commit ed5845e49b3c76f8735ec00e151a7b234acc266c Author: Adam Langley Date: Thu Nov 4 16:06:58 2010 -0400 next_proto_neg.patch diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c index ab60b70..eede8a8 100644 --- a/apps/apps.c +++ b/apps/apps.c @@ -2579,3 +2579,45 @@ void jpake_server_auth(BIO *out, BIO *conn, const char *secret) } #endif + +/* next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string + * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised. + * outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success. + * err: (maybe NULL) on failure, an error message line is written to this BIO. + * in: a NUL termianted string like "abc,def,ghi" + * + * returns: a malloced buffer + */ +unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in) + { + size_t len; + unsigned char *out; + size_t i, start = 0; + + len = strlen(in); + if (len > 65535) + return NULL; + + out = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in) + 1); + if (!out) + return NULL; + + for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i) + { + if (i == len || in[i] == ',') + { + if (i - start > 255) + { + OPENSSL_free(out); + return NULL; + } + out[start] = i - start; + start = i + 1; + } + else + out[i+1] = in[i]; + } + + *outlen = len + 1; + return out; + } diff --git a/apps/s_apps.h b/apps/s_apps.h index f5a39ba..513bcfe 100644 --- a/apps/s_apps.h +++ b/apps/s_apps.h @@ -174,3 +174,5 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len); int MS_CALLBACK verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len); + +unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in); diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c index c071658..6033e77 100644 --- a/apps/s_client.c +++ b/apps/s_client.c @@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void) BIO_printf(bio_err," -status - request certificate status from server\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err," -cutthrough - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n"); } @@ -284,6 +285,38 @@ enum PROTO_XMPP }; +/* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ +typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { + unsigned char *data; + unsigned short len; + int status; +} tlsextnextprotoctx; + +static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto; + +static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) + { + tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg; + + if (!c_quiet) + { + /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */ + unsigned i; + BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: "); + for (i = 0; i < inlen; ) + { + if (i) + BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2); + BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]); + i += in[i] + 1; + } + BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1); + } + + ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len); + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; + } + int MAIN(int, char **); int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) @@ -336,6 +369,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) char *servername = NULL; tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL,0}; + const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; #endif char *sess_in = NULL; char *sess_out = NULL; @@ -536,6 +570,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ticket") == 0) { off|=SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; } + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0) + { + if (--argc < 1) goto bad; + next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv); + } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cutthrough") == 0) cutthrough=1; @@ -624,6 +663,21 @@ bad: OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(); SSL_load_error_strings(); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + next_proto.status = -1; + if (next_proto_neg_in) + { + next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in); + if (next_proto.data == NULL) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n"); + goto end; + } + } + else + next_proto.data = NULL; +#endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1); if (ssl_client_engine_id) @@ -738,6 +792,9 @@ bad: SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, ssl_mode); } + if (next_proto.data) + SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); + if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,apps_ssl_info_callback); if (cipher != NULL) if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx,cipher)) { @@ -1555,6 +1612,20 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full) BIO_printf(bio,"Expansion: %s\n", expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE"); #endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + { + if (next_proto.status != -1) { + const unsigned char *proto; + unsigned int proto_len; + SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len); + BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status); + BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len); + BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); + } + } +#endif + SSL_SESSION_print(bio,SSL_get_session(s)); BIO_printf(bio,"---\n"); if (peer != NULL) diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c index 88b308c..c4e19c9 100644 --- a/apps/s_server.c +++ b/apps/s_server.c @@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void) BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n"); #endif } @@ -740,6 +741,26 @@ BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: received %d ids\n", sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(ids)); goto done; } #endif + + +/* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ +typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { + unsigned char *data; + unsigned int len; +} tlsextnextprotoctx; + + +static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len, void *arg) + { + tlsextnextprotoctx *next_proto = arg; + + *data = next_proto->data; + *len = next_proto->len; + + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; + } + + int MAIN(int, char **); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE @@ -779,6 +800,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING}; + const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; + tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto; #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) @@ -1077,7 +1100,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_key_file2= *(++argv); } - + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0) + { + if (--argc < 1) goto bad; + next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv); + } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE else if (strcmp(*argv,"-jpake") == 0) @@ -1162,6 +1189,20 @@ bad: goto end; } } + + if (next_proto_neg_in) + { + unsigned short len; + next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len, + next_proto_neg_in); + if (next_proto.data == NULL) + goto end; + next_proto.len = len; + } + else + { + next_proto.data = NULL; + } #endif } if (s_dcert_file) @@ -1341,6 +1382,11 @@ bad: store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx2); X509_STORE_set_flags(store, vflags); } + + if (next_proto.data) + { + SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); + } #endif @@ -1980,6 +2026,10 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con) X509 *peer; long verify_error; MS_STATIC char buf[BUFSIZ]; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + const unsigned char *next_proto_neg; + unsigned next_proto_neg_len; +#endif if ((i=SSL_accept(con)) <= 0) { @@ -2019,6 +2069,14 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con) BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Shared ciphers:%s\n",buf); str=SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con)); BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"CIPHER is %s\n",(str != NULL)?str:"(NONE)"); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len); + if (next_proto_neg) { + BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"NEXTPROTO is "); + BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len); + BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n"); + } +#endif if (con->hit) BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Reused session-id\n"); if (SSL_ctrl(con,SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS,0,NULL) & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) diff --git a/ssl/s3_both.c b/ssl/s3_both.c index 869a25d..b88288e 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_both.c +++ b/ssl/s3_both.c @@ -204,16 +204,34 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen) return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } +/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */ +void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { + const char *sender; + int slen; + + if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) + { + sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; + slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; + } + else + { + sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; + slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; + } + + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, + &(s->s3->finish_dgst1), + &(s->s3->finish_dgst2), + sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); +} + int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) { int al,i,ok; long n; unsigned char *p; - /* the mac has already been generated when we received the - * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md - */ - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, a, b, @@ -516,6 +534,11 @@ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok) s->init_num += i; n -= i; } + /* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for + * Finished verification. */ + if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) + ssl3_take_mac(s); + /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c index 6173dbe..f9e1554 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -404,7 +404,11 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; + + if (s->next_proto_negotiated) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; @@ -432,6 +436,13 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) break; + case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: + ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; + break; + case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, @@ -2752,6 +2763,30 @@ static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id) } #endif +int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) + { + unsigned int len, padding_len; + unsigned char *d; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) + { + len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; + padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); + d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + d[4] = len; + memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); + d[5 + len] = padding_len; + memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; + l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; + s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; + s->init_off = 0; + } + + return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); +} + /* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure. diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c index 2c44bde..84bff8d 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_lib.c +++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c @@ -1751,6 +1751,14 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s) s->s3->num_renegotiations=0; s->s3->in_read_app_data=0; s->version=SSL3_VERSION; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->next_proto_negotiated) { + OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); + s->next_proto_negotiated = 0; + s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; + } +#endif } long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c index 5e3583c..6853058 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c +++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c @@ -1264,8 +1264,6 @@ err: int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { int i; - const char *sender; - int slen; if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; @@ -1288,25 +1286,6 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) return(0); - /* we have to record the message digest at - * this point so we can get it before we read - * the finished message */ - if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) - { - sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; - slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; - } - else - { - sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; - slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; - } - - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - &(s->s3->finish_dgst1), - &(s->s3->finish_dgst2), - sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); - return(1); } diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c index e696450..8e0a504 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -499,7 +499,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) * a certificate, the CertificateVerify * message is not sent. */ - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; } else @@ -526,10 +529,21 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; break; + case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: + ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->init_num = 0; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + break; + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, @@ -597,7 +611,12 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; if (s->hit) - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + { + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + } else s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; s->init_num=0; @@ -2324,6 +2343,70 @@ err: return(-1); } +/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It + * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ +int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) + { + int ok; + unsigned proto_len, padding_len; + long n; + const unsigned char *p; + + /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the + * extension in their ClientHello */ + if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); + return -1; + } + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, + SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, + 129, + &ok); + + if (!ok) + return((int)n); + + /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received + * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset + * by ssl3_get_finished). */ + if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); + return -1; + } + + if (n < 2) + return 0; // The body must be > 1 bytes long */ + + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + /* The payload looks like: + * uint8 proto_len; + * uint8 proto[proto_len]; + * uint8 padding_len; + * uint8 padding[padding_len]; + */ + proto_len = p[0]; + if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) + return 0; + padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; + if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) + return 0; + + s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); + if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); + s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; + + return 1; + } + int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h index 9ab9495..dc8dff8 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl.h +++ b/ssl/ssl.h @@ -801,6 +801,23 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st /* Callback for status request */ int (*tlsext_status_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *tlsext_status_arg; + + /* Next protocol negotiation information */ + /* (for experimental NPN extension). */ + + /* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of + * advertised protocols can be provided. */ + int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf, + unsigned int *len, void *arg); + void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg; + /* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the + * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */ + int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, + unsigned char *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, + unsigned int inlen, + void *arg); + void *next_proto_select_cb_arg; #endif }; @@ -857,6 +874,15 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e); #endif void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)); void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)); +void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg); +void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg); + +int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len); +void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len); + +#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0 +#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1 +#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2 #define SSL_NOTHING 1 #define SSL_WRITING 2 @@ -1054,6 +1080,16 @@ struct ssl_st /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */ int tlsext_ticket_expected; SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ + + /* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that + * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello + * extensions. + * + * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from + * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, + * before the Finished message. */ + unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated; + unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len; #define session_ctx initial_ctx #else #define session_ctx ctx @@ -1761,6 +1797,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283 +#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 297 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145 @@ -1827,6 +1864,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER 184 #define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE 185 #define SSL_F_SSL_NEW 186 +#define SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTOS_PARSE 298 #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 287 #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 290 #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 289 @@ -1869,6 +1907,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC 210 #define SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 211 #define SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING 212 +/* Next entry: 299 */ /* Reason codes. */ #define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE 100 @@ -1939,6 +1978,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152 #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153 #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154 +#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 334 +#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 335 #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283 @@ -2120,6 +2161,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER 267 #define SSL_R_X509_LIB 268 #define SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS 269 +/* Next entry: 335 or 1115 */ #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/ssl/ssl3.h b/ssl/ssl3.h index afbdd70..54b73b7 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl3.h +++ b/ssl/ssl3.h @@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st int in_read_app_data; + /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer. */ + int next_proto_neg_seen; + struct { /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */ unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; @@ -484,6 +487,8 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT) #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) +#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT) +#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT) #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) /* read from server */ @@ -529,6 +534,8 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) +#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) +#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) /* write to client */ @@ -553,6 +560,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20 #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22 +#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67 #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c index 7eb5202..ff9c856 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_err.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c @@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE), "SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE), "SSL3_GET_MESSAGE"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO), "SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD), "SSL3_GET_RECORD"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE"}, @@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER), "SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE), "SSL_load_client_CA_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEW), "SSL_new"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTOS_PARSE), "SSL_next_protos_parse"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"}, @@ -335,6 +337,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE),"excessive message size"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE) ,"extra data in message"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got a fin before a ccs"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got next proto before a ccs"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION),"got next proto without seeing extension"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"}, diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 96e056d..cfa70ec 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->initial_ctx=ctx; + s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; #endif s->verify_result=X509_V_OK; @@ -532,6 +533,11 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->next_proto_negotiated) + OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); +#endif + OPENSSL_free(s); } @@ -1576,6 +1582,8 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; + ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; + ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE @@ -1677,6 +1685,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) if (a->client_cert_engine) ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine); #endif + OPENSSL_free(a); } @@ -2752,6 +2761,123 @@ void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int con SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is + * expected that this function is called from the callback set by + * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. + * + * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte + * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte + * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated. + * + * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is: + * + * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the + * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection + * or have a default application level protocol. + * + * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the + * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the + * API that this fallback case was enacted. + * + * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list + * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's + * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol + * a client should use. + * + * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised + * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2. + * + * It returns either + * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or + * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. + */ +int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) + { + unsigned int i, j; + const unsigned char *result; + int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; + + /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */ + for (i = 0; i < server_len; ) + { + for (j = 0; j < client_len; ) + { + if (server[i] == client[j] && + memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0) + { + /* We found a match */ + result = &server[i]; + status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; + goto found; + } + j += client[j]; + j++; + } + i += server[i]; + i++; + } + + /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ + result = client; + status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; + + found: + *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1; + *outlen = result[0]; + return status; + } + +/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's + * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't + * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. + * + * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned + * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols + * provided by the callback. + */ +void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) + { + *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; + if (!*data) { + *len = 0; + } else { + *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; + } +} + +/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a + * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol + * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned + * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will + * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to + * it. + * + * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no + * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */ +void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg) + { + ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; + ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; + } + +/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a + * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| + * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). + * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's + * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can + * assume that |in| is syntactically valid. + * + * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this + * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. + */ +void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) + { + ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; + ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; + } +#endif + int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s) { return (!s->server && /* cutthrough only applies to clients */ diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h index e305db4..a9183ff 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h +++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h @@ -895,6 +895,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s); +int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s); #endif int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s); @@ -913,6 +914,7 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s); +int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s); diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index 8b53112..fd35b18 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -271,6 +271,16 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); } + if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb) + { + /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its + * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ + if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) + return NULL; + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); + s2n(0,ret); + } + if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) return p; @@ -282,6 +292,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha { int extdatalen=0; unsigned char *ret = p; + char next_proto_neg_seen; /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) @@ -337,6 +348,26 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha s2n(0,ret); } + next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; + s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; + if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) + { + const unsigned char *npa; + unsigned int npalen; + int r; + + r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); + if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) + { + if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); + s2n(npalen,ret); + memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); + ret += npalen; + s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; + } + } + if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) return p; @@ -576,6 +607,25 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in else s->tlsext_status_type = -1; } + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) + { + /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a + * renegotiation, but we currently do. + * + * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we + * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on + * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when + * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an + * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing + * anything like that, but this might change). + + * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake + * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > + * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen + * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new + * Finished message could have been computed.) */ + s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; + } /* session ticket processed earlier */ @@ -599,6 +649,24 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in return 1; } +/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No + * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill + * the length of the block. */ +static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) + { + unsigned int off = 0; + + while (off < len) + { + if (d[off] == 0) + return 0; + off += d[off]; + off++; + } + + return off == len; + } + int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) { unsigned short type; @@ -658,6 +726,37 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; } + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) + { + unsigned char *selected; + unsigned char selected_len; + + /* We must have requested it. */ + if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)) + { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + return 0; + } + /* The data must be valid */ + if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) + { + *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) + { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); + if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) + { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); + s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; + } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) diff --git a/ssl/tls1.h b/ssl/tls1.h index afe4807..71d76de 100644 --- a/ssl/tls1.h +++ b/ssl/tls1.h @@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ extern "C" { /* Temporary extension type */ #define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01 +/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */ +#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172 + /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */ #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 /* status request value from RFC 3546 */