diff --git a/common/Makefile b/common/Makefile
index a830c9c5a..8c2d6e87b 100644
--- a/common/Makefile
+++ b/common/Makefile
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ COMMON_SRC_NOGEN :=				\
 
 ifeq ($(EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES),1)
 COMMON_SRC_NOGEN += common/psbt_internal.c
+COMMON_SRC_NOGEN += common/blindedpath.c
 endif
 
 COMMON_SRC_GEN := common/status_wiregen.c common/peer_status_wiregen.c
diff --git a/common/blindedpath.c b/common/blindedpath.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d6c4c15e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/common/blindedpath.c
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+#include <bitcoin/privkey.h>
+#include <bitcoin/pubkey.h>
+#include <ccan/cast/cast.h>
+#include <common/blindedpath.h>
+#include <common/blinding.h>
+#include <common/bolt11.h>
+#include <common/hmac.h>
+#include <common/node_id.h>
+#include <common/utils.h>
+#include <secp256k1_ecdh.h>
+#include <sodium.h>
+#include <wire/onion_wire.h>
+
+/* FIXME: Pad with dummy nodes, but make sure to check them on recv! */
+struct onionmsg_path **make_blindedpath(const tal_t *ctx,
+					const struct pubkey *route,
+					struct pubkey *initial_blinding,
+					struct pubkey *final_blinding)
+{
+	struct privkey e;
+	struct pubkey *pk_e, *b;
+	struct secret *rho;
+	struct onionmsg_path **path;
+	size_t num = tal_count(route);
+
+	if (!num)
+		abort();
+
+	/* E(i) */
+	pk_e = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct pubkey, num);
+	/* B(i) */
+	b = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct pubkey, num);
+	/* rho(i) */
+	rho = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct secret, num);
+
+	randombytes_buf(&e, sizeof(e));
+	if (!pubkey_from_privkey(&e, &pk_e[0]))
+		abort();
+
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+		struct secret ss;
+		struct secret hmac;
+		struct sha256 h;
+
+		if (secp256k1_ecdh(secp256k1_ctx, ss.data,
+				   &route[i].pubkey, e.secret.data,
+				   NULL, NULL) != 1)
+				abort();
+
+		subkey_from_hmac("blinded_node_id", &ss, &hmac);
+		b[i] = route[i];
+		if (i != 0) {
+			if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(secp256k1_ctx,
+					  &b[i].pubkey, hmac.data) != 1)
+				abort();
+		}
+		subkey_from_hmac("rho", &ss, &rho[i]);
+		blinding_hash_e_and_ss(&pk_e[i], &ss, &h);
+		if (i != num-1)
+			blinding_next_pubkey(&pk_e[i], &h, &pk_e[i+1]);
+		blinding_next_privkey(&e, &h, &e);
+	}
+
+	*initial_blinding = pk_e[0];
+	*final_blinding = pk_e[num-1];
+
+	path = tal_arr(ctx, struct onionmsg_path *, num);
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+		path[i] = tal(path, struct onionmsg_path);
+		path[i]->node_id = b[i];
+	}
+
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < num - 1; i++) {
+		const unsigned char npub[crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_NPUBBYTES] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+		struct tlv_onionmsg_payload *inner;
+		int ret;
+
+		/* Inner is encrypted */
+		inner = tlv_onionmsg_payload_new(tmpctx);
+		/* FIXME: We could support scids, too */
+		inner->next_node_id = cast_const(struct pubkey *, &route[i+1]);
+
+		path[i]->enctlv = tal_arr(path, u8, 0);
+		towire_encmsg_tlvs(&path[i]->enctlv, inner);
+		towire_pad(&path[i]->enctlv,
+			   crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_ABYTES);
+
+		ret = crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_encrypt(path[i]->enctlv, NULL,
+								path[i]->enctlv,
+								tal_bytelen(path[i]->enctlv) - crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_ABYTES,
+								NULL, 0,
+								NULL, npub,
+								rho[i].data);
+		assert(ret == 0);
+	}
+
+	/* Final one has no enctlv */
+	path[num-1]->enctlv = NULL;
+
+	return path;
+}
diff --git a/common/blindedpath.h b/common/blindedpath.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ae198132c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/common/blindedpath.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#ifndef LIGHTNING_COMMON_BLINDEDPATH_H
+#define LIGHTNING_COMMON_BLINDEDPATH_H
+#include "config.h"
+#include <ccan/tal/tal.h>
+
+#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
+struct route_info;
+struct pubkey;
+
+/* Fills in *initial_blinding and *final_blinding and returns
+ * onionmsg_path array for this route */
+struct onionmsg_path **make_blindedpath(const tal_t *ctx,
+					const struct pubkey *route,
+					struct pubkey *initial_blinding,
+					struct pubkey *final_blinding);
+#endif /* EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES */
+#endif /* LIGHTNING_COMMON_BLINDEDPATH_H */