assert(tal_len(payload) == ONION_REPLY_SIZE + 4);
 
+	/* BOLT #4:
+	 *
+ 	 * Where `hmac` is an HMAC authenticating the remainder of the packet,
+	 * with a key using the above key generation with key type "_um_"
+	 */
 	generate_key(key, "um", 2, shared_secret->data);
 
 	compute_hmac(hmac, payload, tal_len(payload), key, KEY_LEN);
 	towire(&reply, hmac, sizeof(hmac));
+
 	towire(&reply, payload, tal_len(payload));
 	tal_free(payload);
 
@@ -502,6 +527,15 @@ u8 *wrap_onionreply(const tal_t *ctx,
 	size_t streamlen = tal_len(reply);
 	u8 stream[streamlen];
 	u8 *result = tal_arr(ctx, u8, streamlen);
+
+	/* BOLT #4:
+	 *
+	 * The node then generates a new key, using the key type `ammag`.
+	 * This key is then used to generate a pseudo-random stream, which is
+	 * then applied to the packet using `XOR`.
+	 *
+	 * The obfuscation step is repeated by every node on the return path.
+	 */
 	generate_key(key, "ammag", 5, shared_secret->data);
 	generate_cipher_stream(stream, key, streamlen);
 	xorbytes(result, stream, reply, streamlen);