DEBUG:root:lightningd(16333): 2018-02-08T02:12:21.158Z lightningd(8262): lightning_openingd(0382ce59ebf18be7d84677c2e35f23294b9992ceca95491fcf8a56c6cb2d9de199): Failed hdr decrypt with rn=2
We only hand off the peer if we've not started writing, but that was
insufficient: we increment the sn twice on encrypting packet, so there's
a window before we've actually started writing where this is now
wrong.
The simplest fix is only to hand off from master when we've just written,
and have the read-packet path simply wake the write-packet path.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
For message read, we do it as header then body, so we can have
io_plan_in_started(conn) false, but we're between header and body.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
In particular, the main daemon needs to pass it about (marshal/unmarshal)
but it won't need to actually use it after the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We alternated between using a sha256 and using a privkey, but there are
numerous places where we have a random 32 bytes which are neither.
This fixes many of them (plus, struct privkey is now defined in terms of
struct secret).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Raw crypto_state is what we send across the wire: the peer one is for
use in async crypto io routines (peer_read_message/peer_write_message).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
wire_sync_write() adds length, but we already have it, so use write_all.
sync_crypto_read() handed an on-stack buffer to cryptomsg_decrypt_header,
which expected a tal() pointer, so use the known length instead.
sync_crypto_read() also failed to read the tag; add that in (no
overflow possible as 16 is an int, len is a u16).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It's awkward to handle them differently. But this change means we
need to expose them to the generated code.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Rusty Russell
Christian Decker