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I had each side using the other side's hash secret. That's a very dumb idea, since it means you can steal from a unilateral close! A's secret applies to A's commit transaction: it needs the secret and B's final signature to steal funds, and that should never happen (since A doesn't have the B's final signature, and once A has given B the secret, they never broadcast the commit tx). This makes the update a 4 step dance, since you need the new revocation hash to make the other side's TX to sign. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>ppa-0.6.1
18 changed files with 457 additions and 213 deletions
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#include <ccan/crypto/shachain/shachain.h> |
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#include <ccan/short_types/short_types.h> |
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#include <ccan/tal/tal.h> |
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#include <ccan/opt/opt.h> |
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#include <ccan/str/hex/hex.h> |
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#include <ccan/err/err.h> |
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#include <ccan/read_write_all/read_write_all.h> |
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#include "lightning.pb-c.h" |
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#include "anchor.h" |
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#include "base58.h" |
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#include "pkt.h" |
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#include "bitcoin_script.h" |
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#include "permute_tx.h" |
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#include "signature.h" |
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#include "commit_tx.h" |
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#include "pubkey.h" |
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#include "find_p2sh_out.h" |
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#include <openssl/ec.h> |
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#include <unistd.h> |
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int main(int argc, char *argv[]) |
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{ |
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const tal_t *ctx = tal_arr(NULL, char, 0); |
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struct sha256 seed, revocation_hash, preimage; |
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OpenChannel *o1, *o2; |
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UpdateAccept *ua; |
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Update *update; |
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struct bitcoin_tx *anchor, *commit; |
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struct sha256_double anchor_txid; |
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struct pkt *pkt; |
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struct bitcoin_signature sig; |
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EC_KEY *privkey; |
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bool testnet; |
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struct pubkey pubkey1, pubkey2; |
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u8 *redeemscript; |
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int64_t delta; |
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size_t i, p2sh_out; |
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err_set_progname(argv[0]); |
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opt_register_noarg("--help|-h", opt_usage_and_exit, |
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"<seed> <anchor-tx> <open-channel-file1> <open-channel-file2> <commit-privkey> <update-protobuf> <update-accept-protobuf> [previous-updates]...\n" |
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"Create a new update-channel-signature message", |
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"Print this message."); |
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opt_parse(&argc, argv, opt_log_stderr_exit); |
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if (argc < 8) |
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opt_usage_exit_fail("Expected 7+ arguments"); |
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if (!hex_decode(argv[1], strlen(argv[1]), &seed, sizeof(seed))) |
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errx(1, "Invalid seed '%s' - need 256 hex bits", argv[1]); |
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anchor = bitcoin_tx_from_file(ctx, argv[2]); |
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bitcoin_txid(anchor, &anchor_txid); |
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o1 = pkt_from_file(argv[3], PKT__PKT_OPEN)->open; |
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o2 = pkt_from_file(argv[4], PKT__PKT_OPEN)->open; |
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privkey = key_from_base58(argv[5], strlen(argv[5]), &testnet, &pubkey1); |
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if (!privkey) |
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errx(1, "Invalid private key '%s'", argv[5]); |
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if (!testnet) |
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errx(1, "Private key '%s' not on testnet!", argv[5]); |
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update = pkt_from_file(argv[6], PKT__PKT_UPDATE)->update; |
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ua = pkt_from_file(argv[7], PKT__PKT_UPDATE_ACCEPT)->update_accept; |
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sig.stype = SIGHASH_ALL; |
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if (!proto_to_signature(ua->sig, &sig.sig)) |
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errx(1, "Invalid update signature"); |
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/* Figure out cumulative delta since anchor. */ |
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delta = 0; |
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for (i = 8; i < argc; i++) { |
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Update *u = pkt_from_file(argv[i], PKT__PKT_UPDATE)->update; |
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delta += u->delta; |
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} |
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/* Give up revocation preimage for old tx. */ |
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shachain_from_seed(&seed, argc - 7 - 1, &preimage); |
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/* Get pubkeys */ |
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if (!proto_to_pubkey(o1->anchor->pubkey, &pubkey2)) |
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errx(1, "Invalid o1 commit pubkey"); |
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if (pubkey_len(&pubkey1) != pubkey_len(&pubkey2) |
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|| memcmp(pubkey1.key, pubkey2.key, pubkey_len(&pubkey2)) != 0) |
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errx(1, "o1 pubkey != this privkey"); |
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if (!proto_to_pubkey(o2->anchor->pubkey, &pubkey2)) |
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errx(1, "Invalid o2 final pubkey"); |
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/* This is what the anchor pays to; figure out whick output. */ |
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redeemscript = bitcoin_redeem_2of2(ctx, &pubkey1, &pubkey2); |
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p2sh_out = find_p2sh_out(anchor, redeemscript); |
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/* Check our new commit is signed correctly by them. */ |
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proto_to_sha256(update->revocation_hash, &revocation_hash); |
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commit = create_commit_tx(ctx, o1, o2, &revocation_hash, delta, |
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&anchor_txid, p2sh_out); |
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if (!commit) |
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errx(1, "Delta too large"); |
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/* Check their signature signs this input correctly. */ |
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if (!check_tx_sig(commit, 0, redeemscript, tal_count(redeemscript), |
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&pubkey2, &sig)) |
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errx(1, "Invalid signature."); |
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/* Now create THEIR new commitment tx to spend 2/2 output of anchor. */ |
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proto_to_sha256(ua->revocation_hash, &revocation_hash); |
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commit = create_commit_tx(ctx, o2, o1, &revocation_hash, -delta, |
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&anchor_txid, |
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find_p2sh_out(anchor, redeemscript)); |
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/* If contributions don't exceed fees, this fails. */ |
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if (!commit) |
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errx(1, "Delta too large"); |
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/* Their pubkey must be valid */ |
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if (!proto_to_pubkey(o2->anchor->pubkey, &pubkey2)) |
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errx(1, "Invalid public open-channel-file2"); |
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/* Sign it for them. */ |
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sign_tx_input(ctx, commit, 0, redeemscript, tal_count(redeemscript), |
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privkey, &pubkey1, &sig.sig); |
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pkt = update_signature_pkt(ctx, &sig.sig, &preimage); |
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if (!write_all(STDOUT_FILENO, pkt, |
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sizeof(pkt->len) + le32_to_cpu(pkt->len))) |
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err(1, "Writing out packet"); |
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tal_free(ctx); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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