maxTickDepth checks have been removed for domains and replaced with a
flag that checks if the last callback threw. If it did then execution of
the remaining tickQueue is deferred to the spinner.
This is to prevent domains from entering a continuous loop when an error
callback also throws an error.
Removes the check for maxTickDepth for non-domain callbacks. So a user
can starve I/O by setting a recursive nextTick.
The domain case is more complex and will be addressed in another commit.
Previous code was calling uv_loop_delete() directly on a running loop,
which led to race condition aborts/segfaults within libuv. This change
changes the watchdog thread to call uv_run() with UV_RUN_ONCE so that
the call exits after either the timer times out or uv_async_send() is
called from the main thread in Watchdog::Destroy(). The timer/async
handles are then closed and uv_run() with UV_RUN_DEFAULT is called so
that libuv has a chance to cleanup before the thread exits. The main
thread meanwhile calls uv_thread_join() and then uv_loop_delete() to
complete the cleanup.
Before this, entering something like:
> JSON.parse('066');
resulted in the "..." prompt instead of displaying the expected
"SyntaxError: Unexpected number"
1. Emit `sslOutEnd` only when `_internallyPendingBytes() === 0`.
2. Read before checking `._halfRead`, otherwise we'll see only previous
value, and will invoke `._write` callback improperly.
3. Wait for both `end` and `finish` events in `.destroySoon`.
4. Unpipe encrypted stream from socket to prevent write after destroy.
Stream's `._write()` callback should be invoked only after it's opposite
stream has finished processing incoming data, otherwise `finish` event
fires too early and connection might be closed while there's some data
to send to the client.
see #5544
Quote from SSL_shutdown man page:
The output of SSL_get_error(3) may be misleading,
as an erroneous SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL may be flagged even though
no error occurred.
Also, handle all other errors to prevent assertion in `ClearError()`.
When writing bad data to EncryptedStream it'll first get to the
ClientHello parser, and, only after it will refuse it, to the OpenSSL.
But ClientHello parser has limited buffer and therefore write could
return `bytes_written` < `incoming_bytes`, which is not the case when
working with OpenSSL.
After such errors ClientHello parser disables itself and will
pass-through all data to the OpenSSL. So just trying to write data one
more time will throw the rest into OpenSSL and let it handle it.
Otherwise, writing an empty string causes the whole program to grind to
a halt when piping data into http messages.
This wasn't as much of a problem (though it WAS a bug) in 0.8 and
before, because our hyperactive 'drain' behavior would mean that some
*previous* write() would probably have a pending drain event, and cause
things to start moving again.
This saves a few calls to gettimeofday which can be expensive, and
potentially subject to clock drift. Instead use the loop time which
uses hrtime internally.
fixes#5497
This commit adds an optimization to the HTTP client that makes it
possible to:
* Pack the headers and the first chunk of the request body into a
single write().
* Pack the chunk header and the chunk itself into a single write().
Because only one write() system call is issued instead of several,
the chances of data ending up in a single TCP packet are phenomenally
higher: the benchmark with `type=buf size=32` jumps from 50 req/s to
7,500 req/s, a 150-fold increase.
This commit removes the check from e4b716ef that pushes binary encoded
strings into the slow path. The commit log mentions that:
We were assuming that any string can be concatenated safely to
CRLF. However, for hex, base64, or binary encoded writes, this
is not the case, and results in sending the incorrect response.
For hex and base64 strings that's certainly true but binary strings
are 'das Ding an sich': string.length is the same before and after
decoding.
Fixes#5528.
isaacs
Trevor Norris
Andrew Paprocki
Kiyoshi Nomo
Ryunosuke SATO
Brian White
Fedor Indutny
Bert Belder
Ben Noordhuis
Daniel G. Taylor
Rafael Henrique Moreira
Nathan Zadoks
Timothy J Fontaine