diff --git a/deps/openssl/README.chromium b/deps/openssl/README.chromium deleted file mode 100644 index aec361b66d..0000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/README.chromium +++ /dev/null @@ -1,96 +0,0 @@ -Name: openssl -URL: http://openssl.org/source/ -Version: 1.0.0f -License: BSDish -License File: openssl/LICENSE - -Description: -This is OpenSSL, the standard SSL/TLS library, which is used only in Android. - -It's an unmodified, upstream source except for the patches listed below. - - -******************************************************************************** -The following patches are taken from Android Open Source Project. - - -progs.patch: - -Fixup sources under the apps/ directory that are not built under the android environment. - - -small_records.patch: - -Reduce OpenSSL memory consumption. -SSL records may be as large as 16K, but are typically < 2K. In -addition, a historic bug in Windows allowed records to be as large -32K. OpenSSL statically allocates read and write buffers (34K and -18K respectively) used for processing records. -With this patch, OpenSSL statically allocates 4K + 4K buffers, with -the option of dynamically growing buffers to 34K + 4K, which is a -saving of 44K per connection for the typical case. - - -handshake_cutthrough.patch - -Enables SSL3+ clients to send application data immediately following the -Finished message even when negotiating full-handshakes. With this patch, -clients can negotiate SSL connections in 1-RTT even when performing -full-handshakes. - - -jsse.patch - -Support for JSSE implementation based on OpenSSL. - - -npn.patch - -Transport Layer Security (TLS) Next Protocol Negotiation Extension - - -sha1_armv4_large.patch - -This patch eliminates memory stores to addresses below SP. - - -openssl_no_dtls1.patch - -Add missing #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 - - -******************************************************************************** -The following patches are needed to compile this openssl on Chromium and pass -the related net unit tests. - - -empty_OPENSSL_cpuid_setup.patch - -Use a empty implementation for function OPENSSL_cpuid_setup to resolve link -error. We should figure out how to geenrate platform specific implementation -of OPENSSL_cpuid_setup by leveraging crypto/*cpuid.pl. - - -x509_hash_name_algorithm_change.patch - -There are many symbolic links under /etc/ssl/certs created by using hash of -the pem certificates in order for OpenSSL to find those certificate. -Openssl has a tool to help you create hash symbolic links. (See tools/c_rehash) -However the new openssl changed the hash algorithm, Unless you compile/install -the latest openssl library and re-create all related symbolic links, the new -openssl can not find some certificates because the links of those certificates -were created by using old hash algorithm, which causes some tests failed. -This patch gives a way to find a certificate according to its hash by using both -new algorithm and old algorithm. -crbug.com/111045 is used to track this issue. - - -tls_exporter.patch - -Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (RFC 5705). - - -Android platform support - -Copy config/android/openssl/opensslconf.h from Android's -external/openssl/include/openssl/opensslconf.h diff --git a/deps/openssl/patches/empty_OPENSSL_cpuid_setup.patch b/deps/openssl/patches/empty_OPENSSL_cpuid_setup.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 58e52ad1fd..0000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/patches/empty_OPENSSL_cpuid_setup.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ ---- openssl-1.0.0f-origin/crypto/cryptlib.c 2011-06-22 23:39:00.000000000 +0800 -+++ openssl-1.0.0f/crypto/cryptlib.c 2012-01-19 02:17:50.261681856 +0800 -@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ - unsigned long *OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc(void) { return NULL; } - #endif - int OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated = 0; --#if !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_SETUP) && !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_SETUP) - void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {} - #endif - diff --git a/deps/openssl/patches/handshake_cutthrough.patch b/deps/openssl/patches/handshake_cutthrough.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4f298399c5..0000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/patches/handshake_cutthrough.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,275 +0,0 @@ -diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/apps/s_client.c openssl-1.0.0/apps/s_client.c ---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/apps/s_client.c 2009-12-16 15:28:28.000000000 -0500 -+++ openssl-1.0.0/apps/s_client.c 2010-04-21 14:39:49.000000000 -0400 -@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void) - BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n"); - BIO_printf(bio_err," -status - request certificate status from server\n"); - BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); -+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -cutthrough - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n"); - #endif - } - -@@ -304,6 +305,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) - EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; - char *CApath=NULL,*CAfile=NULL,*cipher=NULL; - int reconnect=0,badop=0,verify=SSL_VERIFY_NONE,bugs=0; -+ int cutthrough=0; - int crlf=0; - int write_tty,read_tty,write_ssl,read_ssl,tty_on,ssl_pending; - SSL_CTX *ctx=NULL; -@@ -533,6 +535,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) - else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ticket") == 0) - { off|=SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; } - #endif -+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cutthrough") == 0) -+ cutthrough=1; - else if (strcmp(*argv,"-serverpref") == 0) - off|=SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE; - else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cipher") == 0) -@@ -714,6 +718,15 @@ bad: - */ - if (sock_type == SOCK_DGRAM) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx, 1); - -+ /* Enable handshake cutthrough for client connections using -+ * strong ciphers. */ -+ if (cutthrough) -+ { -+ int ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx); -+ ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH; -+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, ssl_mode); -+ } -+ - if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,apps_ssl_info_callback); - if (cipher != NULL) - if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx,cipher)) { -diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/s3_clnt.c openssl-1.0.0/ssl/s3_clnt.c ---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-02-27 19:24:24.000000000 -0500 -+++ openssl-1.0.0/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-04-21 14:39:49.000000000 -0400 -@@ -186,6 +186,18 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) - - s->in_handshake++; - if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); -+#if 0 /* Send app data in separate packet, otherwise, some particular site -+ * (only one site so far) closes the socket. -+ * Note: there is a very small chance that two TCP packets -+ * could be arriving at server combined into a single TCP packet, -+ * then trigger that site to break. We haven't encounter that though. -+ */ -+ if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) -+ { -+ /* Send app data along with CCS/Finished */ -+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED; -+ } -+#endif - - for (;;) - { -@@ -454,14 +468,31 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) - } - else - { --#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -- /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ -- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) -- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; -+ if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) && SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) >= 128 -+ && s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 /* no cutthrough on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine) */ -+ ) -+ { -+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) -+ { -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE; -+ s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; -+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE; -+ } -+ } - else -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -+ /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ -+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) -+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; -+ else - #endif -- -- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; -+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; -+ } - } - s->init_num=0; - break; -@@ -512,6 +541,24 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) - s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; - break; - -+ case SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE: -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -+ /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ -+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; -+ else -+#endif -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; -+ -+ /* SSL_write() will take care of flushing buffered data if -+ * DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED is set. -+ */ -+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)) -+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); -+ ret = 1; -+ goto end; -+ /* break; */ -+ - case SSL_ST_OK: - /* clean a few things up */ - ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); -diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/s3_lib.c openssl-1.0.0/ssl/s3_lib.c --- openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/s3_lib.c 2009-10-16 11:24:19.000000000 -0400 -+++ openssl-1.0.0/ssl/s3_lib.c 2010-04-21 14:39:49.000000000 -0400 -@@ -2551,9 +2551,22 @@ int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, - - static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek) - { -- int ret; -+ int n,ret; - - clear_sys_error(); -+ if ((s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER) && (s->wbio == s->bbio)) -+ { -+ /* Deal with an application that calls SSL_read() when handshake data -+ * is yet to be written. -+ */ -+ if (BIO_wpending(s->wbio) > 0) -+ { -+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; -+ n=BIO_flush(s->wbio); -+ if (n <= 0) return(n); -+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; -+ } -+ } - if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s); - s->s3->in_read_app_data=1; - ret=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,buf,len,peek); -diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssl.h openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssl.h ---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssl.h 2010-01-06 12:37:38.000000000 -0500 -+++ openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssl.h 2010-04-21 16:57:49.000000000 -0400 -@@ -605,6 +605,10 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st - /* Use small read and write buffers: (a) lazy allocate read buffers for - * large incoming records, and (b) limit the size of outgoing records. */ - #define SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS 0x00000020L -+/* When set, clients may send application data before receipt of CCS -+ * and Finished. This mode enables full-handshakes to 'complete' in -+ * one RTT. */ -+#define SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH 0x00000040L - - /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value, - * they cannot be used to clear bits. */ -@@ -1097,10 +1101,12 @@ extern "C" { - /* Is the SSL_connection established? */ - #define SSL_get_state(a) SSL_state(a) - #define SSL_is_init_finished(a) (SSL_state(a) == SSL_ST_OK) --#define SSL_in_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_INIT) -+#define SSL_in_init(a) ((SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_INIT) && \ -+ !SSL_cutthrough_complete(a)) - #define SSL_in_before(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_BEFORE) - #define SSL_in_connect_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL_in_accept_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_ACCEPT) -+int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s); - - /* The following 2 states are kept in ssl->rstate when reads fail, - * you should not need these */ -Only in openssl-1.0.0/ssl: ssl.h.orig -diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssl3.h openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssl3.h --- openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-01-06 12:37:38.000000000 -0500 -+++ openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-04-21 14:39:49.000000000 -0400 -@@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - /*client */ - /* extra state */ - #define SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH (0x100|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+#define SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE (0x101|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - /* write to server */ - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x110|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x111|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssl_lib.c ---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-02-17 14:43:46.000000000 -0500 -+++ openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-04-21 17:02:45.000000000 -0400 -@@ -3031,6 +3031,19 @@ void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void - SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); - } - -+int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s) -+ { -+ return (!s->server && /* cutthrough only applies to clients */ -+ !s->hit && /* full-handshake */ -+ s->version >= SSL3_VERSION && -+ s->s3->in_read_app_data == 0 && /* cutthrough only applies to write() */ -+ (SSL_get_mode((SSL*)s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) && /* cutthrough enabled */ -+ SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) >= 128 && /* strong cipher choosen */ -+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 && /* not a renegotiation handshake */ -+ (s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A || /* ready to write app-data*/ -+ s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)); -+ } -+ - /* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer - * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if - * any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md -diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssltest.c openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssltest.c ---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssltest.c 2010-01-24 11:57:38.000000000 -0500 -+++ openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssltest.c 2010-04-21 17:06:35.000000000 -0400 -@@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void) - fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists\n"); - fprintf(stderr," -c_small_records - enable client side use of small SSL record buffers\n"); - fprintf(stderr," -s_small_records - enable server side use of small SSL record buffers\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr," -cutthrough - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n"); - } - - static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix) -@@ -436,6 +437,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - int ssl_mode = 0; - int c_small_records=0; - int s_small_records=0; -+ int cutthrough = 0; - - verbose = 0; - debug = 0; -@@ -632,6 +634,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - { - s_small_records = 1; - } -+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cutthrough") == 0) -+ { -+ cutthrough = 1; -+ } - else - { - fprintf(stderr,"unknown option %s\n",*argv); -@@ -782,6 +788,13 @@ bad: - ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS; - SSL_CTX_set_mode(s_ctx, ssl_mode); - } -+ ssl_mode = 0; -+ if (cutthrough) -+ { -+ ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(c_ctx); -+ ssl_mode = SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH; -+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(c_ctx, ssl_mode); -+ } - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (!no_dhe) -diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/test/testssl openssl-1.0.0/test/testssl ---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/test/testssl 2006-03-10 18:06:27.000000000 -0500 -+++ openssl-1.0.0/test/testssl 2010-04-21 16:50:13.000000000 -0400 -@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ $ssltest -server_auth -client_auth -s_sm - echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication and small client and server buffers - $ssltest -server_auth -client_auth -c_small_records -s_small_records $CA $extra || exit 1 - -+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication and handshake cutthrough -+$ssltest -server_auth -client_auth -cutthrough $CA $extra || exit 1 - - echo test sslv2 via BIO pair - $ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 $extra || exit 1 diff --git a/deps/openssl/patches/jsse.patch b/deps/openssl/patches/jsse.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 249fb5b2b1..0000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/patches/jsse.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,426 +0,0 @@ ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000 -@@ -1133,6 +1133,9 @@ struct ssl_st - /* This can also be in the session once a session is established */ - SSL_SESSION *session; - -+ /* This can be disabled to prevent the use of uncached sessions */ -+ int session_creation_enabled; -+ - /* Default generate session ID callback. */ - GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id; - -@@ -1546,6 +1549,7 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher - int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c,int *alg_bits); - char * SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c); - const char * SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c); -+const char * SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(const SSL_CIPHER *c); - - int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s); - int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s); -@@ -1554,6 +1558,7 @@ const char * SSL_get_cipher_list(const - char * SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len); - int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL * s); - int SSL_pending(const SSL *s); -+const char * SSL_authentication_method(const SSL *c); - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK - int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd); - int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd); -@@ -1565,6 +1570,7 @@ BIO * SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s); - BIO * SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s); - #endif - int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str); -+int SSL_set_cipher_lists(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk); - void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes); - int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s); - int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s); -@@ -1580,6 +1586,8 @@ int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKE - int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk,SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len); - int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); - int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len); -+int SSL_use_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain); -+STACK_OF(X509) * SSL_get_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO - int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); -@@ -1615,6 +1623,7 @@ void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to,const S - SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void); - const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, - unsigned int *len); -+const char * SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s); - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API - int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp,const SSL_SESSION *ses); - #endif -@@ -1624,6 +1633,7 @@ int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp,const SSL_ - void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses); - int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in,unsigned char **pp); - int SSL_set_session(SSL *to, SSL_SESSION *session); -+void SSL_set_session_creation_enabled(SSL *, int); - int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c); - int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *,SSL_SESSION *c); - int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *, GEN_SESSION_CB); -@@ -2066,6 +2076,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); - #define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION 244 - #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE 198 - #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 199 -+#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN 2000 - #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 200 - #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY 201 - #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 202 -@@ -2272,6 +2283,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); - #define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING 345 - #define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 275 - #define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277 -+#define SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED 2000 - #define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219 - #define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220 - #define SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE 221 ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/d1_clnt.c 2010-01-26 19:46:29.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/d1_clnt.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000 -@@ -613,6 +613,12 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s) - #endif - (s->session->not_resumable)) - { -+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled) -+ { -+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); -+ goto err; -+ } - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) - goto err; - } ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s23_clnt.c 2010-02-16 14:20:40.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s23_clnt.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000 -@@ -687,6 +687,13 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s - - /* Since, if we are sending a ssl23 client hello, we are not - * reusing a session-id */ -+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled) -+ { -+ if (!(s->client_version == SSL2_VERSION)) -+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); -+ goto err; -+ } - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) - goto err; - ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000 -@@ -347,8 +347,11 @@ unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL - unsigned long l=7; - BUF_MEM *buf; - int no_chain; -+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain; - -- if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || s->ctx->extra_certs) -+ cert_chain = SSL_get_certificate_chain(s, x); -+ -+ if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || s->ctx->extra_certs || cert_chain) - no_chain = 1; - else - no_chain = 0; -@@ -400,6 +403,10 @@ unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL - return(0); - } - -+ for (i=0; idata[4]); - l2n3(l,p); ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000 -@@ -686,6 +686,12 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) - #endif - (sess->not_resumable)) - { -+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled) -+ { -+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); -+ goto err; -+ } - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) - goto err; - } -@@ -894,6 +900,12 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) - s->hit=0; - if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) - { -+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled) -+ { -+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); -+ goto err; -+ } - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) - { - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000 -@@ -902,6 +902,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) - */ - if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) - { -+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled) -+ { -+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); -+ goto err; -+ } - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) - goto err; - } -@@ -916,6 +922,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) - goto err; - else /* i == 0 */ - { -+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled) -+ { -+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); -+ goto err; -+ } - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) - goto err; - } ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_ciph.c 2010-06-15 17:25:14.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000 -@@ -1652,6 +1652,52 @@ int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER - return(ret); - } - -+/* return string version of key exchange algorithm */ -+const char* SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(const SSL_CIPHER* cipher) -+ { -+ switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) -+ { -+ case SSL_kRSA: -+ return SSL_TXT_RSA; -+ case SSL_kDHr: -+ return SSL_TXT_DH "_" SSL_TXT_RSA; -+ case SSL_kDHd: -+ return SSL_TXT_DH "_" SSL_TXT_DSS; -+ case SSL_kEDH: -+ switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) -+ { -+ case SSL_aDSS: -+ return "DHE_" SSL_TXT_DSS; -+ case SSL_aRSA: -+ return "DHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA; -+ case SSL_aNULL: -+ return SSL_TXT_DH "_anon"; -+ default: -+ return "UNKNOWN"; -+ } -+ case SSL_kKRB5: -+ return SSL_TXT_KRB5; -+ case SSL_kECDHr: -+ return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_" SSL_TXT_RSA; -+ case SSL_kECDHe: -+ return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_" SSL_TXT_ECDSA; -+ case SSL_kEECDH: -+ switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) -+ { -+ case SSL_aECDSA: -+ return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_ECDSA; -+ case SSL_aRSA: -+ return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA; -+ case SSL_aNULL: -+ return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_anon"; -+ default: -+ return "UNKNOWN"; -+ } -+ default: -+ return "UNKNOWN"; -+ } -+ } -+ - SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n) - { - SSL_COMP *ctmp; ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000 -@@ -465,6 +465,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING),"scsv received when renegotiating"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT) ,"serverhello tlsext"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),"session id context uninitialized"}, -+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED),"session may not be created"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHORT_READ) ,"short read"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE),"signature for non signing certificate"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE),"ssl23 doing session id reuse"}, ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000 -@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) - OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); - memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); - s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback; -+ s->session_creation_enabled=1; - s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id; - - s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); -@@ -1311,6 +1312,32 @@ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const cha - return 1; - } - -+/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ -+int SSL_set_cipher_lists(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk) -+ { -+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list; -+ -+ if (sk == NULL) -+ return 0; -+ -+ /* Based on end of ssl_create_cipher_list */ -+ tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(sk); -+ if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) -+ { -+ return 0; -+ } -+ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) -+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); -+ s->cipher_list = sk; -+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) -+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); -+ s->cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list; -+ (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(s->cipher_list_by_id,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); -+ -+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(s->cipher_list_by_id); -+ return 1; -+ } -+ - /* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */ - char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len) - { -@@ -2551,18 +2578,45 @@ SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) - return(NULL); - } - --const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) -+static const char *ssl_get_version(int version) - { -- if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) -+ if (version == TLS1_VERSION) - return("TLSv1"); -- else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) -+ else if (version == SSL3_VERSION) - return("SSLv3"); -- else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) -+ else if (version == SSL2_VERSION) - return("SSLv2"); - else - return("unknown"); - } - -+const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) -+ { -+ return ssl_get_version(s->version); -+ } -+ -+const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s) -+ { -+ return ssl_get_version(s->ssl_version); -+ } -+ -+const char* SSL_authentication_method(const SSL* ssl) -+ { -+ if (ssl->cert != NULL && ssl->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) -+ return SSL_TXT_RSA "_" SSL_TXT_EXPORT; -+ switch (ssl->version) -+ { -+ case SSL2_VERSION: -+ return SSL_TXT_RSA; -+ case SSL3_VERSION: -+ case TLS1_VERSION: -+ case DTLS1_VERSION: -+ return SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher); -+ default: -+ return "UNKNOWN"; -+ } -+ } -+ - SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) - { - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk; ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000 -@@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ - typedef struct cert_pkey_st - { - X509 *x509; -+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain; - EVP_PKEY *privatekey; - } CERT_PKEY; - ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_rsa.c 2009-09-12 23:09:26.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000 -@@ -697,6 +697,42 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type - } - - -+int SSL_use_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain) -+ { -+ if (ssl == NULL) -+ { -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return(0); -+ } -+ if (ssl->cert == NULL) -+ { -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); -+ return(0); -+ } -+ if (ssl->cert->key == NULL) -+ { -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); -+ return(0); -+ } -+ ssl->cert->key->cert_chain = cert_chain; -+ return(1); -+ } -+ -+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) -+ { -+ int i; -+ if (x == NULL) -+ return NULL; -+ if (ssl == NULL) -+ return NULL; -+ if (ssl->cert == NULL) -+ return NULL; -+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) -+ if (ssl->cert->pkeys[i].x509 == x) -+ return ssl->cert->pkeys[i].cert_chain; -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO - /* Read a file that contains our certificate in "PEM" format, - * possibly followed by a sequence of CA certificates that should be ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_sess.c 2010-02-01 16:49:42.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_sess.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000 -@@ -261,6 +261,11 @@ static int def_generate_session_id(const - return 0; - } - -+void SSL_set_session_creation_enabled (SSL *s, int creation_enabled) -+ { -+ s->session_creation_enabled = creation_enabled; -+ } -+ - int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) - { - /* This gets used by clients and servers. */ -@@ -269,6 +274,8 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int sess - SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL; - GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id; - -+ /* caller should check this if they can do better error handling */ -+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled) return(0); - if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0); - - /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */ diff --git a/deps/openssl/patches/npn.patch b/deps/openssl/patches/npn.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 46b7a7df33..0000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/patches/npn.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1293 +0,0 @@ ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/apps.c 2010-11-11 14:42:19.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/apps.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000 -@@ -3012,3 +3012,46 @@ int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf,int - int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf,int siz) - { return write(fileno(stdout),buf,siz); } - #endif -+ -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+/* next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string -+ * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised. -+ * outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success. -+ * in: a NUL termianted string like "abc,def,ghi" -+ * -+ * returns: a malloced buffer or NULL on failure. -+ */ -+unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in) -+ { -+ size_t len; -+ unsigned char *out; -+ size_t i, start = 0; -+ -+ len = strlen(in); -+ if (len >= 65535) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ out = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in) + 1); -+ if (!out) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i) -+ { -+ if (i == len || in[i] == ',') -+ { -+ if (i - start > 255) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(out); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ out[start] = i - start; -+ start = i + 1; -+ } -+ else -+ out[i+1] = in[i]; -+ } -+ -+ *outlen = len + 1; -+ return out; -+ } -+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/apps.h 2009-10-31 13:34:19.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/apps.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000 -@@ -358,3 +358,7 @@ int raw_write_stdout(const void *,int); - #define TM_STOP 1 - double app_tminterval (int stop,int usertime); - #endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in); -+#endif ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/s_client.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/s_client.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000 -@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ static void sc_usage(void) - BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n"); - BIO_printf(bio_err," -status - request certificate status from server\n"); - BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n"); -+# endif - BIO_printf(bio_err," -cutthrough - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n"); - #endif - BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n"); -@@ -367,6 +370,40 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb - - return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; - } -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ -+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { -+ unsigned char *data; -+ unsigned short len; -+ int status; -+} tlsextnextprotoctx; -+ -+static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto; -+ -+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) -+ { -+ tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg; -+ -+ if (!c_quiet) -+ { -+ /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */ -+ unsigned i; -+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: "); -+ for (i = 0; i < inlen; ) -+ { -+ if (i) -+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2); -+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]); -+ i += in[i] + 1; -+ } -+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1); -+ } -+ -+ ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len); -+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; -+ } -+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ - #endif - - enum -@@ -431,6 +468,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) - char *servername = NULL; - tlsextctx tlsextcbp = - {NULL,0}; -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; -+# endif - #endif - char *sess_in = NULL; - char *sess_out = NULL; -@@ -658,6 +698,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ticket") == 0) - { off|=SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; } -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0) -+ { -+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad; -+ next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv); -+ } -+# endif - #endif - else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cutthrough") == 0) - cutthrough=1; -@@ -766,6 +813,21 @@ bad: - OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(); - SSL_load_error_strings(); - -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ next_proto.status = -1; -+ if (next_proto_neg_in) -+ { -+ next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in); -+ if (next_proto.data == NULL) -+ { -+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n"); -+ goto end; -+ } -+ } -+ else -+ next_proto.data = NULL; -+#endif -+ - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1); - if (ssl_client_engine_id) -@@ -896,6 +958,11 @@ bad: - SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, ssl_mode); - } - -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ if (next_proto.data) -+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); -+#endif -+ - if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,apps_ssl_info_callback); - if (cipher != NULL) - if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx,cipher)) { -@@ -1755,6 +1822,18 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s - BIO_printf(bio,"Expansion: %s\n", - expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE"); - #endif -+ -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ if (next_proto.status != -1) { -+ const unsigned char *proto; -+ unsigned int proto_len; -+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len); -+ BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status); -+ BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len); -+ BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); -+ } -+#endif -+ - SSL_SESSION_print(bio,SSL_get_session(s)); - BIO_printf(bio,"---\n"); - if (peer != NULL) ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/s_server.c 2010-06-15 17:25:02.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/s_server.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000 -@@ -492,6 +492,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void) - BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n"); - BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); - BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n"); -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n"); -+# endif - #endif - } - -@@ -826,6 +829,24 @@ BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: received % - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - goto done; - } -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* This is the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ -+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { -+ unsigned char *data; -+ unsigned int len; -+} tlsextnextprotoctx; -+ -+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len, void *arg) -+ { -+ tlsextnextprotoctx *next_proto = arg; -+ -+ *data = next_proto->data; -+ *len = next_proto->len; -+ -+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; -+ } -+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN */ - #endif - - int MAIN(int, char **); -@@ -867,6 +888,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) - #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING}; -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; -+ tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto; -+# endif - #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* by default do not send a PSK identity hint */ -@@ -1191,7 +1216,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) - if (--argc < 1) goto bad; - s_key_file2= *(++argv); - } -- -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0) -+ { -+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad; -+ next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv); -+ } -+# endif - #endif - #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK) - else if (strcmp(*argv,"-jpake") == 0) -@@ -1476,6 +1507,11 @@ bad: - if (vpm) - SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx2, vpm); - } -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ if (next_proto.data) -+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); -+# endif - #endif - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -@@ -1617,6 +1653,21 @@ bad: - goto end; - } - } -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ if (next_proto_neg_in) -+ { -+ unsigned short len; -+ next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len, -+ next_proto_neg_in); -+ if (next_proto.data == NULL) -+ goto end; -+ next_proto.len = len; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ next_proto.data = NULL; -+ } -+# endif - #endif - RSA_free(rsa); - BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"\n"); -@@ -2159,6 +2210,10 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con) - X509 *peer; - long verify_error; - MS_STATIC char buf[BUFSIZ]; -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ const unsigned char *next_proto_neg; -+ unsigned next_proto_neg_len; -+#endif - - if ((i=SSL_accept(con)) <= 0) - { -@@ -2198,6 +2253,15 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con) - BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Shared ciphers:%s\n",buf); - str=SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con)); - BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"CIPHER is %s\n",(str != NULL)?str:"(NONE)"); -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len); -+ if (next_proto_neg) -+ { -+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"NEXTPROTO is "); -+ BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len); -+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n"); -+ } -+#endif - if (con->hit) BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Reused session-id\n"); - if (SSL_ctrl(con,SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS,0,NULL) & - TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -857,6 +857,25 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st - /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */ - int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg); - void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg; -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* Next protocol negotiation information */ -+ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */ -+ -+ /* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of -+ * advertised protocols can be provided. */ -+ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf, -+ unsigned int *len, void *arg); -+ void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg; -+ /* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the -+ * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */ -+ int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, -+ unsigned char *outlen, -+ const unsigned char *in, -+ unsigned int inlen, -+ void *arg); -+ void *next_proto_select_cb_arg; -+# endif - #endif - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK -@@ -928,6 +947,30 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_C - #endif - void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)); - void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s, -+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, -+ const unsigned char **out, -+ unsigned int *outlen, -+ void *arg), void *arg); -+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s, -+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out, -+ unsigned char *outlen, -+ const unsigned char *in, -+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg), -+ void *arg); -+ -+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, -+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, -+ const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len); -+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, -+ unsigned *len); -+ -+#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0 -+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1 -+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2 -+ -+#endif - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the -@@ -1187,6 +1230,19 @@ struct ssl_st - void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg; - - SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that -+ * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello -+ * extensions. -+ * -+ * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from -+ * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, -+ * before the Finished message. */ -+ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated; -+ unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len; -+#endif -+ - #define session_ctx initial_ctx - #else - #define session_ctx ctx -@@ -1919,6 +1975,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283 -+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 304 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145 -@@ -2117,6 +2174,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); - #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152 - #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153 - #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154 -+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 346 -+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 347 - #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 - #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 - #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283 ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -465,6 +465,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - void *server_opaque_prf_input; - size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len; - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from -+ our peer. */ -+ int next_proto_neg_seen; -+#endif -+ - struct { - /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */ - unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; -@@ -557,6 +563,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+#endif - #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - /* read from server */ -@@ -602,6 +612,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) -+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) -+#endif - #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - /* write to client */ -@@ -626,6 +640,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 - #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20 - #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67 -+#endif - #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 - - ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/tls1.h 2009-11-11 14:51:29.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/tls1.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ extern "C" { - /* Temporary extension type */ - #define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01 - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */ -+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172 -+#endif -+ - /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */ - #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 - /* status request value from RFC 3546 */ ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -202,15 +202,40 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, in - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); - } - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */ -+static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) -+ { -+ const char *sender; -+ int slen; -+ -+ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+ { -+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; -+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; -+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; -+ } -+ -+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, -+ sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); -+ } -+#endif -+ - int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) - { - int al,i,ok; - long n; - unsigned char *p; - -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - /* the mac has already been generated when we received the - * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md - */ -+#endif - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - a, -@@ -521,6 +546,15 @@ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, i - s->init_num += i; - n -= i; - } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for -+ * Finished verification. */ -+ if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) -+ ssl3_take_mac(s); -+#endif -+ -+ /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ - ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4); - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -435,7 +435,16 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) - ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, - SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; -+ -+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; -+#else -+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated) -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; -+ else -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; -+#endif -+ - s->init_num=0; - - s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; -@@ -463,6 +472,15 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) - - break; - -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: -+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: -+ ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s); -+ if (ret <= 0) goto end; -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; -+ break; -+#endif -+ - case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: - ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, -@@ -3060,6 +3078,32 @@ err: - */ - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) -+ { -+ unsigned int len, padding_len; -+ unsigned char *d; -+ -+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) -+ { -+ len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; -+ padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); -+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; -+ d[4] = len; -+ memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); -+ d[5 + len] = padding_len; -+ memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); -+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; -+ l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); -+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; -+ s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; -+ s->init_off = 0; -+ } -+ -+ return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); -+ } -+# endif -+ - int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) - { - int ok; ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -2230,6 +2230,15 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s) - s->s3->num_renegotiations=0; - s->s3->in_read_app_data=0; - s->version=SSL3_VERSION; -+ -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); -+ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; -+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; -+ } -+#endif - } - - long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -1394,8 +1394,10 @@ err: - int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) - { - int i; -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - const char *sender; - int slen; -+#endif - - if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; -@@ -1418,6 +1420,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) - return(0); - -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - /* we have to record the message digest at - * this point so we can get it before we read - * the finished message */ -@@ -1434,6 +1437,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) - - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); -+#endif - - return(1); - } ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -538,7 +538,14 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) - * the client uses its key from the certificate - * for key exchange. - */ -+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+#else -+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; -+ else -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+#endif - s->init_num = 0; - } - else -@@ -581,10 +588,27 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) - ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - -+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+#else -+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; -+ else -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+#endif - s->init_num=0; - break; - -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: -+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: -+ ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); -+ if (ret <= 0) goto end; -+ s->init_num = 0; -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+ break; -+#endif -+ - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: - ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, -@@ -655,7 +679,16 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - if (s->hit) -+ { -+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+#else -+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) -+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; -+ else -+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+#endif -+ } - else - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; - s->init_num=0; -@@ -3196,4 +3229,72 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); - } -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN -+/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It -+ * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ -+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) -+ { -+ int ok; -+ unsigned proto_len, padding_len; -+ long n; -+ const unsigned char *p; -+ -+ /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the -+ * extension in their ClientHello */ -+ if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) -+ { -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, -+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, -+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, -+ SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, -+ 514, /* See the payload format below */ -+ &ok); -+ -+ if (!ok) -+ return((int)n); -+ -+ /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received -+ * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset -+ * by ssl3_get_finished). */ -+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) -+ { -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ if (n < 2) -+ return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ -+ -+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; -+ -+ /* The payload looks like: -+ * uint8 proto_len; -+ * uint8 proto[proto_len]; -+ * uint8 padding_len; -+ * uint8 padding[padding_len]; -+ */ -+ proto_len = p[0]; -+ if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) -+ return 0; -+ padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; -+ if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) -+ return 0; -+ -+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); -+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) -+ { -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); -+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; -+ -+ return 1; -+ } -+# endif - #endif ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -857,6 +857,25 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st - /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */ - int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg); - void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg; -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* Next protocol negotiation information */ -+ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */ -+ -+ /* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of -+ * advertised protocols can be provided. */ -+ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf, -+ unsigned int *len, void *arg); -+ void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg; -+ /* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the -+ * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */ -+ int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, -+ unsigned char *outlen, -+ const unsigned char *in, -+ unsigned int inlen, -+ void *arg); -+ void *next_proto_select_cb_arg; -+# endif - #endif - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK -@@ -928,6 +947,30 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_C - #endif - void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)); - void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s, -+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, -+ const unsigned char **out, -+ unsigned int *outlen, -+ void *arg), void *arg); -+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s, -+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out, -+ unsigned char *outlen, -+ const unsigned char *in, -+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg), -+ void *arg); -+ -+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, -+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, -+ const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len); -+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, -+ unsigned *len); -+ -+#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0 -+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1 -+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2 -+ -+#endif - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the -@@ -1187,6 +1230,19 @@ struct ssl_st - void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg; - - SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that -+ * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello -+ * extensions. -+ * -+ * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from -+ * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, -+ * before the Finished message. */ -+ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated; -+ unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len; -+#endif -+ - #define session_ctx initial_ctx - #else - #define session_ctx ctx -@@ -1919,6 +1975,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283 -+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 304 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145 -@@ -2117,6 +2174,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); - #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152 - #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153 - #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154 -+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 346 -+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 347 - #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 - #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 - #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283 ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -465,6 +465,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - void *server_opaque_prf_input; - size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len; - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from -+ our peer. */ -+ int next_proto_neg_seen; -+#endif -+ - struct { - /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */ - unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; -@@ -557,6 +563,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+#endif - #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - /* read from server */ -@@ -602,6 +612,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) -+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) -+#endif - #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - /* write to client */ -@@ -626,6 +640,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 - #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20 - #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67 -+#endif - #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 - - ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= - {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE), "SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE"}, - {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE), "SSL3_GET_MESSAGE"}, - {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"}, -+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO), "SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO"}, - {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD), "SSL3_GET_RECORD"}, - {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"}, - {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE"}, -@@ -355,6 +356,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE),"excessive message size"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE) ,"extra data in message"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got a fin before a ccs"}, -+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got next proto before a ccs"}, -+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION),"got next proto without seeing extension"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"}, ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -354,6 +354,9 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; - CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - s->initial_ctx=ctx; -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; -+# endif - #endif - - s->verify_result=X509_V_OK; -@@ -587,6 +590,11 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) - kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); - #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ - -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated) -+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); -+#endif -+ - OPENSSL_free(s); - } - -@@ -1503,6 +1511,124 @@ int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s - return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; - return -1; - } -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is -+ * expected that this function is called from the callback set by -+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. -+ * -+ * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte -+ * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte -+ * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated. -+ * -+ * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is: -+ * -+ * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the -+ * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection -+ * or have a default application level protocol. -+ * -+ * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the -+ * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the -+ * API that this fallback case was enacted. -+ * -+ * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list -+ * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's -+ * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol -+ * a client should use. -+ * -+ * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised -+ * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2. -+ * -+ * It returns either -+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or -+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. -+ */ -+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) -+ { -+ unsigned int i, j; -+ const unsigned char *result; -+ int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; -+ -+ /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */ -+ for (i = 0; i < server_len; ) -+ { -+ for (j = 0; j < client_len; ) -+ { -+ if (server[i] == client[j] && -+ memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0) -+ { -+ /* We found a match */ -+ result = &server[i]; -+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; -+ goto found; -+ } -+ j += client[j]; -+ j++; -+ } -+ i += server[i]; -+ i++; -+ } -+ -+ /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ -+ result = client; -+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; -+ -+ found: -+ *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1; -+ *outlen = result[0]; -+ return status; -+ } -+ -+/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's -+ * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't -+ * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. -+ * -+ * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned -+ * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols -+ * provided by the callback. -+ */ -+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) -+ { -+ *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; -+ if (!*data) { -+ *len = 0; -+ } else { -+ *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; -+ } -+} -+ -+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a -+ * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol -+ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned -+ * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will -+ * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to -+ * it. -+ * -+ * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no -+ * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */ -+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg) -+ { -+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; -+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; -+ } -+ -+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a -+ * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| -+ * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). -+ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's -+ * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can -+ * assume that |in| is syntactically valid. -+ * -+ * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this -+ * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. -+ */ -+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) -+ { -+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; -+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; -+ } -+ -+# endif - #endif - - static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) -@@ -1667,6 +1793,10 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *m - ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; - ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; - -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; -+ ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; -+# endif - #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL; ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -968,6 +968,9 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s); - int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s); - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s); -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s); -+# endif - #endif - - int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s); -@@ -986,6 +989,9 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s); - int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s); - int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); - int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s); -+#endif - - int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s); - int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s); ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/t1_lib.c 2010-11-16 13:26:24.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/t1_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -494,6 +494,18 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex - i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); - } - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) -+ { -+ /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its -+ * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ -+ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) -+ return NULL; -+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); -+ s2n(0,ret); -+ } -+#endif -+ - if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) - return p; - -@@ -505,6 +517,9 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex - { - int extdatalen=0; - unsigned char *ret = p; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ int next_proto_neg_seen; -+#endif - - /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) -@@ -618,6 +633,28 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex - - } - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; -+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -+ if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) -+ { -+ const unsigned char *npa; -+ unsigned int npalen; -+ int r; -+ -+ r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); -+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) -+ { -+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; -+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); -+ s2n(npalen,ret); -+ memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); -+ ret += npalen; -+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ - if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) - return p; - -@@ -982,6 +1019,28 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, - else - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; - } -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && -+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) -+ { -+ /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a -+ * renegotiation. -+ * -+ * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we -+ * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on -+ * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when -+ * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an -+ * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing -+ * anything like that, but this might change). -+ -+ * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake -+ * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > -+ * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen -+ * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new -+ * Finished message could have been computed.) */ -+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; -+ } -+#endif - - /* session ticket processed earlier */ - data+=size; -@@ -1005,6 +1064,26 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, - return 1; - } - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No -+ * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill -+ * the length of the block. */ -+static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) -+ { -+ unsigned int off = 0; -+ -+ while (off < len) -+ { -+ if (d[off] == 0) -+ return 0; -+ off += d[off]; -+ off++; -+ } -+ -+ return off == len; -+ } -+#endif -+ - int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) - { - unsigned short length; -@@ -1139,6 +1218,39 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, - /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - } -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) -+ { -+ unsigned char *selected; -+ unsigned char selected_len; -+ -+ /* We must have requested it. */ -+ if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)) -+ { -+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ /* The data must be valid */ -+ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) -+ { -+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) -+ { -+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); -+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) -+ { -+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); -+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; -+ } -+#endif - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) - { - if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/tls1.h 2009-11-11 14:51:29.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/tls1.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ extern "C" { - /* Temporary extension type */ - #define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01 - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */ -+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172 -+#endif -+ - /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */ - #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 - /* status request value from RFC 3546 */ diff --git a/deps/openssl/patches/openssl_no_dtls1.patch b/deps/openssl/patches/openssl_no_dtls1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8b61cd3f61..0000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/patches/openssl_no_dtls1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ ---- openssl-1.0.0f.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2012-01-04 22:13:21.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0f/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2012-01-04 22:13:21.000000000 +0000 -@@ -1063,8 +1063,10 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,v - s->max_cert_list=larg; - return(l); - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU: -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 - if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu()) - return 0; -+#endif - - if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || - SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) diff --git a/deps/openssl/patches/progs.patch b/deps/openssl/patches/progs.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 16fd9b0b36..0000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/patches/progs.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ ---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/apps/openssl.c 2009-10-04 09:43:21.000000000 -0700 -+++ openssl-1.0.0/apps/openssl.c 2010-05-18 14:05:14.000000000 -0700 -@@ -275,8 +275,10 @@ int main(int Argc, char *Argv[]) - if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) - == CONF_R_NO_SUCH_FILE) - { -+#if 0 /* ANDROID */ - BIO_printf(bio_err, - "WARNING: can't open config file: %s\n",p); -+#endif - ERR_clear_error(); - NCONF_free(config); - config = NULL; ---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/apps/progs.h 2009-06-30 08:08:38.000000000 -0700 -+++ openssl-1.0.0/apps/progs.h 2010-05-18 14:05:38.000000000 -0700 -@@ -146,7 +152,9 @@ FUNCTION functions[] = { - {FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"ocsp",ocsp_main}, - #endif - {FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"prime",prime_main}, -+#if 0 /* ANDROID */ - {FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"ts",ts_main}, -+#endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 - {FUNC_TYPE_MD,"md2",dgst_main}, - #endif ---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/apps/speed.c 2010-03-03 11:56:17.000000000 -0800 -+++ openssl-1.0.0/apps/speed.c 2010-05-18 14:05:57.000000000 -0700 -@@ -1718,6 +1718,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) - } - } - -+#if 0 /* ANDROID */ - if (doit[D_IGE_128_AES]) - { - for (j=0; jlength > s->s3->rbuf.len - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) -+ { -+ unsigned char *pp; -+ unsigned int newlen = rr->length + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; -+ if ((pp=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, newlen))==NULL) -+ { -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return(-1); -+ } -+ p = pp + (p - s->s3->rbuf.buf); -+ s->s3->rbuf.buf=pp; -+ s->s3->rbuf.len=newlen; -+ s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]); -+ } -+ - /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ - } - -@@ -1342,6 +1360,7 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, con - SSL3_BUFFER *wb; - SSL_SESSION *sess; - int bs; -+ unsigned int len_with_overhead = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD; - - /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written - * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ -@@ -1351,6 +1370,16 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, con - return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); - } - -+ if (s->s3->wbuf.len < len_with_overhead) -+ { -+ if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->wbuf.buf, len_with_overhead)) == NULL) { -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ s->s3->wbuf.buf = p; -+ s->s3->wbuf.len = len_with_overhead; -+ } -+ - /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ - if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) - { ---- openssl-1.0.0a.orig/ssl/s23_srvr.c 2010-02-16 14:20:40.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0a/ssl/s23_srvr.c 2010-08-25 21:12:39.000000000 +0000 -@@ -403,8 +403,13 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) - v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */ - v[1] = p[4]; - -+/* The SSL2 protocol allows n to be larger, just pick -+ * a reasonable buffer size. */ -+#if SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE < 1024*4 - SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD -+#error "SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE is too small." -+#endif - n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1]; -- if (n > (1024*4)) -+ if (n > SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE - 2) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE); - goto err; ---- openssl-1.0.0a.orig/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-03-24 23:16:49.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0a/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-08-25 21:12:39.000000000 +0000 -@@ -715,13 +722,20 @@ int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s) - - if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) - { -- len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH -- + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD -- + headerlen + align; -- if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) -+ if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS) - { -- s->s3->init_extra = 1; -- len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; -+ len = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH -+ + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD -+ + headerlen + align; -+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) -+ { -+ s->s3->init_extra = 1; -+ len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; -+ } - } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)) -@@ -757,7 +771,15 @@ int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s) - - if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL) - { -- len = s->max_send_fragment -+ if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS) -+ { -+ len = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ len = s->max_send_fragment; -+ } -+ len += 0 - + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD - + headerlen + align; - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP -@@ -767,7 +789,6 @@ int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s) - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) - len += headerlen + align - + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD; -- - if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 0, len)) == NULL) - goto err; - s->s3->wbuf.buf = p; -@@ -810,4 +831,3 @@ int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s) - } - return 1; - } -- ---- openssl-1.0.0a.orig/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-03-25 11:22:42.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0a/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-08-25 21:12:39.000000000 +0000 -@@ -293,6 +293,11 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) - size_t extra; - int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0; - unsigned char *mac = NULL; -+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 -+ long align=SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD; -+#else -+ long align=0; -+#endif - - rr= &(s->s3->rrec); - sess=s->session; -@@ -301,7 +306,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) - extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; - else - extra=0; -- if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) -+ if (!(SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS) && -+ extra && !s->s3->init_extra) - { - /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER - * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ -@@ -350,6 +356,21 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length= - goto err; - } - -+ /* If we receive a valid record larger than the current buffer size, -+ * allocate some memory for it. -+ */ -+ if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - align) -+ { -+ if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + align))==NULL) -+ { -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ s->s3->rbuf.buf=p; -+ s->s3->rbuf.len=rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + align; -+ s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]); -+ } -+ - if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) - { - al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; -@@ -576,6 +597,7 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, c - const unsigned char *buf=buf_; - unsigned int tot,n,nw; - int i; -+ unsigned int max_plain_length; - - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - tot=s->s3->wnum; -@@ -595,8 +617,13 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, c - n=(len-tot); - for (;;) - { -- if (n > s->max_send_fragment) -- nw=s->max_send_fragment; -+ if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS)) -+ max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH; -+ else -+ max_plain_length = s->max_send_fragment; -+ -+ if (n > max_plain_length) -+ nw = max_plain_length; - else - nw=n; - -@@ -727,6 +727,18 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; - } - -+ /* resize if necessary to hold the data. */ -+ if (len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD > wb->len) -+ { -+ if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(wb->buf, len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD))==NULL) -+ { -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ wb->buf = p; -+ wb->len = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD; -+ } -+ - if (create_empty_fragment) - { - #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 ---- openssl-1.0.0a.orig/ssl/ssl.h 2010-01-06 17:37:38.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0a/ssl/ssl.h 2010-08-25 21:12:39.000000000 +0000 -@@ -602,6 +602,9 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st - * TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context - * or just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */ - #define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L -+/* Use small read and write buffers: (a) lazy allocate read buffers for -+ * large incoming records, and (b) limit the size of outgoing records. */ -+#define SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS 0x00000020L - - /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value, - * they cannot be used to clear bits. */ ---- openssl-1.0.0a.orig/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-01-06 17:37:38.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0a/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-08-25 21:12:39.000000000 +0000 -@@ -280,6 +280,9 @@ extern "C" { - - #define SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA (16384) - -+/* Default buffer length used for writen records. Thus a generated record -+ * will contain plaintext no larger than this value. */ -+#define SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH 2048 - /* Maximum plaintext length: defined by SSL/TLS standards */ - #define SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH 16384 - /* Maximum compression overhead: defined by SSL/TLS standards */ -@@ -311,6 +314,13 @@ extern "C" { - #define SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE \ - (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) - -+/* Extra space for empty fragment, headers, MAC, and padding. */ -+#define SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD 256 -+#define SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE 4096 - SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD -+#if SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD > SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE -+#error "Insufficient space allocated for write buffers." -+#endif -+ - #define SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST "\x43\x4C\x4E\x54" - #define SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST "\x53\x52\x56\x52" - -@@ -634,4 +645,3 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - } - #endif - #endif -- ---- openssl-1.0.0a.orig/ssl/ssltest.c 2010-01-24 16:57:38.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0a/ssl/ssltest.c 2010-08-25 21:12:39.000000000 +0000 -@@ -316,6 +316,8 @@ static void sv_usage(void) - " (default is sect163r2).\n"); - #endif - fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr," -c_small_records - enable client side use of small SSL record buffers\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr," -s_small_records - enable server side use of small SSL record buffers\n"); - } - - static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix) -@@ -444,6 +447,9 @@ int opaque_prf_input_cb(SSL *ssl, void * - return arg->ret; - } - #endif -+ int ssl_mode = 0; -+ int c_small_records=0; -+ int s_small_records=0; - - int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - { -@@ -680,6 +687,14 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - { - test_cipherlist = 1; - } -+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-c_small_records") == 0) -+ { -+ c_small_records = 1; -+ } -+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-s_small_records") == 0) -+ { -+ s_small_records = 1; -+ } - else - { - fprintf(stderr,"unknown option %s\n",*argv); -@@ -802,6 +821,21 @@ bad: - SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s_ctx,cipher); - } - -+ ssl_mode = 0; -+ if (c_small_records) -+ { -+ ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(c_ctx); -+ ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS; -+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(c_ctx, ssl_mode); -+ } -+ ssl_mode = 0; -+ if (s_small_records) -+ { -+ ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(s_ctx); -+ ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS; -+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(s_ctx, ssl_mode); -+ } -+ - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (!no_dhe) - { ---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/test/testssl 2006-03-10 15:06:27.000000000 -0800 -+++ openssl-1.0.0/test/testssl 2010-04-26 10:24:55.000000000 -0700 -@@ -70,6 +70,16 @@ $ssltest -client_auth $CA $extra || exit - echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication - $ssltest -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1 - -+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication and small client buffers -+$ssltest -server_auth -client_auth -c_small_records $CA $extra || exit 1 -+ -+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication and small server buffers -+$ssltest -server_auth -client_auth -s_small_records $CA $extra || exit 1 -+ -+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication and small client and server buffers -+$ssltest -server_auth -client_auth -c_small_records -s_small_records $CA $extra || exit 1 -+ -+ - echo test sslv2 via BIO pair - $ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 $extra || exit 1 - diff --git a/deps/openssl/patches/tls_exporter.patch b/deps/openssl/patches/tls_exporter.patch deleted file mode 100755 index a9e64a3c73..0000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/patches/tls_exporter.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,220 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ssl/d1_lib.c -index c3b77c8..a94290a 100644 ---- a/ssl/d1_lib.c -+++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c -@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data={ - TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - tls1_alert_code, -+ tls1_export_keying_material, - }; - - long dtls1_default_timeout(void) -diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c -index c19538a..1fecbbc 100644 ---- a/ssl/s3_lib.c -+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c -@@ -2087,6 +2087,9 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data={ - SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST,4, - SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST,4, - ssl3_alert_code, -+ (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, -+ size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, -+ int use_context)) ssl_undefined_function, - }; - - long ssl3_default_timeout(void) -diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h -index 9336af8..be4af2f 100644 ---- a/ssl/ssl.h -+++ b/ssl/ssl.h -@@ -2116,6 +2116,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); - #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 301 - #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 303 - #define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK 270 -+#define SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL 312 - #define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 281 - #define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 282 - #define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223 -@@ -2394,6 +2395,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); - #define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112 - #define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110 - #define SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER 232 -+#define SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL 367 - #define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST 157 - #define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 233 - #define SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 234 -diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c -index 17d2cde..d6ad3c1 100644 ---- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c -+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c -@@ -3127,6 +3127,18 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned - } - #endif - -+int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, -+ const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, -+ int use_context) -+ { -+ if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION) -+ return -1; -+ -+ return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label, -+ llen, p, plen, -+ use_context); -+ } -+ - int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s) - { - return (!s->server && /* cutthrough only applies to clients */ -diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h -index 146c89c..e7c6b9a 100644 ---- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h -+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h -@@ -557,6 +557,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_enc_method - const char *server_finished_label; - int server_finished_label_len; - int (*alert_value)(int); -+ int (*export_keying_material)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, -+ const char *, size_t, -+ const unsigned char *, size_t, -+ int use_context); - } SSL3_ENC_METHOD; - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP -@@ -1041,6 +1045,9 @@ int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p); - int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int snd); - int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, - unsigned char *p, int len); -+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, -+ const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, -+ size_t plen, int use_context); - int tls1_alert_code(int code); - int ssl3_alert_code(int code); - int ssl_ok(SSL *s); -diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c -index 793ea43..b1d5b28 100644 ---- a/ssl/t1_enc.c -+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c -@@ -1001,6 +1001,95 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, - return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); - } - -+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, -+ const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, -+ size_t contextlen, int use_context) -+ { -+ unsigned char *buff; -+ unsigned char *val = NULL; -+ size_t vallen, currentvalpos; -+ int rv; -+ -+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG -+ printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen); -+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ -+ -+ buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen); -+ if (buff == NULL) goto err2; -+ -+ /* construct PRF arguments -+ * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate -+ * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values -+ * does not create a prohibited label. -+ */ -+ vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; -+ if (use_context) -+ { -+ vallen += 2 + contextlen; -+ } -+ -+ val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen); -+ if (val == NULL) goto err2; -+ currentvalpos = 0; -+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen); -+ currentvalpos += llen; -+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); -+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; -+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); -+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; -+ -+ if (use_context) -+ { -+ val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; -+ currentvalpos++; -+ val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; -+ currentvalpos++; -+ if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) -+ { -+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* disallow prohibited labels -+ * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) = -+ * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the -+ * comparisons won't have buffer overflow -+ */ -+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, -+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; -+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, -+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; -+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, -+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; -+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, -+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; -+ -+ rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2, -+ val, vallen, -+ NULL, 0, -+ NULL, 0, -+ NULL, 0, -+ NULL, 0, -+ s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, -+ out,buff,olen); -+ -+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG -+ printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n"); -+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ -+ goto ret; -+err1: -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); -+ rv = 0; -+ goto ret; -+err2: -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rv = 0; -+ret: -+ if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff); -+ if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val); -+ return(rv); -+ } -+ - int tls1_alert_code(int code) - { - switch (code) -diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c -index daa65c9..c094471 100644 ---- a/ssl/t1_lib.c -+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c -@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ - TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - tls1_alert_code, -+ tls1_export_keying_material, - }; - - long tls1_default_timeout(void) -diff --git a/ssl/tls1.h b/ssl/tls1.h -index 1fa96e5..7bbb875 100644 ---- a/ssl/tls1.h -+++ b/ssl/tls1.h -@@ -231,6 +231,9 @@ extern "C" { - - const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) ; - int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) ; -+int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, -+ const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, -+ int use_context); - - #define SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s,name) \ - SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME,TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name,(char *)name) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/deps/openssl/patches/x509_hash_name_algorithm_change.patch b/deps/openssl/patches/x509_hash_name_algorithm_change.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d9601844d3..0000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/patches/x509_hash_name_algorithm_change.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ ---- openssl-1.0.0f-origin/crypto/x509/by_dir.c 2012-01-19 02:20:24.821550944 +0800 -+++ openssl-1.0.0f/crypto/x509/by_dir.c 2012-01-19 23:36:53.597870429 +0800 -@@ -287,6 +287,8 @@ - int ok=0; - int i,j,k; - unsigned long h; -+ unsigned long hash_array[2]; -+ int hash_index; - BUF_MEM *b=NULL; - X509_OBJECT stmp,*tmp; - const char *postfix=""; -@@ -323,6 +325,11 @@ - ctx=(BY_DIR *)xl->method_data; - - h=X509_NAME_hash(name); -+ hash_array[0]=h; -+ hash_array[1]=X509_NAME_hash_old(name); -+ for (hash_index=0; hash_index < 2; hash_index++) -+ { -+ h=hash_array[hash_index]; - for (i=0; i < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs); i++) - { - BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent; -@@ -476,6 +483,7 @@ - goto finish; - } - } -+ } - finish: - if (b != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(b); - return(ok);