We need to do it in various places, but we shouldn't do it lightly:
the primitives are there to help us get overflow handling correct.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Basically we tell it that every field ending in '_msat' is a struct
amount_msat, and 'satoshis' is an amount_sat. The exceptions are
channel_update's fee_base_msat which is a u32, and
final_incorrect_htlc_amount's incoming_htlc_amt which is also a
'struct amount_msat'.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
As a side-effect of using amount_msat in gossipd/routing.c, we explicitly
handle overflows and don't need to pre-prune ridiculous-fee channels.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We used to just throw htlcs into the channel with a flag to tell it to
ignore overflow. Instead, we can insert them in order (which is the same as
id order) which always must be valid.
This helps when we turn the balance into a struct amount_msat which will get
upset with overflows.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
They're generally used pass-by-copy (unusual for C structs, but
convenient they're basically u64) and all possibly problematic
operations return WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool to make you handle the
over/underflow cases.
The new #include in json.h means we bolt11.c sees the amount.h definition
of MSAT_PER_BTC, so delete its local version.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LND seems to do this occasionally, though fixed in new versions. Workaround
in the meantime.
I tested this by hacking our code to send it prematurely, and this worked.
Fixes: #2219
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This solves (or at least reduces probability of) a deadlock in channeld
when there is lot of gossip traffic, see issue #2286. That issue is
almost identical to #1943 (deadlock in openingd) and so is the fix.
Spurious errors were occuring around checking the provided
current commitment point from the peer on reconnect when
option_data_loss_protect is enabled. The problem was that
we were using an inaccurate measure to screen for which
commitment point to compare the peer's provided one to.
This fixes the problem with screening, plus makes our
data_loss test a teensy bit more robust.
Christian and I both unwittingly used it in form:
*tal_arr_expand(&x) = tal(x, ...)
Since '=' isn't a sequence point, the compiler can (and does!) cache
the value of x, handing it to tal *after* tal_arr_expand() moves it
due to tal_resize().
The new version is somewhat less convenient to use, but doesn't have
this problem, since the assignment is always evaluated after the
resize.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is based on Christian's change, but removes all trace of the old codes.
I've proposed another spec change which removes this code altogether:
https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/pull/544
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Rusty Russell <@rustyrussell>
This is mainly just copying over the copy-editing from the
lightning-rfc repository.
[ Split to just perform changes prior to the UNKNOWN_PAYMENT_HASH change --RR ]
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Rusty Russell <@rustyrussell>
Fortunately, we can calculate the sha256 ourselves, so the
outgoing channeld doesn't need to tell us.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
When the next node tells us the onion is malformed, we now actually
report the failcode to lightningd (rather than generating an invalid
error as we do now).
We could generate the onion at this point, but except we don't know
the shared secret; we'd have to plumb that through from the incoming
channeld's HTLC.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This covers all the cases where an onion can be malformed; this means
we know in advance that it's bad. That allows us to distinguish two
cases: where lightningd rejects the onion as bad, and where the next
peer rejects the next onion as bad. Both of those (will) set failcode
to one of the BADONION values.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It's more natural than using a zero-secret when something goes wrong.
Also note that the HSM will actually kill the connection if the ECDH
fails, which is fortunately statistically unlikely.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Funder can't spend the fee it needs to pay for the commitment transaction:
we were not converting to millisatoshis, however!
This breaks our routeboost test, which no longer has sufficient funds
to make payment.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We have an incompatibility with lnd it seems: I've lost channels on
reconnect with 'sync error'. Since I never got this code to be reliable,
disable it for next release since I suspect it's our fault :(
And reenable the check which didn't work, for others to untangle.
I couldn't get option_data_loss_protect to be reliable, and I disabled
the check. This was a mistake, I should have either spent even more
time trying to get to the bottom of this (especially, writing test
vectors for the spec and testing against other implementations).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is prep work for when we sign htlc txs with
SIGHASH_SINGLE|SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY.
We still deal with raw signatures for the htlc txs at the moment, since
we send them like that across the wire, and changing that was simply too
painful (for the moment?).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We only use them for re-transmitting the last commitment tx,
and the HSM signs them sync so it's straight-line code.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This simplifies lifetime assumptions. Currently all callers keep the
original around, but everything broke when I changed that in the next
patch.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
They were not universally used, and most are trivial accessors anyway.
The exception is getting the channel reserve: we have to multiply by 1000
as well as flip direction, so keep that one.
The BOLT quotes move to `struct channel_config`.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We probably also want to call secp_randomise/wally_secp_randomize here
too, and since these calls all call setup_tmpctx, it probably makes
sense to have a helper function to do all that. Until thats done, I
modified the tests so grepping will show the places where the sequence
of calls is repeated.
Signed-off-by: Jon Griffiths <jon_p_griffiths@yahoo.com>
This avoids some very ugly switch() statements which mixed the two,
but we also take the chance to rename 'towire_gossip_' to
'towire_gossipd_' for those inter-daemon messages; they're messages to
gossipd, not gossip messages.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This way there's no need for a context pointer, and freeing a msg_queue
frees its contents, as expected.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This was suggested by Pierre-Marie as the solution to the 'same HTLC,
different CLTV' signature mismatch.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Have c-lightning nodes send out the largest value for
`htlc_maximum_msat` that makes sense, ie the lesser of
the peer's max_inflight_htlc value or the total channel
capacity minus the total channel reserve.
LND does this, and we get upset with it. I had assumed we would only
do this after funding_locked (since we don't consider the channel
shortid stable until that point), but TBH 6 confirms is probably
enough.
Fixes: #1985
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Rusty Russell
Simon Vrouwe
lisa neigut
Christian Decker
Jon Griffiths
practicalswift