Instead of freeing proposals, which we did in *some* places, we just
set ->resolved and check that in billboard_update which didn't get it right.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is important for things we automatically watched because it spends a
watch txo, but only onchaind knows the details about what the TX really is and
how it should be handled.
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
Pubkeys are not not actually DER encoding, but Pieter Wuille corrected
me: it's SEC 1 documented encoding.
Results from 5 runs, min-max(mean +/- stddev):
store_load_msec,vsz_kb,store_rewrite_sec,listnodes_sec,listchannels_sec,routing_sec,peer_write_all_sec
38922-39297(39180.6+/-1.3e+02),2880728,41.040000-41.160000(41.106+/-0.05),2.270000-2.530000(2.338+/-0.097),44.570000-53.980000(49.696+/-3),32.840000-33.080000(32.95+/-0.095),43.060000-44.950000(43.696+/-0.72)
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Weaning `onchaind` off its use of the internal bitcoin_tx input and output
fields, since we're going to remove them soon, I promise.
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
The `wally_tx_input`s do not keep track of their input value, which means we
need to track them ourselves if we try to sign these transactions at a later
point in time.
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
onchaind is in the correct position to tell us about them, so have it pass
them up as well.
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
As a side-effect of using amount_msat in gossipd/routing.c, we explicitly
handle overflows and don't need to pre-prune ridiculous-fee channels.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
They're generally used pass-by-copy (unusual for C structs, but
convenient they're basically u64) and all possibly problematic
operations return WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool to make you handle the
over/underflow cases.
The new #include in json.h means we bolt11.c sees the amount.h definition
of MSAT_PER_BTC, so delete its local version.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Christian and I both unwittingly used it in form:
*tal_arr_expand(&x) = tal(x, ...)
Since '=' isn't a sequence point, the compiler can (and does!) cache
the value of x, handing it to tal *after* tal_arr_expand() moves it
due to tal_resize().
The new version is somewhat less convenient to use, but doesn't have
this problem, since the assignment is always evaluated after the
resize.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is mainly just copying over the copy-editing from the
lightning-rfc repository.
[ Split to just perform changes after the UNKNOWN_PAYMENT_HASH change --RR ]
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Rusty Russell <@rustyrussell>
This is mainly just copying over the copy-editing from the
lightning-rfc repository.
[ Split to just perform changes prior to the UNKNOWN_PAYMENT_HASH change --RR ]
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Rusty Russell <@rustyrussell>
This is prep work for when we sign htlc txs with
SIGHASH_SINGLE|SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY.
We still deal with raw signatures for the htlc txs at the moment, since
we send them like that across the wire, and changing that was simply too
painful (for the moment?).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
For onchaind we need to remove globals from memleak consideration;
we also change the htlc pointer to an htlc copy, which simplifies
things as well.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
When we have multiple HTLCs with the same preimage and the same CLTV,
it doesn't matter what order we treat them (they're literally
identical). But when we offer HTLCs with the same preimage but
different CLTVs, the commitment tx outputs look identical, but the
HTLC txs are different: if we simply take the first HTLC which matches
(and that's not the right one), the HTLC signature we got from them
won't match. As we rely on the signature matching to detect the fee
paid, we get:
onchaind: STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR: grind_fee failed
So we alter match_htlc_output() to return an array of all matching
HTLC indices, which can have more than one entry for offered HTLCs.
If it's our commitment, we loop through until one of the HTLC
signatures matches. If it's their commitment, we choose the HTLC with
the largest CLTV: we're going to ignore it once that hits anyway, so
this is the most conservative approach. If it's a penalty, it doesn't
matter since we steal all HTLC outputs the same independent of CLTV.
For accepted HTLCs, the CLTV value is encoded in the witness script,
so this confusion isn't possible. We nonetheless assert that the
CLTVs all match in that case.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If there are two HTLCs with the same preimage, lightningd would always
find the first one. By including the id in the `struct htlc_stub`
it's both faster (normal HTLC lookup) and allows lightningd to detect
that onchaind wants to fail both of them.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We do this a lot, and had boutique helpers in various places. So add
a more generic one; for convenience it returns a pointer to the new
end element.
I prefer the name tal_arr_expand to tal_arr_append, since it's up to
the caller to populate the new array entry.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
That matches the other CSV names (HSM was the first, so it was written
before the pattern emerged).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
@renepickhardt: why is it actually lightningd.c with a d but hsm.c without d ?
And delete unused gossipd/gossip.h.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is a wrapper around shachain_get_hash, which converts the
commit_num to an index and returns a 'struct secret' rather than a
'struct sha256' (which is really an internal detail).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
tal_count() is used where there's a type, even if it's char or u8, and
tal_bytelen() is going to replace tal_len() for clarity: it's only needed
where a pointer is void.
We shim tal_bytelen() for now.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This means onchaind doesn't need the per-channel secret at all (aka. peer seed)
so we remove that from the onchaind_init message.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The HSM will to need it to create signatures: we currently use it to create
privkeys then don't hand it around.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
structeq() is too dangerous: if a structure has padding, it can fail
silently.
The new ccan/structeq instead provides a macro to define foo_eq(),
which does the right thing in case of padding (which none of our
structures currently have anyway).
Upgrade ccan, and use it everywhere. Except run-peer-wire.c, which
is only testing code and can use raw memcmp(): valgrind will tell us
if padding exists.
Interestingly, we still declared short_channel_id_eq, even though
we didn't define it any more!
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
lisa neigut
Rusty Russell
Christian Decker
William Casarin