I tried to just do gossipd, but it was uncontainable, so this ended up being
a complete sweep.
We didn't get much space saving in gossipd, even though we should save
24 bytes per node.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We set the version BIP32_VER_TEST_PRIVATE for testnet/regtest
BIP32 privkey generation with libwally-core, and set
BIP32_VER_MAIN_PRIVATE for mainnet.
For litecoin, we also set it like bitcoin else.
As a side-effect of using amount_msat in gossipd/routing.c, we explicitly
handle overflows and don't need to pre-prune ridiculous-fee channels.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is prep work for when we sign htlc txs with
SIGHASH_SINGLE|SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY.
We still deal with raw signatures for the htlc txs at the moment, since
we send them like that across the wire, and changing that was simply too
painful (for the moment?).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
That matches the other CSV names (HSM was the first, so it was written
before the pattern emerged).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The current code sends hsmstatus_client_bad_request via the req fd;
this won't work, since lightningd uses that synchronously and only
expects a reply to its commands. So send it via status_conn.
We also enhance hsmstatus_client_bad_request to include details, and
create convenience functions for it. Our previous handling was ad-hoc;
we sometimes just closed on the client without telling lightningd,
and sometimes we didn't tell lightningd *which* client was broken.
Also make every handler the exact same prototype, so they now use the
exact same patterns (hsmd *only* handles requests, makes replies).
I tested this manually by corrupting a request to hsmd.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Currently it works for any secret (we don't know the current secret),
but importantly it doesn't leak timing information when checking.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This will be used by onchaind for now, but also for openingd and channeld
in future, so it returns the old revocation secret as well.
Of course, the HSM should refuse to sign a commitment transaction if it
has handed out the revocation secret previously!
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We need this later, to generate its seed. When we switch to lnd's key system,
we'll only need this, and not peerid.
Note also that the peerid is not just for messages any more, too.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Originally we were supposed to tell the HSM we had just created the directory,
otherwise it wouldn't create a new seed. But we modified it to check if
there was a seed file anyway: just move that logic into a branch of hsmd.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
So far we have been generating the tx both in the HSM and in the
caller, and had to rely on them generating exactly the same
transaction. This makes it a lot simpler by fully signing and
serializing the TX on the HSM side and the caller just needs to unpack
and broadcast it.
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
Change all calls to use the correct serialization and deserialization
functions, include the correct headers and remove the control
messages.
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
The format we use to generate marshal/unmarshal code is from
the spec's tools/extract-formats.py which includes the offset:
we don't use it at all, so rather than having manually-calculated
(and thus probably wrong) values, or 0, emit it altogther.
Reported-by: Christian Decker
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We alternated between using a sha256 and using a privkey, but there are
numerous places where we have a random 32 bytes which are neither.
This fixes many of them (plus, struct privkey is now defined in terms of
struct secret).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Rusty Russell
trueptolemy
Christian Decker
ZmnSCPxj