getchaintips returns tips even if we don't have the body for them, so
we need to look for the active tip, not just the first (most-work) one.
Here's what happens in the log:
+2849.963414597 lightningd(26779):BROKEN: bitcoin-cli getblock 0000000000000000018626ff7160bdf38a602e6650bd04ec258759ea578b106d false exited 91: 'error code: -32603
error message:
Can't read block from disk
'
And here's an example problematic getchaintips output:
[
{
"height": 419635,
"hash": "0000000000000000000fd32d87fce19efb7ccd07aa4ddaf1b94b9a219deec0f9",
"branchlen": 1,
"status": "headers-only"
},
{
"height": 419634,
"hash": "000000000000000002988d6512719697147cf252b2f64d247cf229266615d2bb",
"branchlen": 0,
"status": "active"
},
{
"height": 416372,
"hash": "0000000000000000004d0a54341c992ae174a91c8dd3981a9f2b3d3f6221ba59",
"branchlen": 1,
"status": "valid-headers"
},
{
"height": 416231,
"hash": "0000000000000000044d0d2c25f33cb48931540366149cde3fb0154f55b58c76",
"branchlen": 1,
"status": "headers-only"
}
]
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
From doing a code walkthrough with Christian Decker; unnecessary const in
bitcoin/tx.c, an erroneous FIXME, a missing comment, and an unused struct.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is generally redundant, since HTLC pointer is in that side's
commit_info, but makes HTLC completely self-contained.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Rather than using the non-portable internal secp256k1 format, the updated
libsecp256k1 has a "compact" form.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Update libsecp256k1 has a normalize function, which allows us to test
if the signature was in low-S form.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Add Makefile target update-secp256k1, and run it.
The only API change is that len is now an IN-OUT parameter to serialization
functions.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If upgrade changes configure flags, 'make distclean' can fail as it
tries to reconfigure. Deleting secp256k1/libsecp256k1.la forces a
full autogen/configure/make cycle.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We use libsecp256k1 to convert signatures to DER; we were creating a
temporary one, but we really should be handing the one we have in dstate
through. This does that, everywhere.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
BOLT has been updated, so update code and comments. The receiving
side check is sufficient, as the limit is per-offerer, and that's the
only way the HTLCs get back to the offerer's side.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Thus a node MUST estimate the deadline for successful redemption for
each HTLC it offers. A node MUST NOT offer a HTLC after this
deadline, and MUST fail the connection if an HTLC which it offered is
in either node's current commitment transaction past this deadline.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The most complex thing we've logged yet, so we extract the core of the
log_struct_ function to call it multiple times.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
There's a corner case where they had it in their commit tx, in which
case we can't fail the HTLC until our commit tx has won. Again, we
use dstate->config.min_htlc_expiry.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We now need to use bitcoin_witness_htlc with the r value, so that API
is updated to take 'struct rval' or 'struct sha256'.
We use the nc->delay amount (ie. dstate->config.min_htlc_expiry) to
wait for a timeout refund to be buried before "failing" upstream.
This should probably be made into a clearer parameter rather than
overloading this one.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Header from folded patch 'dont-use-peer-nc-in-onchain-code.patch':
peer: Don't use peer->nc->delay for onchain case.
Use the config var directly. We should be freeing peer->nc when the
connection dies anyway.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is the command an actual user would use: it figures out the fee
and route, and pays it if it can.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If a block triggers two peers to close, we ran io_break() on both of them; the
second overrode the first and we didn't end up freeing that one.
Rather than chase such bugs in future, simply iterate to see if any
peers need freeing.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Note that the base fee is in millisatoshi, the proportional fee is
in microsatoshi per satoshi. ie. 1,000,000 means charge 1 satoshi for
every satoshi carried.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Most HTLCs we offer are triggered by an incoming HTLC from a different
peer. Save this "source" htlc, so we can fail/fulfill it when we
fail/fulfill this one.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>