lib/http.js is using stream._handle.readStart/readStop to control
data-flow coming out from underlying stream. If this methods are not
present - data might be buffered regardless of whether it'll be read.
see #4657
This adds a proxy for bytesWritten to the tls.CryptoStream. This
change makes the connection object more similar between HTTP and
HTTPS requests in an effort to avoid confusion.
See issue #4650 for more background information.
Don't allow connections to stall indefinitely if the SSL/TLS handshake does
not complete.
Adds a new tls.Server and https.Server configuration option, handshakeTimeout.
Fixes#4355.
Listen for the 'clientError' event that is emitted when a renegotation attack
is detected and close the connection.
Fixes test/pummel/test-https-ci-reneg-attack.js
This commit changes the default value of the rejectUnauthorized option from
false to true.
What that means is that tls.connect(), https.get() and https.request() will
reject invalid server certificates from now on, including self-signed
certificates.
There is an escape hatch: if you set the NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED
environment variable to the literal string "0", node.js reverts to its
old behavior.
Fixes#3949.
Throw an exception in the tls.Server constructor when the options object
doesn't contain either a PFX or a key/certificate combo.
Said change exposed a bug in simple/test-tls-junk-closes-server. Addressed.
Fixes#3941.
Update the default cipher list from RC4-SHA:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA
to ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:AES128-GCM-SHA256:RC4:HIGH:!MD5:!aNULL:!EDH
in order to mitigate BEAST attacks.
The documentation suggested AES256-SHA but unfortunately that's a CBC cipher
and therefore susceptible to attacks.
Fixes#3900.
Commit 4e5fe2d changed the way how process.nextTick() works:
process.nextTick(function foo() {
process.nextTick(function bar() {
// ...
});
});
Before said commit, foo() and bar() used to run on separate event loop ticks
but that is no longer the case.
However, that's exactly the behavior that the TLS renegotiation attack guard
relies on. It gets called by OpenSSL and needs to defer the 'error' event to a
later tick because the default action is to destroy the TLS context - the same
context that OpenSSL currently operates on.
When things change underneath your feet, bad things happen and OpenSSL is no
exception. Ergo, use setImmediate() instead of process.nextTick() to ensure
that the 'error' event is actually emitted at a later tick.
Fixes#3840.
Make CLIENT_RENEG_LIMIT inclusive instead of exclusive, i.e. a limit of 2
means the peer can renegotiate twice, not just once.
Update pummel/test-tls-ci-reneg-attack accordingly and make it less timing
sensitive (and run faster) while we're at it.
Instead of allocating a new 64KB buffer each time when checking if there is
something to transform, continue to use the same buffer. Once the buffer is
exhausted, allocate a new buffer. This solves the problem of huge allocations
when small fragments of data are processed, but will also continue to work
well with big pieces of data.