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@ -996,6 +996,216 @@ def test_penalty_htlc_tx_timeout(node_factory, bitcoind, chainparams): |
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assert account_balance(l2, channel_id) == 0 |
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@unittest.skipIf(not DEVELOPER, "uses dev_sign_last_tx") |
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def test_penalty_rbf_normal(node_factory, bitcoind, executor, chainparams): |
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''' |
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Test that penalty transactions are RBFed. |
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''' |
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to_self_delay = 10 |
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# l1 is the thief, which causes our honest upstanding lightningd |
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# code to break, so l1 can fail. |
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# Initially, disconnect before the HTLC can be resolved. |
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l1 = node_factory.get_node(disconnect=['=WIRE_COMMITMENT_SIGNED-nocommit'], |
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may_fail=True, allow_broken_log=True) |
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l2 = node_factory.get_node(disconnect=['=WIRE_COMMITMENT_SIGNED-nocommit'], |
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options={'watchtime-blocks': to_self_delay}) |
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l1.rpc.connect(l2.info['id'], 'localhost', l2.port) |
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l1.fund_channel(l2, 10**7) |
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# Trigger an HTLC being added. |
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t = executor.submit(l1.pay, l2, 1000000 * 1000) |
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# Make sure the channel is still alive. |
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assert len(l1.getactivechannels()) == 2 |
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assert len(l2.getactivechannels()) == 2 |
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# Wait for the disconnection. |
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l1.daemon.wait_for_log('=WIRE_COMMITMENT_SIGNED-nocommit') |
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l2.daemon.wait_for_log('=WIRE_COMMITMENT_SIGNED-nocommit') |
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# Make sure l1 gets the new HTLC. |
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l1.daemon.wait_for_log('got commitsig') |
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# l1 prepares a theft commitment transaction |
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theft_tx = l1.rpc.dev_sign_last_tx(l2.info['id'])['tx'] |
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# Now continue processing until fulfilment. |
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l1.rpc.dev_reenable_commit(l2.info['id']) |
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l2.rpc.dev_reenable_commit(l1.info['id']) |
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# Wait for the fulfilment. |
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l1.daemon.wait_for_log('peer_in WIRE_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC') |
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l1.daemon.wait_for_log('peer_out WIRE_REVOKE_AND_ACK') |
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l2.daemon.wait_for_log('peer_out WIRE_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC') |
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l1.daemon.wait_for_log('peer_in WIRE_REVOKE_AND_ACK') |
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# Now payment should complete. |
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t.result(timeout=10) |
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# l1 goes offline and bribes the miners to censor transactions from l2. |
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l1.rpc.stop() |
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def censoring_sendrawtx(r): |
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return {'id': r['id'], 'result': {}} |
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l2.daemon.rpcproxy.mock_rpc('sendrawtransaction', censoring_sendrawtx) |
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# l1 now performs the theft attack! |
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bitcoind.rpc.sendrawtransaction(theft_tx) |
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bitcoind.generate_block(1) |
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# l2 notices. |
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l2.daemon.wait_for_log(' to ONCHAIN') |
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def get_rbf_tx(self, depth, name, resolve): |
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r = self.daemon.wait_for_log('Broadcasting RBF {} .* to resolve {} depth={}' |
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.format(name, resolve, depth)) |
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return re.search(r'.* \(([0-9a-fA-F]*)\)', r).group(1) |
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rbf_txes = [] |
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# Now the censoring miners generate some blocks. |
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for depth in range(2, 8): |
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bitcoind.generate_block(1) |
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sync_blockheight(bitcoind, [l2]) |
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# l2 should RBF, twice even, one for the l1 main output, |
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# one for the l1 HTLC output. |
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rbf_txes.append(get_rbf_tx(l2, depth, |
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'OUR_PENALTY_TX', |
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'THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL/THEIR_HTLC')) |
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rbf_txes.append(get_rbf_tx(l2, depth, |
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'OUR_PENALTY_TX', |
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'THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL/DELAYED_CHEAT_OUTPUT_TO_THEM')) |
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# Now that the transactions have high fees, independent miners |
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# realize they can earn potentially more money by grabbing the |
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# high-fee censored transactions, and fresh, non-censoring |
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# hashpower arises, evicting the censor. |
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l2.daemon.rpcproxy.mock_rpc('sendrawtransaction', None) |
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# Check that the order in which l2 generated RBF transactions |
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# would be acceptable to Bitcoin. |
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for tx in rbf_txes: |
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# Use the bcli interface as well, so that we also check the |
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# bcli interface. |
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l2.rpc.call('sendrawtransaction', [tx, True]) |
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# Now the non-censoring miners overpower the censoring miners. |
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bitcoind.generate_block(1) |
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sync_blockheight(bitcoind, [l2]) |
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# And l2 should consider it resolved now. |
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l2.daemon.wait_for_log('Resolved THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL/DELAYED_CHEAT_OUTPUT_TO_THEM by our proposal OUR_PENALTY_TX') |
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l2.daemon.wait_for_log('Resolved THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL/THEIR_HTLC by our proposal OUR_PENALTY_TX') |
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# And l2 should consider it in its listfunds. |
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assert(len(l2.rpc.listfunds()['outputs']) >= 1) |
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@unittest.skipIf(not DEVELOPER, "uses dev_sign_last_tx") |
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def test_penalty_rbf_burn(node_factory, bitcoind, executor, chainparams): |
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''' |
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Test that penalty transactions are RBFed and we are willing to burn |
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it all up to spite the thief. |
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''' |
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to_self_delay = 10 |
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# l1 is the thief, which causes our honest upstanding lightningd |
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# code to break, so l1 can fail. |
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# Initially, disconnect before the HTLC can be resolved. |
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l1 = node_factory.get_node(disconnect=['=WIRE_COMMITMENT_SIGNED-nocommit'], |
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may_fail=True, allow_broken_log=True) |
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l2 = node_factory.get_node(disconnect=['=WIRE_COMMITMENT_SIGNED-nocommit'], |
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options={'watchtime-blocks': to_self_delay}) |
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l1.rpc.connect(l2.info['id'], 'localhost', l2.port) |
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l1.fund_channel(l2, 10**7) |
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# Trigger an HTLC being added. |
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t = executor.submit(l1.pay, l2, 1000000 * 1000) |
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# Make sure the channel is still alive. |
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assert len(l1.getactivechannels()) == 2 |
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assert len(l2.getactivechannels()) == 2 |
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# Wait for the disconnection. |
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l1.daemon.wait_for_log('=WIRE_COMMITMENT_SIGNED-nocommit') |
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l2.daemon.wait_for_log('=WIRE_COMMITMENT_SIGNED-nocommit') |
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# Make sure l1 gets the new HTLC. |
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l1.daemon.wait_for_log('got commitsig') |
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# l1 prepares a theft commitment transaction |
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theft_tx = l1.rpc.dev_sign_last_tx(l2.info['id'])['tx'] |
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# Now continue processing until fulfilment. |
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l1.rpc.dev_reenable_commit(l2.info['id']) |
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l2.rpc.dev_reenable_commit(l1.info['id']) |
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# Wait for the fulfilment. |
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l1.daemon.wait_for_log('peer_in WIRE_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC') |
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l1.daemon.wait_for_log('peer_out WIRE_REVOKE_AND_ACK') |
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l2.daemon.wait_for_log('peer_out WIRE_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC') |
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l1.daemon.wait_for_log('peer_in WIRE_REVOKE_AND_ACK') |
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# Now payment should complete. |
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t.result(timeout=10) |
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# l1 goes offline and bribes the miners to censor transactions from l2. |
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l1.rpc.stop() |
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def censoring_sendrawtx(r): |
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return {'id': r['id'], 'result': {}} |
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l2.daemon.rpcproxy.mock_rpc('sendrawtransaction', censoring_sendrawtx) |
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# l1 now performs the theft attack! |
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bitcoind.rpc.sendrawtransaction(theft_tx) |
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bitcoind.generate_block(1) |
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# l2 notices. |
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l2.daemon.wait_for_log(' to ONCHAIN') |
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def get_rbf_tx(self, depth, name, resolve): |
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r = self.daemon.wait_for_log('Broadcasting RBF {} .* to resolve {} depth={}' |
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.format(name, resolve, depth)) |
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return re.search(r'.* \(([0-9a-fA-F]*)\)', r).group(1) |
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rbf_txes = [] |
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# Now the censoring miners generate some blocks. |
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for depth in range(2, 10): |
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bitcoind.generate_block(1) |
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sync_blockheight(bitcoind, [l2]) |
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# l2 should RBF, twice even, one for the l1 main output, |
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# one for the l1 HTLC output. |
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rbf_txes.append(get_rbf_tx(l2, depth, |
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'OUR_PENALTY_TX', |
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'THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL/THEIR_HTLC')) |
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rbf_txes.append(get_rbf_tx(l2, depth, |
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'OUR_PENALTY_TX', |
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'THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL/DELAYED_CHEAT_OUTPUT_TO_THEM')) |
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# Now that the transactions have high fees, independent miners |
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# realize they can earn potentially more money by grabbing the |
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# high-fee censored transactions, and fresh, non-censoring |
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# hashpower arises, evicting the censor. |
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l2.daemon.rpcproxy.mock_rpc('sendrawtransaction', None) |
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# Check that the last two txes can be broadcast. |
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# These should donate the total amount to miners. |
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rbf_txes = rbf_txes[-2:] |
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for tx in rbf_txes: |
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l2.rpc.call('sendrawtransaction', [tx, True]) |
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# Now the non-censoring miners overpower the censoring miners. |
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bitcoind.generate_block(1) |
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sync_blockheight(bitcoind, [l2]) |
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# And l2 should consider it resolved now. |
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l2.daemon.wait_for_log('Resolved THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL/DELAYED_CHEAT_OUTPUT_TO_THEM by our proposal OUR_PENALTY_TX') |
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l2.daemon.wait_for_log('Resolved THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL/THEIR_HTLC by our proposal OUR_PENALTY_TX') |
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# l2 donated it to the miners, so it owns nothing |
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assert(len(l2.rpc.listfunds()['outputs']) == 0) |
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@unittest.skipIf(not DEVELOPER, "needs DEVELOPER=1") |
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def test_onchain_first_commit(node_factory, bitcoind): |
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"""Onchain handling where opener immediately drops to chain""" |
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ZmnSCPxj jxPCSnmZ
4 years ago
Rusty Russell