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2758 lines
82 KiB
2758 lines
82 KiB
/* Main channel operation daemon: runs from funding_locked to shutdown_complete.
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*
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* We're fairly synchronous: our main loop looks for gossip, master or
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* peer requests and services them synchronously.
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*
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* The exceptions are:
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* 1. When we've asked the master something: in that case, we queue
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* non-response packets for later processing while we await the reply.
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* 2. We queue and send non-blocking responses to peers: if both peers were
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* reading and writing synchronously we could deadlock if we hit buffer
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* limits, unlikely as that is.
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*/
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#include <bitcoin/privkey.h>
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#include <bitcoin/script.h>
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#include <ccan/cast/cast.h>
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#include <ccan/container_of/container_of.h>
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#include <ccan/crypto/hkdf_sha256/hkdf_sha256.h>
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#include <ccan/crypto/shachain/shachain.h>
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#include <ccan/err/err.h>
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#include <ccan/fdpass/fdpass.h>
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#include <ccan/mem/mem.h>
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#include <ccan/structeq/structeq.h>
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#include <ccan/take/take.h>
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#include <ccan/tal/str/str.h>
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#include <ccan/time/time.h>
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#include <channeld/commit_tx.h>
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#include <channeld/full_channel.h>
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#include <channeld/gen_channel_wire.h>
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#include <common/crypto_sync.h>
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#include <common/derive_basepoints.h>
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#include <common/dev_disconnect.h>
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#include <common/htlc_tx.h>
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#include <common/io_debug.h>
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#include <common/key_derive.h>
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#include <common/msg_queue.h>
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#include <common/peer_billboard.h>
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#include <common/peer_failed.h>
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#include <common/ping.h>
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#include <common/read_peer_msg.h>
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#include <common/sphinx.h>
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#include <common/status.h>
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#include <common/subdaemon.h>
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#include <common/timeout.h>
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#include <common/type_to_string.h>
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#include <common/version.h>
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#include <common/wire_error.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <gossipd/gen_gossip_wire.h>
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#include <gossipd/routing.h>
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#include <hsmd/gen_hsm_client_wire.h>
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#include <inttypes.h>
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#include <secp256k1.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <wire/gen_onion_wire.h>
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#include <wire/peer_wire.h>
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#include <wire/wire.h>
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#include <wire/wire_io.h>
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#include <wire/wire_sync.h>
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/* stdin == requests, 3 == peer, 4 = gossip, 5 = HSM */
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#define MASTER_FD STDIN_FILENO
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#define PEER_FD 3
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#define GOSSIP_FD 4
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#define HSM_FD 5
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struct commit_sigs {
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struct peer *peer;
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature commit_sig;
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *htlc_sigs;
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};
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struct peer {
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struct crypto_state cs;
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struct channel_config conf[NUM_SIDES];
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bool funding_locked[NUM_SIDES];
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u64 next_index[NUM_SIDES];
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/* Tolerable amounts for feerate (only relevant for fundee). */
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u32 feerate_min, feerate_max;
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/* Remote's current per-commit point. */
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struct pubkey remote_per_commit;
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/* Remotes's last per-commitment point: we keep this to check
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* revoke_and_ack's `per_commitment_secret` is correct. */
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struct pubkey old_remote_per_commit;
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/* Their sig for current commit. */
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature their_commit_sig;
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/* Secret keys and basepoint secrets. */
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struct secrets our_secrets;
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/* Our shaseed for generating per-commitment-secrets. */
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struct sha256 shaseed;
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* A sending node MUST set `id` to 0 for the first HTLC it offers, and
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* increase the value by 1 for each successive offer.
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*/
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u64 htlc_id;
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struct bitcoin_blkid chain_hash;
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struct channel_id channel_id;
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struct channel *channel;
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/* Pending msgs to send (not encrypted) */
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struct msg_queue peer_out;
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/* Current msg to send, and offset (encrypted) */
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const u8 *peer_outmsg;
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size_t peer_outoff;
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/* Messages from master / gossipd: we queue them since we
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* might be waiting for a specific reply. */
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struct msg_queue from_master, from_gossipd;
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struct timers timers;
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struct oneshot *commit_timer;
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u64 commit_timer_attempts;
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u32 commit_msec;
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/* Don't accept a pong we didn't ping for. */
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size_t num_pings_outstanding;
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/* The feerate we want. */
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u32 desired_feerate;
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/* Announcement related information */
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struct pubkey node_ids[NUM_SIDES];
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struct short_channel_id short_channel_ids[NUM_SIDES];
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature announcement_node_sigs[NUM_SIDES];
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature announcement_bitcoin_sigs[NUM_SIDES];
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bool have_sigs[NUM_SIDES];
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/* Which direction of the channel do we control? */
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u16 channel_direction;
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/* CLTV delta to announce to peers */
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u16 cltv_delta;
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u32 fee_base;
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u32 fee_per_satoshi;
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/* We save calculated commit sigs while waiting for master approval */
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struct commit_sigs *next_commit_sigs;
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/* The scriptpubkey to use for shutting down. */
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u8 *final_scriptpubkey;
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/* If master told us to shut down */
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bool send_shutdown;
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/* Has shutdown been sent by each side? */
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bool shutdown_sent[NUM_SIDES];
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/* Information used for reestablishment. */
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bool last_was_revoke;
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struct changed_htlc *last_sent_commit;
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u64 revocations_received;
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u8 channel_flags;
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bool announce_depth_reached;
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/* Where we got up to in gossip broadcasts. */
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u64 gossip_index;
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/* Make sure timestamps move forward. */
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u32 last_update_timestamp;
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};
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static u8 *create_channel_announcement(const tal_t *ctx, struct peer *peer);
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static void start_commit_timer(struct peer *peer);
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static void billboard_update(const struct peer *peer)
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{
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const char *funding_status, *announce_status, *shutdown_status;
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if (peer->funding_locked[LOCAL] && peer->funding_locked[REMOTE])
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funding_status = "Funding transaction locked.";
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else if (!peer->funding_locked[LOCAL] && !peer->funding_locked[REMOTE])
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/* FIXME: Say how many blocks to go! */
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funding_status = "Funding needs more confirmations.";
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else if (peer->funding_locked[LOCAL] && !peer->funding_locked[REMOTE])
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funding_status = "We've confirmed funding, they haven't yet.";
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else if (!peer->funding_locked[LOCAL] && peer->funding_locked[REMOTE])
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funding_status = "They've confirmed funding, we haven't yet.";
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if (peer->have_sigs[LOCAL] && peer->have_sigs[REMOTE])
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announce_status = " Channel announced.";
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else if (peer->have_sigs[LOCAL] && !peer->have_sigs[REMOTE])
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announce_status = " Waiting for their announcement signatures.";
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else if (!peer->have_sigs[LOCAL] && peer->have_sigs[REMOTE])
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announce_status = " They need our announcement signatures.";
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else if (!peer->have_sigs[LOCAL] && !peer->have_sigs[REMOTE])
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announce_status = "";
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if (!peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL] && !peer->shutdown_sent[REMOTE])
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shutdown_status = "";
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else if (!peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL] && peer->shutdown_sent[REMOTE])
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shutdown_status = " We've send shutdown, waiting for theirs";
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else if (peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL] && !peer->shutdown_sent[REMOTE])
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shutdown_status = " They've sent shutdown, waiting for ours";
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else if (peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL] && peer->shutdown_sent[REMOTE]) {
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size_t num_htlcs = num_channel_htlcs(peer->channel);
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if (num_htlcs)
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shutdown_status = tal_fmt(tmpctx,
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" Shutdown messages exchanged,"
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" waiting for %zu HTLCs to complete.",
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num_htlcs);
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else
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shutdown_status = tal_fmt(tmpctx,
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" Shutdown messages exchanged.");
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}
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peer_billboard(false, "%s%s%s", funding_status,
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announce_status, shutdown_status);
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}
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/* Returns a pointer to the new end */
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static void *tal_arr_append_(void **p, size_t size)
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{
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size_t n = tal_len(*p) / size;
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tal_resize_(p, size, n+1, false);
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return (char *)(*p) + n * size;
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}
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#define tal_arr_append(p) tal_arr_append_((void **)(p), sizeof(**(p)))
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static void do_peer_write(struct peer *peer)
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{
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int r;
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size_t len = tal_len(peer->peer_outmsg);
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r = write(PEER_FD, peer->peer_outmsg + peer->peer_outoff,
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len - peer->peer_outoff);
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if (r < 0)
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peer_failed_connection_lost();
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peer->peer_outoff += r;
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if (peer->peer_outoff == len)
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peer->peer_outmsg = tal_free(peer->peer_outmsg);
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}
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static bool peer_write_pending(struct peer *peer)
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{
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const u8 *msg;
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if (peer->peer_outmsg)
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return true;
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msg = msg_dequeue(&peer->peer_out);
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if (!msg)
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return false;
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status_io(LOG_IO_OUT, msg);
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peer->peer_outmsg = cryptomsg_encrypt_msg(peer, &peer->cs, take(msg));
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peer->peer_outoff = 0;
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return true;
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}
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/* Synchronous flush of all pending packets. */
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static void flush_peer_out(struct peer *peer)
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{
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while (peer_write_pending(peer))
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do_peer_write(peer);
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}
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static void enqueue_peer_msg(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg TAKES)
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{
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#if DEVELOPER
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enum dev_disconnect d = dev_disconnect(fromwire_peektype(msg));
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/* We want to effect this exact packet, so flush any pending. */
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if (d != DEV_DISCONNECT_NORMAL)
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flush_peer_out(peer);
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switch (d) {
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case DEV_DISCONNECT_BEFORE:
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/* Fail immediately. */
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dev_sabotage_fd(PEER_FD);
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msg_enqueue(&peer->peer_out, msg);
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flush_peer_out(peer);
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/* Should not return */
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abort();
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case DEV_DISCONNECT_DROPPKT:
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tal_free(msg);
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/* Fail next time we try to do something. */
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dev_sabotage_fd(PEER_FD);
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return;
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case DEV_DISCONNECT_AFTER:
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msg_enqueue(&peer->peer_out, msg);
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flush_peer_out(peer);
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dev_sabotage_fd(PEER_FD);
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return;
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case DEV_DISCONNECT_BLACKHOLE:
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msg_enqueue(&peer->peer_out, msg);
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dev_blackhole_fd(PEER_FD);
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return;
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case DEV_DISCONNECT_NORMAL:
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break;
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}
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#endif
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msg_enqueue(&peer->peer_out, msg);
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}
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static void gossip_in(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
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{
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u8 *gossip;
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u64 gossip_index;
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if (!fromwire_gossip_send_gossip(msg, msg, &gossip_index, &gossip))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_GOSSIP_IO,
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"Got bad message from gossipd: %s",
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tal_hex(msg, msg));
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/* Zero is a special index meaning this is unindexed gossip. */
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if (gossip_index != 0)
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peer->gossip_index = gossip_index;
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if (is_msg_for_gossipd(gossip))
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enqueue_peer_msg(peer, gossip);
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else if (fromwire_peektype(gossip) == WIRE_ERROR) {
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struct channel_id channel_id;
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char *what = sanitize_error(msg, msg, &channel_id);
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peer_failed(&peer->cs, peer->gossip_index, &channel_id,
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"gossipd said: %s", what);
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} else
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_GOSSIP_IO,
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"Got bad message type %s from gossipd: %s",
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wire_type_name(fromwire_peektype(gossip)),
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tal_hex(msg, msg));
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}
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/* Send a temporary `channel_announcement` and `channel_update`. These
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* are unsigned and mainly used to tell gossip about the channel
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* before we have reached the `announcement_depth`, not being signed
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* means they will not be relayed, but we can already rely on them for
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* our own outgoing payments */
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static void send_temporary_announcement(struct peer *peer)
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{
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u8 *msg;
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/* If we are supposed to send a real announcement, don't do a
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* dummy one here, hence the check for announce_depth. */
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if (peer->announce_depth_reached || !peer->funding_locked[LOCAL] ||
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!peer->funding_locked[REMOTE])
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return;
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msg = towire_gossip_local_add_channel(
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NULL, &peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL], &peer->chain_hash,
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&peer->node_ids[REMOTE], peer->cltv_delta,
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peer->conf[REMOTE].htlc_minimum_msat, peer->fee_base,
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peer->fee_per_satoshi);
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wire_sync_write(GOSSIP_FD, take(msg));
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}
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static void send_announcement_signatures(struct peer *peer)
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{
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/* First 2 + 256 byte are the signatures and msg type, skip them */
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size_t offset = 258;
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struct sha256_double hash;
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u8 *msg, *ca, *req;
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/* BOLT #7:
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*
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* If sent, `announcement_signatures` messages MUST NOT be sent until
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* `funding_locked` has been sent and the funding transaction has
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* at least 6 confirmations.
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*/
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/* Actually defer a bit further until both ends have signaled */
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if (!peer->announce_depth_reached || !peer->funding_locked[LOCAL] ||
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!peer->funding_locked[REMOTE])
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return;
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status_trace("Exchanging announcement signatures.");
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ca = create_channel_announcement(tmpctx, peer);
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req = towire_hsm_cannouncement_sig_req(
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tmpctx, &peer->channel->funding_pubkey[LOCAL], ca);
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|
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if (!wire_sync_write(HSM_FD, req))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
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"Writing cannouncement_sig_req: %s",
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strerror(errno));
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msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, HSM_FD);
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if (!msg || !fromwire_hsm_cannouncement_sig_reply(msg,
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&peer->announcement_node_sigs[LOCAL]))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
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"Reading cannouncement_sig_resp: %s",
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strerror(errno));
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/* Double-check that HSM gave a valid signature. */
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sha256_double(&hash, ca + offset, tal_len(ca) - offset);
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if (!check_signed_hash(&hash, &peer->announcement_node_sigs[LOCAL],
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&peer->node_ids[LOCAL])) {
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/* It's ok to fail here, the channel announcement is
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* unique, unlike the channel update which may have
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* been replaced in the meantime. */
|
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
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"HSM returned an invalid signature");
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}
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|
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/* TODO(cdecker) Move this to the HSM once we store the
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* funding_privkey there */
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sign_hash(&peer->our_secrets.funding_privkey, &hash,
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&peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[LOCAL]);
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|
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peer->have_sigs[LOCAL] = true;
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billboard_update(peer);
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msg = towire_announcement_signatures(
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NULL, &peer->channel_id, &peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL],
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&peer->announcement_node_sigs[LOCAL],
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&peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[LOCAL]);
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enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
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}
|
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|
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static u8 *create_channel_update(const tal_t *ctx,
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struct peer *peer, bool disabled)
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|
{
|
|
u32 timestamp = time_now().ts.tv_sec;
|
|
u16 flags;
|
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u8 *cupdate, *msg;
|
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|
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/* Identical timestamps will be ignored. */
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if (timestamp <= peer->last_update_timestamp)
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timestamp = peer->last_update_timestamp + 1;
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peer->last_update_timestamp = timestamp;
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|
|
/* Set the signature to empty so that valgrind doesn't complain */
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig =
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talz(tmpctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature);
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|
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flags = peer->channel_direction | (disabled << 1);
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cupdate = towire_channel_update(
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tmpctx, sig, &peer->chain_hash,
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&peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL], timestamp, flags,
|
|
peer->cltv_delta, peer->conf[REMOTE].htlc_minimum_msat,
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peer->fee_base, peer->fee_per_satoshi);
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|
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msg = towire_hsm_cupdate_sig_req(tmpctx, cupdate);
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|
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if (!wire_sync_write(HSM_FD, msg))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
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"Writing cupdate_sig_req: %s",
|
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strerror(errno));
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|
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msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, HSM_FD);
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if (!msg || !fromwire_hsm_cupdate_sig_reply(ctx, msg, &cupdate))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
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|
"Reading cupdate_sig_req: %s",
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
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return cupdate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Tentatively create a channel_announcement, possibly with invalid
|
|
* signatures. The signatures need to be collected first, by asking
|
|
* the HSM and by exchanging announcement_signature messages. */
|
|
static u8 *create_channel_announcement(const tal_t *ctx, struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
int first, second;
|
|
u8 *cannounce, *features = tal_arr(ctx, u8, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (peer->channel_direction == 0) {
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|
first = LOCAL;
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second = REMOTE;
|
|
} else {
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|
first = REMOTE;
|
|
second = LOCAL;
|
|
}
|
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|
|
cannounce = towire_channel_announcement(
|
|
ctx, &peer->announcement_node_sigs[first],
|
|
&peer->announcement_node_sigs[second],
|
|
&peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[first],
|
|
&peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[second],
|
|
features,
|
|
&peer->chain_hash,
|
|
&peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL], &peer->node_ids[first],
|
|
&peer->node_ids[second], &peer->channel->funding_pubkey[first],
|
|
&peer->channel->funding_pubkey[second]);
|
|
tal_free(features);
|
|
return cannounce;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_peer_funding_locked(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct channel_id chanid;
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* On reconnection, a node MUST ignore a redundant `funding_locked` if
|
|
* it receives one.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (peer->funding_locked[REMOTE])
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
peer->old_remote_per_commit = peer->remote_per_commit;
|
|
if (!fromwire_funding_locked(msg, &chanid,
|
|
&peer->remote_per_commit))
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs, peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad funding_locked %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
|
|
|
|
if (!structeq(&chanid, &peer->channel_id))
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs, peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Wrong channel id in %s (expected %s)",
|
|
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg),
|
|
type_to_string(msg, struct channel_id,
|
|
&peer->channel_id));
|
|
|
|
peer->funding_locked[REMOTE] = true;
|
|
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
|
|
take(towire_channel_got_funding_locked(NULL,
|
|
&peer->remote_per_commit)));
|
|
|
|
if (peer->funding_locked[LOCAL]) {
|
|
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
|
|
take(towire_channel_normal_operation(NULL)));
|
|
}
|
|
billboard_update(peer);
|
|
|
|
/* Send temporary or final announcements */
|
|
send_temporary_announcement(peer);
|
|
send_announcement_signatures(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Once we have both, we'd better make sure we agree what they are! */
|
|
static void check_short_ids_match(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
assert(peer->have_sigs[LOCAL]);
|
|
assert(peer->have_sigs[REMOTE]);
|
|
|
|
if (!structeq(&peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL],
|
|
&peer->short_channel_ids[REMOTE]))
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs, peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"We disagree on short_channel_ids:"
|
|
" I have %s, you say %s",
|
|
type_to_string(peer, struct short_channel_id,
|
|
&peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL]),
|
|
type_to_string(peer, struct short_channel_id,
|
|
&peer->short_channel_ids[REMOTE]));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void announce_channel(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *cannounce, *cupdate;
|
|
|
|
check_short_ids_match(peer);
|
|
|
|
cannounce = create_channel_announcement(tmpctx, peer);
|
|
cupdate = create_channel_update(tmpctx, peer, false);
|
|
|
|
wire_sync_write(GOSSIP_FD, cannounce);
|
|
wire_sync_write(GOSSIP_FD, cupdate);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_peer_announcement_signatures(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct channel_id chanid;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_announcement_signatures(msg,
|
|
&chanid,
|
|
&peer->short_channel_ids[REMOTE],
|
|
&peer->announcement_node_sigs[REMOTE],
|
|
&peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[REMOTE]))
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs, peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad announcement_signatures %s",
|
|
tal_hex(msg, msg));
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure we agree on the channel ids */
|
|
if (!structeq(&chanid, &peer->channel_id)) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs, peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Wrong channel_id: expected %s, got %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id,
|
|
&peer->channel_id),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id, &chanid));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
peer->have_sigs[REMOTE] = true;
|
|
billboard_update(peer);
|
|
|
|
/* We have the remote sigs, do we have the local ones as well? */
|
|
if (peer->funding_locked[LOCAL] && peer->have_sigs[LOCAL])
|
|
announce_channel(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool get_shared_secret(const struct htlc *htlc,
|
|
struct secret *shared_secret)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pubkey ephemeral;
|
|
struct onionpacket *op;
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
|
|
/* We unwrap the onion now. */
|
|
op = parse_onionpacket(tmpctx, htlc->routing, TOTAL_PACKET_SIZE);
|
|
if (!op) {
|
|
/* Return an invalid shared secret. */
|
|
memset(shared_secret, 0, sizeof(*shared_secret));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Because wire takes struct pubkey. */
|
|
ephemeral.pubkey = op->ephemeralkey;
|
|
msg = towire_hsm_ecdh_req(tmpctx, &ephemeral);
|
|
if (!wire_sync_write(HSM_FD, msg))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO, "Writing ecdh req");
|
|
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, HSM_FD);
|
|
/* Gives all-zero shares_secret if it was invalid. */
|
|
if (!msg || !fromwire_hsm_ecdh_resp(msg, shared_secret))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO, "Reading ecdh response");
|
|
|
|
return !memeqzero(shared_secret, sizeof(*shared_secret));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_peer_add_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct channel_id channel_id;
|
|
u64 id;
|
|
u64 amount_msat;
|
|
u32 cltv_expiry;
|
|
struct sha256 payment_hash;
|
|
u8 onion_routing_packet[TOTAL_PACKET_SIZE];
|
|
enum channel_add_err add_err;
|
|
struct htlc *htlc;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_update_add_htlc(msg, &channel_id, &id, &amount_msat,
|
|
&payment_hash, &cltv_expiry,
|
|
onion_routing_packet))
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad peer_add_htlc %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
|
|
|
|
add_err = channel_add_htlc(peer->channel, REMOTE, id, amount_msat,
|
|
cltv_expiry, &payment_hash,
|
|
onion_routing_packet, &htlc);
|
|
if (add_err != CHANNEL_ERR_ADD_OK)
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad peer_add_htlc: %s",
|
|
channel_add_err_name(add_err));
|
|
|
|
/* If this is wrong, we don't complain yet; when it's confirmed we'll
|
|
* send it to the master which handles all HTLC failures. */
|
|
htlc->shared_secret = tal(htlc, struct secret);
|
|
get_shared_secret(htlc, htlc->shared_secret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_peer_feechange(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct channel_id channel_id;
|
|
u32 feerate;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_update_fee(msg, &channel_id, &feerate)) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad update_fee %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A receiving node MUST fail the channel if the sender is not
|
|
* responsible for paying the bitcoin fee.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (peer->channel->funder != REMOTE)
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"update_fee from non-funder?");
|
|
|
|
status_trace("update_fee %u, range %u-%u",
|
|
feerate, peer->feerate_min, peer->feerate_max);
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A receiving node SHOULD fail the channel if the `update_fee` is too
|
|
* low for timely processing, or unreasonably large.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (feerate < peer->feerate_min || feerate > peer->feerate_max)
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"update_fee %u outside range %u-%u",
|
|
feerate, peer->feerate_min, peer->feerate_max);
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A receiving node SHOULD fail the channel if the sender cannot
|
|
* afford the new fee rate on the receiving node's current commitment
|
|
* transaction, but it MAY delay this check until the `update_fee` is
|
|
* committed.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!channel_update_feerate(peer->channel, feerate))
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"update_fee %u unaffordable",
|
|
feerate);
|
|
|
|
status_trace("peer updated fee to %u", feerate);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct changed_htlc *changed_htlc_arr(const tal_t *ctx,
|
|
const struct htlc **changed_htlcs)
|
|
{
|
|
struct changed_htlc *changed;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
changed = tal_arr(ctx, struct changed_htlc, tal_count(changed_htlcs));
|
|
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(changed_htlcs); i++) {
|
|
changed[i].id = changed_htlcs[i]->id;
|
|
changed[i].newstate = changed_htlcs[i]->state;
|
|
}
|
|
return changed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u8 *sending_commitsig_msg(const tal_t *ctx,
|
|
u64 remote_commit_index,
|
|
u32 remote_feerate,
|
|
const struct htlc **changed_htlcs,
|
|
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *commit_sig,
|
|
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *htlc_sigs)
|
|
{
|
|
struct changed_htlc *changed;
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
|
|
/* We tell master what (of our) HTLCs peer will now be
|
|
* committed to. */
|
|
changed = changed_htlc_arr(tmpctx, changed_htlcs);
|
|
msg = towire_channel_sending_commitsig(ctx, remote_commit_index,
|
|
remote_feerate,
|
|
changed, commit_sig, htlc_sigs);
|
|
return msg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool shutdown_complete(const struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
return peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL]
|
|
&& peer->shutdown_sent[REMOTE]
|
|
&& num_channel_htlcs(peer->channel) == 0
|
|
/* We could be awaiting revoke-and-ack for a feechange */
|
|
&& peer->revocations_received == peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A node MUST NOT send a `shutdown` if there are updates pending on
|
|
* the receiving node's commitment transaction.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* So we only call this after reestablish or immediately after sending commit */
|
|
static void maybe_send_shutdown(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
|
|
if (!peer->send_shutdown)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* Send a disable channel_update so others don't try to route
|
|
* over us */
|
|
msg = create_channel_update(NULL, peer, true);
|
|
wire_sync_write(GOSSIP_FD, msg);
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
|
|
msg = towire_shutdown(NULL, &peer->channel_id, peer->final_scriptpubkey);
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
peer->send_shutdown = false;
|
|
peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL] = true;
|
|
billboard_update(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This queues other traffic from the fd until we get reply. */
|
|
static u8 *wait_sync_reply(const tal_t *ctx,
|
|
const u8 *msg,
|
|
int replytype,
|
|
int fd,
|
|
struct msg_queue *queue,
|
|
const char *who)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *reply;
|
|
|
|
status_trace("Sending %s %u", who, fromwire_peektype(msg));
|
|
|
|
if (!wire_sync_write(fd, msg))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Could not set sync write to %s: %s",
|
|
who, strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
status_trace("... , awaiting %u", replytype);
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
reply = wire_sync_read(ctx, fd);
|
|
if (!reply)
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Could not set sync read from %s: %s",
|
|
who, strerror(errno));
|
|
if (fromwire_peektype(reply) == replytype) {
|
|
status_trace("Got it!");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status_trace("Nope, got %u instead", fromwire_peektype(reply));
|
|
msg_enqueue(queue, take(reply));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return reply;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u8 *master_wait_sync_reply(const tal_t *ctx,
|
|
struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg,
|
|
enum channel_wire_type replytype)
|
|
{
|
|
return wait_sync_reply(ctx, msg, replytype,
|
|
MASTER_FD, &peer->from_master, "master");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u8 *gossipd_wait_sync_reply(const tal_t *ctx,
|
|
struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg,
|
|
enum gossip_wire_type replytype)
|
|
{
|
|
return wait_sync_reply(ctx, msg, replytype,
|
|
GOSSIP_FD, &peer->from_gossipd, "gossipd");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct commit_sigs *calc_commitsigs(const tal_t *ctx,
|
|
const struct peer *peer,
|
|
u64 commit_index)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
struct bitcoin_tx **txs;
|
|
const u8 **wscripts;
|
|
const struct htlc **htlc_map;
|
|
struct pubkey local_htlckey;
|
|
struct privkey local_htlcsecretkey;
|
|
struct commit_sigs *commit_sigs = tal(ctx, struct commit_sigs);
|
|
|
|
if (!derive_simple_privkey(&peer->our_secrets.htlc_basepoint_secret,
|
|
&peer->channel->basepoints[LOCAL].htlc,
|
|
&peer->remote_per_commit,
|
|
&local_htlcsecretkey))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Deriving local_htlcsecretkey");
|
|
|
|
if (!derive_simple_key(&peer->channel->basepoints[LOCAL].htlc,
|
|
&peer->remote_per_commit,
|
|
&local_htlckey))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Deriving local_htlckey");
|
|
|
|
status_trace("Derived key %s from basepoint %s, point %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &local_htlckey),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
|
|
&peer->channel->basepoints[LOCAL].htlc),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
|
|
&peer->remote_per_commit));
|
|
|
|
txs = channel_txs(tmpctx, &htlc_map, &wscripts, peer->channel,
|
|
&peer->remote_per_commit,
|
|
commit_index,
|
|
REMOTE);
|
|
|
|
sign_tx_input(txs[0], 0, NULL,
|
|
wscripts[0],
|
|
&peer->our_secrets.funding_privkey,
|
|
&peer->channel->funding_pubkey[LOCAL],
|
|
&commit_sigs->commit_sig);
|
|
|
|
status_trace("Creating commit_sig signature %"PRIu64" %s for tx %s wscript %s key %s",
|
|
commit_index,
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature,
|
|
&commit_sigs->commit_sig),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, txs[0]),
|
|
tal_hex(tmpctx, wscripts[0]),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
|
|
&peer->channel->funding_pubkey[LOCAL]));
|
|
dump_htlcs(peer->channel, "Sending commit_sig");
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A node MUST include one `htlc_signature` for every HTLC transaction
|
|
* corresponding to BIP69 lexicographic ordering of the commitment
|
|
* transaction.
|
|
*/
|
|
commit_sigs->htlc_sigs = tal_arr(commit_sigs, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature,
|
|
tal_count(txs) - 1);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(commit_sigs->htlc_sigs); i++) {
|
|
sign_tx_input(txs[1 + i], 0,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
wscripts[1 + i],
|
|
&local_htlcsecretkey, &local_htlckey,
|
|
&commit_sigs->htlc_sigs[i]);
|
|
status_trace("Creating HTLC signature %s for tx %s wscript %s key %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature,
|
|
&commit_sigs->htlc_sigs[i]),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, txs[1+i]),
|
|
tal_hex(tmpctx, wscripts[1+i]),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
|
|
&local_htlckey));
|
|
assert(check_tx_sig(txs[1+i], 0, NULL, wscripts[1+i],
|
|
&local_htlckey,
|
|
&commit_sigs->htlc_sigs[i]));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return commit_sigs;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void send_commit(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
const struct htlc **changed_htlcs;
|
|
|
|
#if DEVELOPER
|
|
/* Hack to suppress all commit sends if dev_disconnect says to */
|
|
if (dev_suppress_commit) {
|
|
peer->commit_timer = NULL;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: Document this requirement in BOLT 2! */
|
|
/* We can't send two commits in a row. */
|
|
if (peer->revocations_received != peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 1) {
|
|
assert(peer->revocations_received
|
|
== peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 2);
|
|
peer->commit_timer_attempts++;
|
|
/* Only report this in extreme cases */
|
|
if (peer->commit_timer_attempts % 100 == 0)
|
|
status_trace("Can't send commit:"
|
|
" waiting for revoke_and_ack with %"
|
|
PRIu64" attempts",
|
|
peer->commit_timer_attempts);
|
|
/* Mark this as done and try again. */
|
|
peer->commit_timer = NULL;
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* - if no HTLCs remain in either commitment transaction:
|
|
* - MUST NOT send any `update` message after a `shutdown`.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL] && !num_channel_htlcs(peer->channel)) {
|
|
status_trace("Can't send commit: final shutdown phase");
|
|
|
|
peer->commit_timer = NULL;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we wanted to update fees, do it now. */
|
|
if (peer->channel->funder == LOCAL
|
|
&& peer->desired_feerate != channel_feerate(peer->channel, REMOTE)) {
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
u32 feerate, max = approx_max_feerate(peer->channel);
|
|
|
|
feerate = peer->desired_feerate;
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: We should avoid adding HTLCs until we can meet this
|
|
* feerate! */
|
|
if (feerate > max)
|
|
feerate = max;
|
|
|
|
if (!channel_update_feerate(peer->channel, feerate))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Could not afford feerate %u"
|
|
" (vs max %u)",
|
|
feerate, max);
|
|
|
|
msg = towire_update_fee(NULL, &peer->channel_id, feerate);
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A node MUST NOT send a `commitment_signed` message which does not
|
|
* include any updates.
|
|
*/
|
|
changed_htlcs = tal_arr(tmpctx, const struct htlc *, 0);
|
|
if (!channel_sending_commit(peer->channel, &changed_htlcs)) {
|
|
status_trace("Can't send commit: nothing to send");
|
|
|
|
/* Covers the case where we've just been told to shutdown. */
|
|
maybe_send_shutdown(peer);
|
|
|
|
peer->commit_timer = NULL;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
peer->next_commit_sigs = calc_commitsigs(peer, peer,
|
|
peer->next_index[REMOTE]);
|
|
|
|
status_trace("Telling master we're about to commit...");
|
|
/* Tell master to save this next commit to database, then wait. */
|
|
msg = sending_commitsig_msg(NULL, peer->next_index[REMOTE],
|
|
channel_feerate(peer->channel, REMOTE),
|
|
changed_htlcs,
|
|
&peer->next_commit_sigs->commit_sig,
|
|
peer->next_commit_sigs->htlc_sigs);
|
|
/* Message is empty; receiving it is the point. */
|
|
master_wait_sync_reply(tmpctx, peer, take(msg),
|
|
WIRE_CHANNEL_SENDING_COMMITSIG_REPLY);
|
|
|
|
status_trace("Sending commit_sig with %zu htlc sigs",
|
|
tal_count(peer->next_commit_sigs->htlc_sigs));
|
|
|
|
peer->next_index[REMOTE]++;
|
|
|
|
msg = towire_commitment_signed(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
|
|
&peer->next_commit_sigs->commit_sig,
|
|
peer->next_commit_sigs->htlc_sigs);
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
peer->next_commit_sigs = tal_free(peer->next_commit_sigs);
|
|
|
|
maybe_send_shutdown(peer);
|
|
|
|
/* Timer now considered expired, you can add a new one. */
|
|
peer->commit_timer = NULL;
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void start_commit_timer(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Already armed? */
|
|
if (peer->commit_timer)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
peer->commit_timer_attempts = 0;
|
|
peer->commit_timer = new_reltimer(&peer->timers, peer,
|
|
time_from_msec(peer->commit_msec),
|
|
send_commit, peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u8 *make_revocation_msg(const struct peer *peer, u64 revoke_index)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pubkey oldpoint, point;
|
|
struct sha256 old_commit_secret;
|
|
|
|
/* Get secret. */
|
|
per_commit_secret(&peer->shaseed, &old_commit_secret, revoke_index);
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check that it corresponds to the point we sent. */
|
|
pubkey_from_privkey((struct privkey *)&old_commit_secret, &point);
|
|
if (!per_commit_point(&peer->shaseed, &oldpoint, revoke_index))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Invalid point %"PRIu64" for commit_point",
|
|
revoke_index);
|
|
|
|
status_trace("Sending revocation #%"PRIu64" for %s",
|
|
revoke_index,
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &oldpoint));
|
|
|
|
if (!pubkey_eq(&point, &oldpoint))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Invalid secret %s for commit_point",
|
|
tal_hexstr(tmpctx, &old_commit_secret,
|
|
sizeof(old_commit_secret)));
|
|
|
|
/* We're revoking N-1th commit, sending N+1th point. */
|
|
if (!per_commit_point(&peer->shaseed, &point, revoke_index+2))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Deriving next commit_point");
|
|
|
|
return towire_revoke_and_ack(peer, &peer->channel_id, &old_commit_secret,
|
|
&point);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void send_revocation(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Revoke previous commit. */
|
|
u8 *msg = make_revocation_msg(peer, peer->next_index[LOCAL]-1);
|
|
|
|
/* From now on we apply changes to the next commitment */
|
|
peer->next_index[LOCAL]++;
|
|
|
|
/* If this queues more changes on the other end, send commit. */
|
|
if (channel_sending_revoke_and_ack(peer->channel)) {
|
|
status_trace("revoke_and_ack made pending: commit timer");
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u8 *got_commitsig_msg(const tal_t *ctx,
|
|
u64 local_commit_index,
|
|
u32 local_feerate,
|
|
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *commit_sig,
|
|
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *htlc_sigs,
|
|
const struct htlc **changed_htlcs,
|
|
const struct bitcoin_tx *committx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct changed_htlc *changed;
|
|
struct fulfilled_htlc *fulfilled;
|
|
const struct failed_htlc **failed;
|
|
struct added_htlc *added;
|
|
struct secret *shared_secret;
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
|
|
changed = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct changed_htlc, 0);
|
|
added = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct added_htlc, 0);
|
|
shared_secret = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct secret, 0);
|
|
failed = tal_arr(tmpctx, const struct failed_htlc *, 0);
|
|
fulfilled = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct fulfilled_htlc, 0);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(changed_htlcs); i++) {
|
|
const struct htlc *htlc = changed_htlcs[i];
|
|
if (htlc->state == RCVD_ADD_COMMIT) {
|
|
struct added_htlc *a = tal_arr_append(&added);
|
|
struct secret *s = tal_arr_append(&shared_secret);
|
|
a->id = htlc->id;
|
|
a->amount_msat = htlc->msatoshi;
|
|
a->payment_hash = htlc->rhash;
|
|
a->cltv_expiry = abs_locktime_to_blocks(&htlc->expiry);
|
|
memcpy(a->onion_routing_packet,
|
|
htlc->routing,
|
|
sizeof(a->onion_routing_packet));
|
|
*s = *htlc->shared_secret;
|
|
} else if (htlc->state == RCVD_REMOVE_COMMIT) {
|
|
if (htlc->r) {
|
|
struct fulfilled_htlc *f;
|
|
assert(!htlc->fail);
|
|
f = tal_arr_append(&fulfilled);
|
|
f->id = htlc->id;
|
|
f->payment_preimage = *htlc->r;
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct failed_htlc **f;
|
|
assert(htlc->fail);
|
|
f = tal_arr_append(&failed);
|
|
*f = tal(failed, struct failed_htlc);
|
|
(*f)->id = htlc->id;
|
|
(*f)->malformed = htlc->malformed;
|
|
(*f)->failreason = cast_const(u8 *, htlc->fail);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct changed_htlc *c = tal_arr_append(&changed);
|
|
assert(htlc->state == RCVD_REMOVE_ACK_COMMIT
|
|
|| htlc->state == RCVD_ADD_ACK_COMMIT);
|
|
|
|
c->id = htlc->id;
|
|
c->newstate = htlc->state;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg = towire_channel_got_commitsig(ctx, local_commit_index,
|
|
local_feerate,
|
|
commit_sig,
|
|
htlc_sigs,
|
|
added,
|
|
shared_secret,
|
|
fulfilled,
|
|
failed,
|
|
changed,
|
|
committx);
|
|
return msg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_peer_commit_sig(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct channel_id channel_id;
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature commit_sig, *htlc_sigs;
|
|
struct pubkey remote_htlckey, point;
|
|
struct bitcoin_tx **txs;
|
|
const struct htlc **htlc_map, **changed_htlcs;
|
|
const u8 **wscripts;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
changed_htlcs = tal_arr(msg, const struct htlc *, 0);
|
|
if (!channel_rcvd_commit(peer->channel, &changed_htlcs)) {
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A node MUST NOT send a `commitment_signed` message which
|
|
* does not include any updates.
|
|
*/
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"commit_sig with no changes");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We were supposed to check this was affordable as we go. */
|
|
if (peer->channel->funder == REMOTE)
|
|
assert(can_funder_afford_feerate(peer->channel,
|
|
peer->channel->view[LOCAL]
|
|
.feerate_per_kw));
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_commitment_signed(tmpctx, msg,
|
|
&channel_id, &commit_sig, &htlc_sigs))
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad commit_sig %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
|
|
|
|
if (!per_commit_point(&peer->shaseed, &point,
|
|
peer->next_index[LOCAL]))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Deriving per_commit_point for %"PRIu64,
|
|
peer->next_index[LOCAL]);
|
|
|
|
txs = channel_txs(tmpctx, &htlc_map, &wscripts, peer->channel,
|
|
&point, peer->next_index[LOCAL], LOCAL);
|
|
|
|
if (!derive_simple_key(&peer->channel->basepoints[REMOTE].htlc,
|
|
&point, &remote_htlckey))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Deriving remote_htlckey");
|
|
status_trace("Derived key %s from basepoint %s, point %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &remote_htlckey),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
|
|
&peer->channel->basepoints[REMOTE].htlc),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &point));
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A receiving node MUST fail the channel if `signature` is not valid
|
|
* for its local commitment transaction once all pending updates are
|
|
* applied.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!check_tx_sig(txs[0], 0, NULL, wscripts[0],
|
|
&peer->channel->funding_pubkey[REMOTE], &commit_sig)) {
|
|
dump_htlcs(peer->channel, "receiving commit_sig");
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad commit_sig signature %"PRIu64" %s for tx %s wscript %s key %s",
|
|
peer->next_index[LOCAL],
|
|
type_to_string(msg, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature,
|
|
&commit_sig),
|
|
type_to_string(msg, struct bitcoin_tx, txs[0]),
|
|
tal_hex(msg, wscripts[0]),
|
|
type_to_string(msg, struct pubkey,
|
|
&peer->channel->funding_pubkey
|
|
[REMOTE]));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A receiving node MUST fail the channel if `num_htlcs` is not equal
|
|
* to the number of HTLC outputs in the local commitment transaction
|
|
* once all pending updates are applied.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (tal_count(htlc_sigs) != tal_count(txs) - 1)
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Expected %zu htlc sigs, not %zu",
|
|
tal_count(txs) - 1, tal_count(htlc_sigs));
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A receiving node MUST fail
|
|
* the channel if any `htlc_signature` is not valid for the
|
|
* corresponding HTLC transaction.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(htlc_sigs); i++) {
|
|
if (!check_tx_sig(txs[1+i], 0, NULL, wscripts[1+i],
|
|
&remote_htlckey, &htlc_sigs[i]))
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad commit_sig signature %s for htlc %s wscript %s key %s",
|
|
type_to_string(msg, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature, &htlc_sigs[i]),
|
|
type_to_string(msg, struct bitcoin_tx, txs[1+i]),
|
|
tal_hex(msg, wscripts[1+i]),
|
|
type_to_string(msg, struct pubkey,
|
|
&remote_htlckey));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status_trace("Received commit_sig with %zu htlc sigs",
|
|
tal_count(htlc_sigs));
|
|
|
|
/* Tell master daemon, then wait for ack. */
|
|
msg = got_commitsig_msg(NULL, peer->next_index[LOCAL],
|
|
channel_feerate(peer->channel, LOCAL),
|
|
&commit_sig, htlc_sigs, changed_htlcs, txs[0]);
|
|
|
|
master_wait_sync_reply(tmpctx, peer, take(msg),
|
|
WIRE_CHANNEL_GOT_COMMITSIG_REPLY);
|
|
return send_revocation(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u8 *got_revoke_msg(const tal_t *ctx, u64 revoke_num,
|
|
const struct sha256 *per_commitment_secret,
|
|
const struct pubkey *next_per_commit_point,
|
|
const struct htlc **changed_htlcs)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
struct changed_htlc *changed = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct changed_htlc, 0);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(changed_htlcs); i++) {
|
|
struct changed_htlc *c = tal_arr_append(&changed);
|
|
const struct htlc *htlc = changed_htlcs[i];
|
|
|
|
status_trace("HTLC %"PRIu64"[%s] => %s",
|
|
htlc->id, side_to_str(htlc_owner(htlc)),
|
|
htlc_state_name(htlc->state));
|
|
|
|
c->id = changed_htlcs[i]->id;
|
|
c->newstate = changed_htlcs[i]->state;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg = towire_channel_got_revoke(ctx, revoke_num, per_commitment_secret,
|
|
next_per_commit_point, changed);
|
|
return msg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_peer_revoke_and_ack(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sha256 old_commit_secret;
|
|
struct privkey privkey;
|
|
struct channel_id channel_id;
|
|
struct pubkey per_commit_point, next_per_commit;
|
|
const struct htlc **changed_htlcs = tal_arr(msg, const struct htlc *, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_revoke_and_ack(msg, &channel_id, &old_commit_secret,
|
|
&next_per_commit)) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad revoke_and_ack %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (peer->revocations_received != peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 2) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Unexpected revoke_and_ack");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A receiving node MUST check that `per_commitment_secret` generates
|
|
* the previous `per_commitment_point`, and MUST fail if it does
|
|
* not.
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(&privkey, &old_commit_secret, sizeof(privkey));
|
|
if (!pubkey_from_privkey(&privkey, &per_commit_point)) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad privkey %s",
|
|
type_to_string(msg, struct privkey, &privkey));
|
|
}
|
|
if (!pubkey_eq(&per_commit_point, &peer->old_remote_per_commit)) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Wrong privkey %s for %"PRIu64" %s",
|
|
type_to_string(msg, struct privkey, &privkey),
|
|
peer->next_index[LOCAL]-2,
|
|
type_to_string(msg, struct pubkey,
|
|
&peer->old_remote_per_commit));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We start timer even if this returns false: we might have delayed
|
|
* commit because we were waiting for this! */
|
|
if (channel_rcvd_revoke_and_ack(peer->channel, &changed_htlcs))
|
|
status_trace("Commits outstanding after recv revoke_and_ack");
|
|
else
|
|
status_trace("No commits outstanding after recv revoke_and_ack");
|
|
|
|
/* Tell master about things this locks in, wait for response */
|
|
msg = got_revoke_msg(NULL, peer->revocations_received++,
|
|
&old_commit_secret, &next_per_commit,
|
|
changed_htlcs);
|
|
master_wait_sync_reply(tmpctx, peer, take(msg),
|
|
WIRE_CHANNEL_GOT_REVOKE_REPLY);
|
|
|
|
peer->old_remote_per_commit = peer->remote_per_commit;
|
|
peer->remote_per_commit = next_per_commit;
|
|
status_trace("revoke_and_ack %s: remote_per_commit = %s, old_remote_per_commit = %s",
|
|
side_to_str(peer->channel->funder),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
|
|
&peer->remote_per_commit),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
|
|
&peer->old_remote_per_commit));
|
|
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_peer_fulfill_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct channel_id channel_id;
|
|
u64 id;
|
|
struct preimage preimage;
|
|
enum channel_remove_err e;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_update_fulfill_htlc(msg, &channel_id,
|
|
&id, &preimage)) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad update_fulfill_htlc %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
e = channel_fulfill_htlc(peer->channel, LOCAL, id, &preimage);
|
|
switch (e) {
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_REMOVE_OK:
|
|
/* FIXME: We could send preimages to master immediately. */
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
return;
|
|
/* These shouldn't happen, because any offered HTLC (which would give
|
|
* us the preimage) should have timed out long before. If we
|
|
* were to get preimages from other sources, this could happen. */
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_NO_SUCH_ID:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_ALREADY_FULFILLED:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_UNCOMMITTED:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_NOT_IRREVOCABLE:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_BAD_PREIMAGE:
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad update_fulfill_htlc: failed to fulfill %"
|
|
PRIu64 " error %s", id, channel_remove_err_name(e));
|
|
}
|
|
abort();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_peer_fail_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct channel_id channel_id;
|
|
u64 id;
|
|
enum channel_remove_err e;
|
|
u8 *reason;
|
|
struct htlc *htlc;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_update_fail_htlc(msg, msg,
|
|
&channel_id, &id, &reason)) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad update_fulfill_htlc %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
e = channel_fail_htlc(peer->channel, LOCAL, id, NULL);
|
|
switch (e) {
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_REMOVE_OK:
|
|
/* Save reason for when we tell master. */
|
|
htlc = channel_get_htlc(peer->channel, LOCAL, id);
|
|
htlc->fail = tal_steal(htlc, reason);
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
return;
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_NO_SUCH_ID:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_ALREADY_FULFILLED:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_UNCOMMITTED:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_NOT_IRREVOCABLE:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_BAD_PREIMAGE:
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad update_fail_htlc: failed to remove %"
|
|
PRIu64 " error %s", id,
|
|
channel_remove_err_name(e));
|
|
}
|
|
abort();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_peer_fail_malformed_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct channel_id channel_id;
|
|
u64 id;
|
|
enum channel_remove_err e;
|
|
struct sha256 sha256_of_onion;
|
|
u16 failure_code;
|
|
struct htlc *htlc;
|
|
u8 *fail;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_update_fail_malformed_htlc(msg, &channel_id, &id,
|
|
&sha256_of_onion,
|
|
&failure_code)) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad update_fail_malformed_htlc %s",
|
|
tal_hex(msg, msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A receiving node MUST fail the channel if the `BADONION` bit in
|
|
* `failure_code` is not set for `update_fail_malformed_htlc`.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(failure_code & BADONION)) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad update_fail_malformed_htlc failure code %u",
|
|
failure_code);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
e = channel_fail_htlc(peer->channel, LOCAL, id, &htlc);
|
|
switch (e) {
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_REMOVE_OK:
|
|
/* FIXME: Do this! */
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A receiving node MAY check the `sha256_of_onion`
|
|
* in `update_fail_malformed_htlc` and MAY retry or choose an
|
|
* alternate error response if it does not match the onion it
|
|
* sent.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* Otherwise, a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC
|
|
* canceled by `update_fail_malformed_htlc` MUST return an
|
|
* error in the `update_fail_htlc` sent to the link which
|
|
* originally sent the HTLC using the `failure_code` given and
|
|
* setting the data to `sha256_of_onion`.
|
|
*/
|
|
fail = tal_arr(htlc, u8, 0);
|
|
towire_u16(&fail, failure_code);
|
|
towire_sha256(&fail, &sha256_of_onion);
|
|
htlc->fail = fail;
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
return;
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_NO_SUCH_ID:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_ALREADY_FULFILLED:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_UNCOMMITTED:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_NOT_IRREVOCABLE:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_BAD_PREIMAGE:
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad update_fail_malformed_htlc: failed to remove %"
|
|
PRIu64 " error %s", id, channel_remove_err_name(e));
|
|
}
|
|
abort();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_pong(struct peer *peer, const u8 *pong)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *err = got_pong(pong, &peer->num_pings_outstanding);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"%s", err);
|
|
|
|
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
|
|
take(towire_channel_ping_reply(NULL, tal_len(pong))));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_peer_shutdown(struct peer *peer, const u8 *shutdown)
|
|
{
|
|
struct channel_id channel_id;
|
|
u8 *scriptpubkey, *msg;
|
|
|
|
msg = create_channel_update(NULL, peer, true);
|
|
wire_sync_write(GOSSIP_FD, take(msg));
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_shutdown(peer, shutdown, &channel_id, &scriptpubkey))
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Bad shutdown %s", tal_hex(peer, shutdown));
|
|
|
|
/* Tell master: we don't have to wait because on reconnect other end
|
|
* will re-send anyway. */
|
|
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
|
|
take(towire_channel_got_shutdown(NULL, scriptpubkey)));
|
|
|
|
peer->shutdown_sent[REMOTE] = true;
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* A receiving node:
|
|
* ...
|
|
* - once there are no outstanding updates on the peer, UNLESS
|
|
* it has already sent a `shutdown`:
|
|
* - MUST reply to a `shutdown` message with a `shutdown`
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL]) {
|
|
peer->send_shutdown = true;
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
billboard_update(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Note: msg came from read_peer_msg() which handles pings, gossip,
|
|
* wrong channel, errors */
|
|
static void peer_in(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
enum wire_type type = fromwire_peektype(msg);
|
|
|
|
/* Must get funding_locked before almost anything. */
|
|
if (!peer->funding_locked[REMOTE]) {
|
|
if (type != WIRE_FUNDING_LOCKED && type != WIRE_PONG) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"%s (%u) before funding locked",
|
|
wire_type_name(type), type);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
case WIRE_FUNDING_LOCKED:
|
|
handle_peer_funding_locked(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES:
|
|
handle_peer_announcement_signatures(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_UPDATE_ADD_HTLC:
|
|
handle_peer_add_htlc(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_COMMITMENT_SIGNED:
|
|
handle_peer_commit_sig(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_UPDATE_FEE:
|
|
handle_peer_feechange(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_REVOKE_AND_ACK:
|
|
handle_peer_revoke_and_ack(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC:
|
|
handle_peer_fulfill_htlc(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_UPDATE_FAIL_HTLC:
|
|
handle_peer_fail_htlc(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_UPDATE_FAIL_MALFORMED_HTLC:
|
|
handle_peer_fail_malformed_htlc(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_PONG:
|
|
handle_pong(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_SHUTDOWN:
|
|
handle_peer_shutdown(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case WIRE_INIT:
|
|
case WIRE_OPEN_CHANNEL:
|
|
case WIRE_ACCEPT_CHANNEL:
|
|
case WIRE_FUNDING_CREATED:
|
|
case WIRE_FUNDING_SIGNED:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_REESTABLISH:
|
|
case WIRE_CLOSING_SIGNED:
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/* These are all swallowed by read_peer_msg */
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_ANNOUNCEMENT:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_UPDATE:
|
|
case WIRE_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT:
|
|
case WIRE_PING:
|
|
case WIRE_ERROR:
|
|
abort();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Peer sent unknown message %u (%s)",
|
|
type, wire_type_name(type));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void peer_conn_broken(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If we have signatures, send an update to say we're disabled. */
|
|
if (peer->have_sigs[LOCAL] && peer->have_sigs[REMOTE]) {
|
|
u8 *cupdate = create_channel_update(NULL, peer, true);
|
|
|
|
wire_sync_write(GOSSIP_FD, take(cupdate));
|
|
}
|
|
peer_failed_connection_lost();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void resend_revoke(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Current commit is peer->next_index[LOCAL]-1, revoke prior */
|
|
u8 *msg = make_revocation_msg(peer, peer->next_index[LOCAL]-2);
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void send_fail_or_fulfill(struct peer *peer, const struct htlc *h)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
if (h->malformed) {
|
|
struct sha256 sha256_of_onion;
|
|
sha256(&sha256_of_onion, h->routing, tal_len(h->routing));
|
|
|
|
msg = towire_update_fail_malformed_htlc(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
|
|
h->id, &sha256_of_onion,
|
|
h->malformed);
|
|
} else if (h->fail) {
|
|
msg = towire_update_fail_htlc(NULL, &peer->channel_id, h->id,
|
|
h->fail);
|
|
} else if (h->r) {
|
|
msg = towire_update_fulfill_htlc(NULL, &peer->channel_id, h->id,
|
|
h->r);
|
|
} else
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"HTLC %"PRIu64" state %s not failed/fulfilled",
|
|
h->id, htlc_state_name(h->state));
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void resend_commitment(struct peer *peer, const struct changed_htlc *last)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
struct commit_sigs *commit_sigs;
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* If `next_local_commitment_number` is equal to the commitment number
|
|
* of the last `commitment_signed` message the receiving node has
|
|
* sent, it MUST reuse the same commitment number for its next
|
|
* `commitment_signed`
|
|
*/
|
|
/* In our case, we consider ourselves already committed to this, so
|
|
* retransmission is simplest. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(last); i++) {
|
|
const struct htlc *h;
|
|
|
|
h = channel_get_htlc(peer->channel,
|
|
htlc_state_owner(last[i].newstate),
|
|
last[i].id);
|
|
|
|
/* I think this can happen if we actually received revoke_and_ack
|
|
* then they asked for a retransmit */
|
|
if (!h)
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"Can't find HTLC %"PRIu64" to resend",
|
|
last[i].id);
|
|
|
|
if (h->state == SENT_ADD_COMMIT) {
|
|
u8 *msg = towire_update_add_htlc(peer, &peer->channel_id,
|
|
h->id, h->msatoshi,
|
|
&h->rhash,
|
|
abs_locktime_to_blocks(
|
|
&h->expiry),
|
|
h->routing);
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
} else if (h->state == SENT_REMOVE_COMMIT) {
|
|
send_fail_or_fulfill(peer, h);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure they have the correct fee. */
|
|
if (peer->channel->funder == LOCAL) {
|
|
msg = towire_update_fee(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
|
|
channel_feerate(peer->channel, REMOTE));
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Re-send the commitment_signed itself. */
|
|
commit_sigs = calc_commitsigs(peer, peer, peer->next_index[REMOTE]-1);
|
|
msg = towire_commitment_signed(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
|
|
&commit_sigs->commit_sig,
|
|
commit_sigs->htlc_sigs);
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
tal_free(commit_sigs);
|
|
|
|
assert(peer->revocations_received == peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Our local wrapper around read_peer_msg */
|
|
static void channeld_io_error(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
peer_conn_broken(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool channeld_send_reply(struct crypto_state *cs UNUSED,
|
|
int peer_fd UNUSED,
|
|
const u8 *msg UNUSED,
|
|
struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, msg);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u8 *channeld_read_peer_msg(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
return read_peer_msg(peer, &peer->cs, peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
channeld_send_reply,
|
|
channeld_io_error,
|
|
peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void peer_reconnect(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
struct channel_id channel_id;
|
|
/* Note: BOLT #2 uses these names, which are sender-relative! */
|
|
u64 next_local_commitment_number, next_remote_revocation_number;
|
|
bool retransmit_revoke_and_ack;
|
|
struct htlc_map_iter it;
|
|
const struct htlc *htlc;
|
|
u8 *msg, *cupdate;
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* On reconnection, a node MUST transmit `channel_reestablish` for
|
|
* each channel, and MUST wait for to receive the other node's
|
|
* `channel_reestablish` message before sending any other messages for
|
|
* that channel.
|
|
*
|
|
* The sending node MUST set `next_local_commitment_number` to the
|
|
* commitment number of the next `commitment_signed` it expects to
|
|
* receive, and MUST set `next_remote_revocation_number` to the
|
|
* commitment number of the next `revoke_and_ack` message it expects
|
|
* to receive.
|
|
*/
|
|
msg = towire_channel_reestablish(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
|
|
peer->next_index[LOCAL],
|
|
peer->revocations_received);
|
|
if (!sync_crypto_write(&peer->cs, PEER_FD, take(msg)))
|
|
peer_failed_connection_lost();
|
|
|
|
peer_billboard(false, "Sent reestablish, waiting for theirs");
|
|
|
|
/* Read until they say something interesting */
|
|
while ((msg = channeld_read_peer_msg(peer)) == NULL)
|
|
clean_tmpctx();
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_channel_reestablish(msg, &channel_id,
|
|
&next_local_commitment_number,
|
|
&next_remote_revocation_number)) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"bad reestablish msg: %s %s",
|
|
wire_type_name(fromwire_peektype(msg)),
|
|
tal_hex(msg, msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status_trace("Got reestablish commit=%"PRIu64" revoke=%"PRIu64,
|
|
next_local_commitment_number,
|
|
next_remote_revocation_number);
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* If `next_local_commitment_number` is 1 in both the
|
|
* `channel_reestablish` it sent and received, then the node MUST
|
|
* retransmit `funding_locked`, otherwise it MUST NOT.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (peer->funding_locked[LOCAL]
|
|
&& peer->next_index[LOCAL] == 1
|
|
&& next_local_commitment_number == 1) {
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
struct pubkey next_per_commit_point;
|
|
|
|
/* Contains per commit point #1, for first post-opening commit */
|
|
per_commit_point(&peer->shaseed, &next_per_commit_point, 1);
|
|
msg = towire_funding_locked(NULL,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
&next_per_commit_point);
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Note: next_index is the index of the current commit we're working
|
|
* on, but BOLT #2 refers to the *last* commit index, so we -1 where
|
|
* required. */
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* If `next_remote_revocation_number` is equal to the commitment
|
|
* number of the last `revoke_and_ack` the receiving node has sent and the receiving node has not already received a `closing_signed`, it
|
|
* MUST re-send the `revoke_and_ack`, otherwise if
|
|
* `next_remote_revocation_number` is not equal to one greater than
|
|
* the commitment number of the last `revoke_and_ack` the receiving
|
|
* node has sent (or equal to zero if none have been sent), it SHOULD
|
|
* fail the channel.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (next_remote_revocation_number == peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 2) {
|
|
/* Don't try to retransmit revocation index -1! */
|
|
if (peer->next_index[LOCAL] < 2) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"bad reestablish revocation_number: %"
|
|
PRIu64,
|
|
next_remote_revocation_number);
|
|
}
|
|
retransmit_revoke_and_ack = true;
|
|
} else if (next_remote_revocation_number != peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 1) {
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"bad reestablish revocation_number: %"PRIu64
|
|
" vs %"PRIu64,
|
|
next_remote_revocation_number,
|
|
peer->next_index[LOCAL]);
|
|
} else
|
|
retransmit_revoke_and_ack = false;
|
|
|
|
/* We have to re-send in the same order we sent originally:
|
|
* revoke_and_ack (usually) alters our next commitment. */
|
|
if (retransmit_revoke_and_ack && !peer->last_was_revoke)
|
|
resend_revoke(peer);
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* If `next_local_commitment_number` is equal to the commitment number
|
|
* of the last `commitment_signed` message the receiving node has
|
|
* sent, it MUST reuse the same commitment number for its next
|
|
* `commitment_signed`
|
|
*/
|
|
if (next_local_commitment_number == peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 1) {
|
|
/* We completed opening, we don't re-transmit that one! */
|
|
if (next_local_commitment_number == 0)
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"bad reestablish commitment_number: %"
|
|
PRIu64,
|
|
next_local_commitment_number);
|
|
|
|
resend_commitment(peer, peer->last_sent_commit);
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* ... otherwise if `next_local_commitment_number` is not one greater
|
|
* than the commitment number of the last `commitment_signed` message
|
|
* the receiving node has sent, it SHOULD fail the channel.
|
|
*/
|
|
} else if (next_local_commitment_number != peer->next_index[REMOTE])
|
|
peer_failed(&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
"bad reestablish commitment_number: %"PRIu64
|
|
" vs %"PRIu64,
|
|
next_local_commitment_number,
|
|
peer->next_index[REMOTE]);
|
|
|
|
/* This covers the case where we sent revoke after commit. */
|
|
if (retransmit_revoke_and_ack && peer->last_was_revoke)
|
|
resend_revoke(peer);
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* On reconnection if the node has sent a previous `closing_signed` it
|
|
* MUST send another `closing_signed`, otherwise if the node has sent
|
|
* a previous `shutdown` it MUST retransmit it.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* If we had sent `closing_signed`, we'd be in closingd. */
|
|
maybe_send_shutdown(peer);
|
|
|
|
/* Corner case: we didn't send shutdown before because update_add_htlc
|
|
* pending, but now they're cleared by restart, and we're actually
|
|
* complete. In that case, their `shutdown` will trigger us. */
|
|
|
|
/* Start commit timer: if we sent revoke we might need it. */
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
|
|
/* Now, re-send any that we're supposed to be failing. */
|
|
for (htlc = htlc_map_first(peer->channel->htlcs, &it);
|
|
htlc;
|
|
htlc = htlc_map_next(peer->channel->htlcs, &it)) {
|
|
if (htlc->state == SENT_REMOVE_HTLC)
|
|
send_fail_or_fulfill(peer, htlc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Reenable channel by sending a channel_update without the
|
|
* disable flag */
|
|
cupdate = create_channel_update(NULL, peer, false);
|
|
wire_sync_write(GOSSIP_FD, cupdate);
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(cupdate));
|
|
|
|
/* Corner case: we will get upset with them if they send
|
|
* commitment_signed with no changes. But it could be that we sent a
|
|
* feechange, they acked, and now they want to commit it; we can't
|
|
* even tell by seeing if fees are different (short of saving full fee
|
|
* state in database) since it could be a tiny feechange, or two
|
|
* feechanges which cancelled out. */
|
|
if (peer->channel->funder == LOCAL)
|
|
peer->channel->changes_pending[LOCAL] = true;
|
|
|
|
peer_billboard(true, "Reconnected, and reestablished.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_funding_locked(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pubkey next_per_commit_point;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_channel_funding_locked(msg,
|
|
&peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL]))
|
|
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNEL_FUNDING_LOCKED, msg);
|
|
|
|
per_commit_point(&peer->shaseed,
|
|
&next_per_commit_point, peer->next_index[LOCAL]);
|
|
|
|
status_trace("funding_locked: sending commit index %"PRIu64": %s",
|
|
peer->next_index[LOCAL],
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &next_per_commit_point));
|
|
msg = towire_funding_locked(NULL,
|
|
&peer->channel_id, &next_per_commit_point);
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
peer->funding_locked[LOCAL] = true;
|
|
|
|
if (peer->funding_locked[REMOTE]) {
|
|
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
|
|
take(towire_channel_normal_operation(NULL)));
|
|
}
|
|
billboard_update(peer);
|
|
|
|
/* Send temporary or final announcements */
|
|
send_temporary_announcement(peer);
|
|
send_announcement_signatures(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_funding_announce_depth(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
peer->announce_depth_reached = true;
|
|
send_announcement_signatures(peer);
|
|
|
|
/* Only send the announcement and update if the other end gave
|
|
* us its sig */
|
|
if (peer->have_sigs[REMOTE])
|
|
announce_channel(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_offer_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
u32 cltv_expiry;
|
|
u64 amount_msat;
|
|
struct sha256 payment_hash;
|
|
u8 onion_routing_packet[TOTAL_PACKET_SIZE];
|
|
enum channel_add_err e;
|
|
enum onion_type failcode;
|
|
/* Subtle: must be tal_arr since we marshal using tal_len() */
|
|
const char *failmsg;
|
|
|
|
if (!peer->funding_locked[LOCAL] || !peer->funding_locked[REMOTE])
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
|
|
"funding not locked for offer_htlc");
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_channel_offer_htlc(inmsg, &amount_msat,
|
|
&cltv_expiry, &payment_hash,
|
|
onion_routing_packet))
|
|
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNEL_OFFER_HTLC, inmsg);
|
|
|
|
e = channel_add_htlc(peer->channel, LOCAL, peer->htlc_id,
|
|
amount_msat, cltv_expiry, &payment_hash,
|
|
onion_routing_packet, NULL);
|
|
status_trace("Adding HTLC %"PRIu64" msat=%"PRIu64" cltv=%u gave %s",
|
|
peer->htlc_id, amount_msat, cltv_expiry,
|
|
channel_add_err_name(e));
|
|
|
|
switch (e) {
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_ADD_OK:
|
|
/* Tell the peer. */
|
|
msg = towire_update_add_htlc(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
|
|
peer->htlc_id, amount_msat,
|
|
&payment_hash, cltv_expiry,
|
|
onion_routing_packet);
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
/* Tell the master. */
|
|
msg = towire_channel_offer_htlc_reply(NULL, peer->htlc_id,
|
|
0, NULL);
|
|
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD, take(msg));
|
|
peer->htlc_id++;
|
|
return;
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_INVALID_EXPIRY:
|
|
failcode = WIRE_INCORRECT_CLTV_EXPIRY;
|
|
failmsg = tal_fmt(inmsg, "Invalid cltv_expiry %u", cltv_expiry);
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_DUPLICATE:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_DUPLICATE_ID_DIFFERENT:
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
|
|
"Duplicate HTLC %"PRIu64, peer->htlc_id);
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: Fuzz the boundaries a bit to avoid probing? */
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_MAX_HTLC_VALUE_EXCEEDED:
|
|
/* FIXME: We should advertise this? */
|
|
failcode = WIRE_TEMPORARY_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
|
|
failmsg = tal_fmt(inmsg, "Maximum value exceeded");
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_EXCEEDED:
|
|
failcode = WIRE_TEMPORARY_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
|
|
failmsg = tal_fmt(inmsg, "Capacity exceeded");
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_BELOW_MINIMUM:
|
|
failcode = WIRE_AMOUNT_BELOW_MINIMUM;
|
|
failmsg = tal_fmt(inmsg, "HTLC too small (%u minimum)",
|
|
htlc_minimum_msat(peer->channel, REMOTE));
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_TOO_MANY_HTLCS:
|
|
failcode = WIRE_TEMPORARY_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
|
|
failmsg = tal_fmt(inmsg, "Too many HTLCs");
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Shouldn't return anything else! */
|
|
abort();
|
|
|
|
failed:
|
|
/* Note: tal_fmt doesn't set tal_len() to exact length, so fix here. */
|
|
tal_resize(&failmsg, strlen(failmsg)+1);
|
|
msg = towire_channel_offer_htlc_reply(NULL, 0, failcode, (u8*)failmsg);
|
|
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD, take(msg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_feerates(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 feerate;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_channel_feerates(inmsg, &feerate,
|
|
&peer->feerate_min,
|
|
&peer->feerate_max))
|
|
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNEL_FEERATES, inmsg);
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* The node which is responsible for paying the bitcoin fee SHOULD
|
|
* send `update_fee` to ensure the current fee rate is sufficient for
|
|
* timely processing of the commitment transaction by a significant
|
|
* margin. */
|
|
if (peer->channel->funder == LOCAL) {
|
|
peer->desired_feerate = feerate;
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* The node which is not responsible for paying the bitcoin
|
|
* fee MUST NOT send `update_fee`.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* FIXME: We could drop to chain if fees are too low, but
|
|
* that's fraught too. */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_preimage(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
u64 id;
|
|
struct preimage preimage;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_channel_fulfill_htlc(inmsg, &id, &preimage))
|
|
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNEL_FULFILL_HTLC, inmsg);
|
|
|
|
switch (channel_fulfill_htlc(peer->channel, REMOTE, id, &preimage)) {
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_REMOVE_OK:
|
|
msg = towire_update_fulfill_htlc(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
|
|
id, &preimage);
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
return;
|
|
/* These shouldn't happen, because any offered HTLC (which would give
|
|
* us the preimage) should have timed out long before. If we
|
|
* were to get preimages from other sources, this could happen. */
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_NO_SUCH_ID:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_ALREADY_FULFILLED:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_UNCOMMITTED:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_NOT_IRREVOCABLE:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_BAD_PREIMAGE:
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
|
|
"HTLC %"PRIu64" preimage failed", id);
|
|
}
|
|
abort();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u8 *foreign_channel_update(const tal_t *ctx,
|
|
struct peer *peer,
|
|
const struct short_channel_id *scid)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *msg, *update;
|
|
|
|
msg = towire_gossip_get_update(NULL, scid);
|
|
msg = gossipd_wait_sync_reply(tmpctx, peer, take(msg),
|
|
WIRE_GOSSIP_GET_UPDATE_REPLY);
|
|
if (!fromwire_gossip_get_update_reply(ctx, msg, &update))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_GOSSIP_IO,
|
|
"Invalid update reply");
|
|
return update;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u8 *make_failmsg(const tal_t *ctx,
|
|
struct peer *peer,
|
|
const struct htlc *htlc,
|
|
enum onion_type failcode,
|
|
const struct short_channel_id *scid)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *msg, *channel_update = NULL;
|
|
u32 cltv_expiry = abs_locktime_to_blocks(&htlc->expiry);
|
|
|
|
switch (failcode) {
|
|
case WIRE_INVALID_REALM:
|
|
msg = towire_invalid_realm(ctx);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_TEMPORARY_NODE_FAILURE:
|
|
msg = towire_temporary_node_failure(ctx);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_PERMANENT_NODE_FAILURE:
|
|
msg = towire_permanent_node_failure(ctx);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_REQUIRED_NODE_FEATURE_MISSING:
|
|
msg = towire_required_node_feature_missing(ctx);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_TEMPORARY_CHANNEL_FAILURE:
|
|
channel_update = foreign_channel_update(ctx, peer, scid);
|
|
msg = towire_temporary_channel_failure(ctx, channel_update);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_DISABLED:
|
|
msg = towire_channel_disabled(ctx);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_PERMANENT_CHANNEL_FAILURE:
|
|
msg = towire_permanent_channel_failure(ctx);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_REQUIRED_CHANNEL_FEATURE_MISSING:
|
|
msg = towire_required_channel_feature_missing(ctx);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_UNKNOWN_NEXT_PEER:
|
|
msg = towire_unknown_next_peer(ctx);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_AMOUNT_BELOW_MINIMUM:
|
|
channel_update = foreign_channel_update(ctx, peer, scid);
|
|
msg = towire_amount_below_minimum(ctx, htlc->msatoshi,
|
|
channel_update);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_FEE_INSUFFICIENT:
|
|
channel_update = foreign_channel_update(ctx, peer, scid);
|
|
msg = towire_fee_insufficient(ctx, htlc->msatoshi,
|
|
channel_update);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_INCORRECT_CLTV_EXPIRY:
|
|
channel_update = foreign_channel_update(ctx, peer, scid);
|
|
msg = towire_incorrect_cltv_expiry(ctx, cltv_expiry,
|
|
channel_update);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_EXPIRY_TOO_SOON:
|
|
channel_update = foreign_channel_update(ctx, peer, scid);
|
|
msg = towire_expiry_too_soon(ctx, channel_update);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_EXPIRY_TOO_FAR:
|
|
msg = towire_expiry_too_far(ctx);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_UNKNOWN_PAYMENT_HASH:
|
|
msg = towire_unknown_payment_hash(ctx);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_INCORRECT_PAYMENT_AMOUNT:
|
|
msg = towire_incorrect_payment_amount(ctx);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_FINAL_EXPIRY_TOO_SOON:
|
|
msg = towire_final_expiry_too_soon(ctx);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_FINAL_INCORRECT_CLTV_EXPIRY:
|
|
msg = towire_final_incorrect_cltv_expiry(ctx, cltv_expiry);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_FINAL_INCORRECT_HTLC_AMOUNT:
|
|
msg = towire_final_incorrect_htlc_amount(ctx, htlc->msatoshi);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case WIRE_INVALID_ONION_VERSION:
|
|
case WIRE_INVALID_ONION_HMAC:
|
|
case WIRE_INVALID_ONION_KEY:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Asked to create failmsg %u (%s)",
|
|
failcode, onion_type_name(failcode));
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
tal_free(channel_update);
|
|
return msg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_fail(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
u64 id;
|
|
u8 *errpkt;
|
|
u16 failcode;
|
|
struct short_channel_id scid;
|
|
enum channel_remove_err e;
|
|
struct htlc *h;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_channel_fail_htlc(inmsg, inmsg, &id, &errpkt,
|
|
&failcode, &scid))
|
|
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNEL_FAIL_HTLC, inmsg);
|
|
|
|
if (failcode && tal_len(errpkt))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
|
|
"Invalid channel_fail_htlc: %s with errpkt?",
|
|
onion_type_name(failcode));
|
|
|
|
e = channel_fail_htlc(peer->channel, REMOTE, id, &h);
|
|
switch (e) {
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_REMOVE_OK:
|
|
if (failcode & BADONION) {
|
|
struct sha256 sha256_of_onion;
|
|
status_trace("Failing %"PRIu64" with code %u",
|
|
id, failcode);
|
|
sha256(&sha256_of_onion, h->routing,
|
|
tal_len(h->routing));
|
|
msg = towire_update_fail_malformed_htlc(peer,
|
|
&peer->channel_id,
|
|
id, &sha256_of_onion,
|
|
failcode);
|
|
} else {
|
|
u8 *reply;
|
|
|
|
if (failcode) {
|
|
u8 *failmsg = make_failmsg(inmsg, peer, h,
|
|
failcode, &scid);
|
|
errpkt = create_onionreply(inmsg,
|
|
h->shared_secret,
|
|
failmsg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
reply = wrap_onionreply(inmsg, h->shared_secret,
|
|
errpkt);
|
|
msg = towire_update_fail_htlc(peer, &peer->channel_id,
|
|
id, reply);
|
|
}
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(msg));
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
return;
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_NO_SUCH_ID:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_ALREADY_FULFILLED:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_UNCOMMITTED:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_NOT_IRREVOCABLE:
|
|
case CHANNEL_ERR_BAD_PREIMAGE:
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
|
|
"HTLC %"PRIu64" removal failed: %s", id,
|
|
channel_remove_err_name(e));
|
|
}
|
|
abort();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_ping_cmd(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
|
|
{
|
|
u16 num_pong_bytes, ping_len;
|
|
u8 *ping;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_channel_ping(inmsg, &num_pong_bytes, &ping_len))
|
|
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNEL_PING, inmsg);
|
|
|
|
ping = make_ping(NULL, num_pong_bytes, ping_len);
|
|
if (tal_len(ping) > 65535)
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO, "Oversize channel_ping");
|
|
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(ping));
|
|
|
|
status_trace("sending ping expecting %sresponse",
|
|
num_pong_bytes >= 65532 ? "no " : "");
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #1:
|
|
*
|
|
* if `num_pong_bytes` is less than 65532 it MUST respond by sending a
|
|
* `pong` message with `byteslen` equal to `num_pong_bytes`, otherwise
|
|
* it MUST ignore the `ping`.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (num_pong_bytes >= 65532)
|
|
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
|
|
take(towire_channel_ping_reply(NULL, 0)));
|
|
else
|
|
peer->num_pings_outstanding++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void handle_shutdown_cmd(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!fromwire_channel_send_shutdown(inmsg))
|
|
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNEL_SEND_SHUTDOWN, inmsg);
|
|
|
|
/* We can't send this until commit (if any) is done, so start timer. */
|
|
peer->send_shutdown = true;
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if DEVELOPER
|
|
static void handle_dev_reenable_commit(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
dev_suppress_commit = false;
|
|
start_commit_timer(peer);
|
|
status_trace("dev_reenable_commit");
|
|
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
|
|
take(towire_channel_dev_reenable_commit_reply(NULL)));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static void req_in(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
enum channel_wire_type t = fromwire_peektype(msg);
|
|
|
|
switch (t) {
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_FUNDING_LOCKED:
|
|
handle_funding_locked(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_FUNDING_ANNOUNCE_DEPTH:
|
|
handle_funding_announce_depth(peer);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_OFFER_HTLC:
|
|
handle_offer_htlc(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_FEERATES:
|
|
handle_feerates(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_FULFILL_HTLC:
|
|
handle_preimage(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_FAIL_HTLC:
|
|
handle_fail(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_PING:
|
|
handle_ping_cmd(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_SEND_SHUTDOWN:
|
|
handle_shutdown_cmd(peer, msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_DEV_REENABLE_COMMIT:
|
|
#if DEVELOPER
|
|
handle_dev_reenable_commit(peer);
|
|
return;
|
|
#endif /* DEVELOPER */
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_NORMAL_OPERATION:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_INIT:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_OFFER_HTLC_REPLY:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_PING_REPLY:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_SENDING_COMMITSIG:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_GOT_COMMITSIG:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_GOT_REVOKE:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_SENDING_COMMITSIG_REPLY:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_GOT_COMMITSIG_REPLY:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_GOT_REVOKE_REPLY:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_GOT_FUNDING_LOCKED:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_GOT_SHUTDOWN:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE:
|
|
case WIRE_CHANNEL_DEV_REENABLE_COMMIT_REPLY:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
master_badmsg(-1, msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void init_shared_secrets(struct channel *channel,
|
|
const struct added_htlc *htlcs,
|
|
const enum htlc_state *hstates)
|
|
{
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(htlcs); i++) {
|
|
struct htlc *htlc;
|
|
|
|
/* We only derive this for HTLCs *they* added. */
|
|
if (htlc_state_owner(hstates[i]) != REMOTE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
htlc = channel_get_htlc(channel, REMOTE, htlcs[i].id);
|
|
htlc->shared_secret = tal(htlc, struct secret);
|
|
get_shared_secret(htlc, htlc->shared_secret);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We do this synchronously. */
|
|
static void init_channel(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
struct privkey seed;
|
|
struct basepoints points[NUM_SIDES];
|
|
u64 funding_satoshi;
|
|
u16 funding_txout;
|
|
u64 local_msatoshi;
|
|
struct pubkey funding_pubkey[NUM_SIDES];
|
|
struct bitcoin_txid funding_txid;
|
|
enum side funder;
|
|
enum htlc_state *hstates;
|
|
struct fulfilled_htlc *fulfilled;
|
|
enum side *fulfilled_sides;
|
|
struct failed_htlc **failed;
|
|
enum side *failed_sides;
|
|
struct added_htlc *htlcs;
|
|
bool reconnected;
|
|
u8 *funding_signed;
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
u32 feerate_per_kw[NUM_SIDES];
|
|
|
|
assert(!(fcntl(MASTER_FD, F_GETFL) & O_NONBLOCK));
|
|
|
|
status_setup_sync(MASTER_FD);
|
|
|
|
msg = wire_sync_read(peer, MASTER_FD);
|
|
if (!fromwire_channel_init(peer, msg,
|
|
&peer->chain_hash,
|
|
&funding_txid, &funding_txout,
|
|
&funding_satoshi,
|
|
&peer->conf[LOCAL], &peer->conf[REMOTE],
|
|
feerate_per_kw,
|
|
&peer->feerate_min, &peer->feerate_max,
|
|
&peer->their_commit_sig,
|
|
&peer->cs,
|
|
&peer->gossip_index,
|
|
&funding_pubkey[REMOTE],
|
|
&points[REMOTE].revocation,
|
|
&points[REMOTE].payment,
|
|
&points[REMOTE].htlc,
|
|
&points[REMOTE].delayed_payment,
|
|
&peer->remote_per_commit,
|
|
&peer->old_remote_per_commit,
|
|
&funder,
|
|
&peer->fee_base,
|
|
&peer->fee_per_satoshi,
|
|
&local_msatoshi,
|
|
&seed,
|
|
&peer->node_ids[LOCAL],
|
|
&peer->node_ids[REMOTE],
|
|
&peer->commit_msec,
|
|
&peer->cltv_delta,
|
|
&peer->last_was_revoke,
|
|
&peer->last_sent_commit,
|
|
&peer->next_index[LOCAL],
|
|
&peer->next_index[REMOTE],
|
|
&peer->revocations_received,
|
|
&peer->htlc_id,
|
|
&htlcs,
|
|
&hstates,
|
|
&fulfilled,
|
|
&fulfilled_sides,
|
|
&failed,
|
|
&failed_sides,
|
|
&peer->funding_locked[LOCAL],
|
|
&peer->funding_locked[REMOTE],
|
|
&peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL],
|
|
&reconnected,
|
|
&peer->send_shutdown,
|
|
&peer->shutdown_sent[REMOTE],
|
|
&peer->final_scriptpubkey,
|
|
&peer->channel_flags,
|
|
&funding_signed))
|
|
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNEL_INIT, msg);
|
|
|
|
status_trace("init %s: remote_per_commit = %s, old_remote_per_commit = %s"
|
|
" next_idx_local = %"PRIu64
|
|
" next_idx_remote = %"PRIu64
|
|
" revocations_received = %"PRIu64
|
|
" feerates %u/%u (range %u-%u)",
|
|
side_to_str(funder),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
|
|
&peer->remote_per_commit),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
|
|
&peer->old_remote_per_commit),
|
|
peer->next_index[LOCAL], peer->next_index[REMOTE],
|
|
peer->revocations_received,
|
|
feerate_per_kw[LOCAL], feerate_per_kw[REMOTE],
|
|
peer->feerate_min, peer->feerate_max);
|
|
|
|
/* First commit is used for opening: if we've sent 0, we're on
|
|
* index 1. */
|
|
assert(peer->next_index[LOCAL] > 0);
|
|
assert(peer->next_index[REMOTE] > 0);
|
|
|
|
/* channel_id is set from funding txout */
|
|
derive_channel_id(&peer->channel_id, &funding_txid, funding_txout);
|
|
|
|
/* We derive everything from the one secret seed. */
|
|
derive_basepoints(&seed, &funding_pubkey[LOCAL], &points[LOCAL],
|
|
&peer->our_secrets, &peer->shaseed);
|
|
|
|
peer->channel = new_full_channel(peer, &funding_txid, funding_txout,
|
|
funding_satoshi,
|
|
local_msatoshi,
|
|
feerate_per_kw,
|
|
&peer->conf[LOCAL], &peer->conf[REMOTE],
|
|
&points[LOCAL], &points[REMOTE],
|
|
&funding_pubkey[LOCAL],
|
|
&funding_pubkey[REMOTE],
|
|
funder);
|
|
|
|
if (!channel_force_htlcs(peer->channel, htlcs, hstates,
|
|
fulfilled, fulfilled_sides,
|
|
cast_const2(const struct failed_htlc **,
|
|
failed),
|
|
failed_sides))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Could not restore HTLCs");
|
|
|
|
/* We derive shared secrets for each remote HTLC, so we can
|
|
* create error packet if necessary. */
|
|
init_shared_secrets(peer->channel, htlcs, hstates);
|
|
|
|
peer->channel_direction = get_channel_direction(
|
|
&peer->node_ids[LOCAL], &peer->node_ids[REMOTE]);
|
|
|
|
/* Default desired feerate is the feerate we set for them last. */
|
|
if (peer->channel->funder == LOCAL)
|
|
peer->desired_feerate = feerate_per_kw[REMOTE];
|
|
|
|
/* OK, now we can process peer messages. */
|
|
if (reconnected)
|
|
peer_reconnect(peer);
|
|
|
|
/* If we have a funding_signed message, send that immediately */
|
|
if (funding_signed)
|
|
enqueue_peer_msg(peer, take(funding_signed));
|
|
|
|
billboard_update(peer);
|
|
tal_free(msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void send_shutdown_complete(struct peer *peer)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Push out any incomplete messages to peer. */
|
|
flush_peer_out(peer);
|
|
|
|
/* Now we can tell master shutdown is complete. */
|
|
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
|
|
take(towire_channel_shutdown_complete(NULL,
|
|
&peer->cs,
|
|
peer->gossip_index)));
|
|
fdpass_send(MASTER_FD, PEER_FD);
|
|
fdpass_send(MASTER_FD, GOSSIP_FD);
|
|
close(MASTER_FD);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
|
{
|
|
int i, nfds;
|
|
fd_set fds_in, fds_out;
|
|
struct peer *peer;
|
|
|
|
subdaemon_setup(argc, argv);
|
|
|
|
peer = tal(NULL, struct peer);
|
|
peer->num_pings_outstanding = 0;
|
|
timers_init(&peer->timers, time_mono());
|
|
peer->commit_timer = NULL;
|
|
peer->have_sigs[LOCAL] = peer->have_sigs[REMOTE] = false;
|
|
peer->announce_depth_reached = false;
|
|
msg_queue_init(&peer->from_master, peer);
|
|
msg_queue_init(&peer->from_gossipd, peer);
|
|
msg_queue_init(&peer->peer_out, peer);
|
|
peer->peer_outmsg = NULL;
|
|
peer->peer_outoff = 0;
|
|
peer->next_commit_sigs = NULL;
|
|
peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL] = false;
|
|
peer->last_update_timestamp = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* We send these to HSM to get real signatures; don't have valgrind
|
|
* complain. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < NUM_SIDES; i++) {
|
|
memset(&peer->announcement_node_sigs[i], 0,
|
|
sizeof(peer->announcement_node_sigs[i]));
|
|
memset(&peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[i], 0,
|
|
sizeof(peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[i]));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Read init_channel message sync. */
|
|
init_channel(peer);
|
|
|
|
FD_ZERO(&fds_in);
|
|
FD_SET(MASTER_FD, &fds_in);
|
|
FD_SET(PEER_FD, &fds_in);
|
|
FD_SET(GOSSIP_FD, &fds_in);
|
|
|
|
FD_ZERO(&fds_out);
|
|
FD_SET(PEER_FD, &fds_out);
|
|
nfds = GOSSIP_FD+1;
|
|
|
|
while (!shutdown_complete(peer)) {
|
|
struct timemono first;
|
|
fd_set rfds = fds_in, wfds, *wptr;
|
|
struct timeval timeout, *tptr;
|
|
struct timer *expired;
|
|
const u8 *msg;
|
|
struct timemono now = time_mono();
|
|
|
|
/* Free any temporary allocations */
|
|
clean_tmpctx();
|
|
|
|
/* For simplicity, we process one event at a time. */
|
|
msg = msg_dequeue(&peer->from_master);
|
|
if (msg) {
|
|
status_trace("Now dealing with deferred %s",
|
|
channel_wire_type_name(
|
|
fromwire_peektype(msg)));
|
|
req_in(peer, msg);
|
|
tal_free(msg);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
expired = timers_expire(&peer->timers, now);
|
|
if (expired) {
|
|
timer_expired(peer, expired);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg = msg_dequeue(&peer->from_gossipd);
|
|
if (msg) {
|
|
status_trace("Now dealing with deferred gossip %u",
|
|
fromwire_peektype(msg));
|
|
gossip_in(peer, msg);
|
|
tal_free(msg);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (timer_earliest(&peer->timers, &first)) {
|
|
timeout = timespec_to_timeval(
|
|
timemono_between(first, now).ts);
|
|
tptr = &timeout;
|
|
} else
|
|
tptr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (peer_write_pending(peer)) {
|
|
wfds = fds_out;
|
|
wptr = &wfds;
|
|
} else
|
|
wptr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (select(nfds, &rfds, wptr, NULL, tptr) < 0) {
|
|
/* Signals OK, eg. SIGUSR1 */
|
|
if (errno == EINTR)
|
|
continue;
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"select failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Try writing out encrypted packet if any (don't block!) */
|
|
if (wptr && FD_ISSET(PEER_FD, wptr)) {
|
|
if (!io_fd_block(PEER_FD, false))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"NONBLOCK failed: %s",
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
do_peer_write(peer);
|
|
if (!io_fd_block(PEER_FD, true))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"NONBLOCK unset failed: %s",
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (FD_ISSET(MASTER_FD, &rfds)) {
|
|
msg = wire_sync_read(peer, MASTER_FD);
|
|
|
|
if (!msg)
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
|
|
"Can't read command: %s",
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
req_in(peer, msg);
|
|
} else if (FD_ISSET(GOSSIP_FD, &rfds)) {
|
|
msg = wire_sync_read(peer, GOSSIP_FD);
|
|
|
|
if (!msg)
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_GOSSIP_IO,
|
|
"Can't read command: %s",
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
gossip_in(peer, msg);
|
|
} else if (FD_ISSET(PEER_FD, &rfds)) {
|
|
/* This could take forever, but who cares? */
|
|
msg = channeld_read_peer_msg(peer);
|
|
if (msg)
|
|
peer_in(peer, msg);
|
|
} else
|
|
msg = NULL;
|
|
tal_free(msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We only exit when shutdown is complete. */
|
|
assert(shutdown_complete(peer));
|
|
send_shutdown_complete(peer);
|
|
tal_free(tmpctx);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|