tal_count() is used where there's a type, even if it's char or u8, and
tal_bytelen() is going to replace tal_len() for clarity: it's only needed
where a pointer is void.
We shim tal_bytelen() for now.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This seems like a premature optimization: it tried to cut down the number of
allocations by reusing the same `struct invoice_details` while iterating through
a number of results. But this sidesteps the checks by `valgrind` and we'd miss a
missing field that was set by the previous iteration.
Reported-by: @rustyrussell
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <@cdecker>
`wallet_stmt2payment` always expects the same fields in the same order, so we
should make sure that we always fetch them in that order and all of them.
Well, it's generated by shachain, so technically it is a sha256, but
that's an internal detail. It's a secret.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
structeq() is too dangerous: if a structure has padding, it can fail
silently.
The new ccan/structeq instead provides a macro to define foo_eq(),
which does the right thing in case of padding (which none of our
structures currently have anyway).
Upgrade ccan, and use it everywhere. Except run-peer-wire.c, which
is only testing code and can use raw memcmp(): valgrind will tell us
if padding exists.
Interestingly, we still declared short_channel_id_eq, even though
we didn't define it any more!
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Tor wasn't actually working for me to connect to anything, but it worked
for 'ssh -D' testing.
Note that the resulting 'netaddr' is a bit weird, but I guess it's honest.
$ ./cli/lightning-cli connect 021f2cbffc4045ca2d70678ecf8ed75e488290874c9da38074f6d378248337062b
{
"id": "021f2cbffc4045ca2d70678ecf8ed75e488290874c9da38074f6d378248337062b"
}
$ ./cli/lightning-cli listpeers
{
"peers": [
{
"state": "GOSSIPING",
"id": "021f2cbffc4045ca2d70678ecf8ed75e488290874c9da38074f6d378248337062b",
"netaddr": [
"ln1qg0je0lugpzu5ttsv78vlrkhteyg9yy8fjw68qr57mfhsfyrxurzkq522ah.lseed.bitcoinstats.com:9735"
],
"connected": true,
"owner": "lightning_gossipd"
}
]
}
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Risks leakage. We could do lookup via the proxy, but that's a TODO.
There's only one occurance of getaddrinfo (and no gethostbyname), so
we add a flag to the callers.
Note: the use of --always-use-proxy suppresses *all* DNS lookups, even
those from connect commands and the command line.
FIXME: An implicit setting of use_proxy_always is done in gossipd if it
determines that we are announcing nothing but Tor addresses, but that
does *not* suppress 'connect'.
This is fixed in a later patch.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
1. Add special option where an empty host means 'wildcard for IPv4 and/or IPv6'
which means ':1234' can be used to set only the portnum.
2. Only add this protocol wildcard if --autolisten=1 (default)
and no other addresses specified.
3. Pass it down to gossipd, so it can handle errors correctly: in most cases,
it's fatal not to be able to bind to a port, but for this case, it's OK
if we can only bind to one of IPv4/v6 (fatal iff neither).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This replacement is a little menial, but it explicitly catches all
the places where we allow a local socket. The actual implementation of
opening a AF_UNIX socket is almost hidden in the patch.
The detection of "valid address" is now more complex:
p->addr.itype != ADDR_INTERNAL_WIREADDR || p->addr.u.wireaddr.type != ADDR_TYPE_PADDING
But most places we do this, we should audit: I'm pretty sure we can't
get an invalid address any more from gossipd (they may be in db, but
we should fix that too).
Closes: #1323
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
I would have liked to make it a tal object, then we'd catch most
things with our memleak detection. However, sqlite3 doesn't seem to
allow allocator overrides.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is the cause of 'sqlite3_close: unable to close due to unfinalized statements or unfinished backups' with the --daemon option.
Fixes: #1420
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Currently we intuit it from the fd being closed, but that may happen out
of order with when the master thinks it's dead.
So now if the gossip fd closes we just ignore it, and we'll get a
notification from the master when the peer is disconnected.
The notification is slightly ugly in that we have to disable it for
a channel when we manually hand the channel back to gossipd.
Note: as stands, this is racy with reconnects. See the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Simplification of the offset calculation to use the rescan parameter, and rename
of `wallet_first_blocknum`. We now use either relative rescan from our last
known location, or absolute if a negative rescan was given. It's all handled in
a single location (except the case in which the blockcount is below our
precomputed offset), so this should reduce surprises.
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
This is a big simplification, we just report the DBs current blockchain height
as the point to continue scanning, or the passed in default. No more guessing
where to continue from or whether the wallet was used and when it first saw the
light of day.
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
The only use for these was to compute their txids so we could notify depth
in case of reorgs.
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
Repeated crashes could result in the `last_processed_block` variable being
pushed further and further into the past (in some cases going as far back as
scanning blocks from 2012...). This is a stop-gap solution that just lower
bounds the value to what is the first possible block we might be interested in
LN, until we have the 0-rescan fix I'm working on.
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
There are two very hard problems in software engineering:
1. Off-by-one errors
In this case we were rolling back further than needed and we were starting the
catchup one block further than expected.
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
So we know how much counterparty could theoretically steal from us
(msatoshi_to_us - msatoshi_to_us_min) and how much we could
theoretically steal from counterparty (msatoshi_to_us_max -
msatoshi_to_us).
For more piloting goodness.
Rusty Russell
practicalswift
Christian Decker
William Casarin
Jan Sarenik
ZmnSCPxj