This is the final step: we pass the complete fee_states to and from
channeld.
Changelog-Fixed: "Bad commitment signature" closing channels when we sent back-to-back update_fee messages across multiple reconnects.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Bastien TEINTURIER <bastien@acinq.fr> writes:
> One thing I noticed but didn't investigate much: after sending the two
> payments, I tried using `waitsendpay` and it reported an error *208*
> (*"Never attempted payment for
> '98ee736d29d860948e436546a88b0cc84f267de8818531b0fdbe6ce3d080f22a'"*).
>
> I was expecting the result to be something like: "payment succeeded for
> that payment hash" (the HTLCs were correctly settled).
Indeed, if you waitsendpay without specifying a partid, you are waiting
for 0, which may not exist. Clarify the error msg.
Reported-by: @t-bast
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Bastien TEINTURIER <bastien@acinq.fr> writes:
> It looks like the split on c-lightning side is quite limited at the moment:
> the only option is to split a payment in exactly its two halves,
> otherwise I get rejected because of the rule of overpaying more than
> twice the amount?
We only tested exactly two equal-size payments; indeed, our finalhop
test was backwards. We only complain if the final hop pays more than
twice msat (technically, this test is still too loose for mpp: the
spec says we should sum to the exact amount).
Reported-by: @t-bast
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The invoice_try_pay code now takes a set, rather than a single htlc, but
it's basically the same thing.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
AFAICT this only "worked" previously because replay htlc simply failed
them all (no peers are currently connected). With upcoming changes
(foreshadowed by the comment) this is no longer true:
Attempting to prepare a db_stmt outside of a transaction: wallet/invoices.c:373
lightningd: FATAL SIGNAL 6 (version v0.7.3-188-g45b0af4-modded)
0x55b475590a73 send_backtrace
common/daemon.c:41
0x55b475590b1d crashdump
common/daemon.c:54
0x7f16c557b46f ???
???:0
0x7f16c557b3eb ???
???:0
0x7f16c555a898 ???
???:0
0x55b475564c8f fatal
lightningd/log.c:814
0x55b4755c3ed5 db_prepare_v2_
wallet/db.c:605
0x55b4755c76b5 invoices_find_unpaid
wallet/invoices.c:373
0x55b4755ce91c wallet_invoice_find_unpaid
wallet/wallet.c:1990
0x55b47555861f invoice_check_payment
lightningd/invoice.c:257
0x55b475557a7c htlc_add_set
lightningd/htlc_set.c:112
0x55b47557b294 handle_localpay
lightningd/peer_htlcs.c:332
0x55b47557c63c htlc_accepted_hook_callback
lightningd/peer_htlcs.c:857
0x55b475585573 plugin_hook_call_
lightningd/plugin_hook.c:118
0x55b47557c747 plugin_hook_call_htlc_accepted
lightningd/peer_htlcs.c:882
0x55b47557ca3e peer_accepted_htlc
lightningd/peer_htlcs.c:991
0x55b47557ffb9 htlcs_resubmit
lightningd/peer_htlcs.c:2131
0x55b4755620f7 main
lightningd/lightningd.c:801
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This isn't plumbed in yet, but the idea is that every htlc gets put
into a "set" and then we process them once the set is satisfied. For
the !EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES, the set is simply always size 1.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We now return the same error for various "does not match this
invoice", so it makes sense to encapsulate these checks. We'll also
want to expose this for multi-part payments.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Explicit #if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES check in case we enable them at different
times, but it requires a payment_secret since we put them in the same field.
This incidently stops it working on legacy nodes.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
msatoshi was used to indicate the amount the invoice asked for, but
for parallel sendpay it's required, as it allows our sanity check of
limiting the total payments in flight, ie. it becomes
'total_msat'.
There's a special case for sendonion, which always tells us the value is 0.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We currently refuse a payment if one is already in flight. For parallel
payments, it's a bit more subtle: we want to refuse if it we already have
the total-amount-of-invoice in flight.
So we get all the current payments, and sum the pending ones.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
In particular, we're about to do surgery on the detection-of-previous-payments
logic, and we should not do this in two places.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is a transient field, so rework things so we don't leave it in
struct htlc_out. Instead, load htlc_in first and connect htlc_out to
them as we go.
This also changes one place where we use it instead of the am_origin
flag.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is in preparation for partial payments. For existing payments,
partid is 0 (to match the corresponding payment).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is in preparation for partial payments. For existing payments,
partid is 0 (arbitrarity) and total_msat is msatoshi.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Because my node runs under valgrind, it can take quite a while to
sync; nodes tend to disconnect and reconnect if you block too long.
This is particularly problematic since we often update fees: when the
other side sends its commitment_signed we block.
In particular, this triggers the corner case we have where we
update_fee twice, disconnecting each time, and our state machine gets
confused (which is why we never saw this exact corner case before this
change in 0.7.3!).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Now "raw_payload" is always the complete string (including realm or length
bytes at the front).
This has several effects:
1. We can receive an decrypt an onion which is grossly malformed.
2. We can still hand this to the htlc_accepted hook.
3. We then fail it unless the htlc_accepted accepts it manually.
4. The createonion API now takes the raw payload, and does not know
anything about "style".
The only caveat is that the sphinx code needs to know the payload
length: we have a call for that, which simply tells it to copy the
entire onion (and treat us as the final node) if it's invalid.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
In particular:
1. It must redirect to an existing command.
2. It must contain method, params and id.
And update the docs to show the id, which is vital.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We want to have a static Tor service created from a blob bound to
our node on cmdline
Changelog-added: persistent Tor address support
Changelog-added: allow the Tor inbound service port differ from 9735
Signed-off-by: Saibato <saibato.naga@pm.me>
Add base64 encode/decode to common
We need this to encode the blob for the tor service
Signed-off-by: Saibato <saibato.naga@pm.me>
cppcheck found this:
[lightningd/options.c:1137] -> [lightningd/options.c:1120] -> [lightningd/options.c:1193]: (error) Using pointer to local variable 'buf' that is out of scope.
Indeed, answer can point into buf, which is no longer in scope at the end.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If we initiated the payment using an externally generated onion we don't know
what the final hop gets, or even who it is, so we don't display the amount in
these cases. I chose to show `null` instead in order not to break dependees
that rely on the value being there.
If we can't decode the onion, because the onion got corrupted or we used
`sendonion` without specifying the `shared_secrets` used, the best we can do
is tell the caller instead.
This means that c-lightning can now internally decrypt an eventual error
message, and not force the caller to implement the decryption. The main
difficulty was that we now have a new state (channels and nodes not specified,
while shared_secrets are specified) which needed to be handled.
When using `sendonion` with `shared_secrets` we may be able to decode the
onioned error message but we cannot infer which node reported the failure
since we don't know which nodes where involved.
We are breaking with a couple of assumptions, namely that we have the
`path_secrets` to decode the error onion. If this happens we just want it to
error out.
These are useful for the `createonion` JSON-RPC we're going to build next. The
secret is used for the optional `session_key` while the hex-encoded binary is
used for the `assocdata` field to which the onion commits. The latter does not
have a constant size, hence the raw binary conversion.
We were using sleeps to hope we catch the password prompt. This makes the test
flaky. So I added a help text followed by a `fflush` to make sure we catcht he
right moment, instead of guessing. The `fflush` is also useful for debugging
if a user ever pipes the output to a file it'd get buffered and the user would
wait forever. The same applies for automated systems such as `expect` or
`pexpect` based scripts that enter the password on prompt.
This will change the command `listconfigs` output in several ways:
- Deprecated the duplicated "plugin" JSON output by replacing it with
- a "plugins" array with substructures for each plugin with:
- path, name and their options
Changelog-Changed: JSON-RPC: `listconfigs` now structures plugins and include their options
Changelog-Deprecated: JSON-RPC: `listconfigs` duplicated "plugin" paths
We don't set the secret to compulsory (yet!) but put code in for the
future. Meanwhile, if there is a secret, check it is correct.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Rusty Russell
Christian Decker
Saibato
fiatjaf
darosior
Michael Schmoock