ThomasV
6 years ago
4 changed files with 189 additions and 182 deletions
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import hmac |
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import hashlib |
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import cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead as AEAD |
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from .crypto import sha256 |
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from .lnutil import get_ecdh |
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from .lnutil import LightningPeerConnectionClosed, HandshakeFailed |
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from . import ecc |
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class HandshakeState(object): |
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prologue = b"lightning" |
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protocol_name = b"Noise_XK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256" |
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handshake_version = b"\x00" |
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def __init__(self, responder_pub): |
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self.responder_pub = responder_pub |
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self.h = sha256(self.protocol_name) |
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self.ck = self.h |
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self.update(self.prologue) |
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self.update(self.responder_pub) |
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def update(self, data): |
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self.h = sha256(self.h + data) |
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return self.h |
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def get_nonce_bytes(n): |
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"""BOLT 8 requires the nonce to be 12 bytes, 4 bytes leading |
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zeroes and 8 bytes little endian encoded 64 bit integer. |
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""" |
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return b"\x00"*4 + n.to_bytes(8, 'little') |
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def aead_encrypt(k, nonce, associated_data, data): |
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nonce_bytes = get_nonce_bytes(nonce) |
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a = AEAD.ChaCha20Poly1305(k) |
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return a.encrypt(nonce_bytes, data, associated_data) |
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def aead_decrypt(k, nonce, associated_data, data): |
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nonce_bytes = get_nonce_bytes(nonce) |
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a = AEAD.ChaCha20Poly1305(k) |
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#raises InvalidTag exception if it's not valid |
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return a.decrypt(nonce_bytes, data, associated_data) |
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def get_bolt8_hkdf(salt, ikm): |
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"""RFC5869 HKDF instantiated in the specific form |
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used in Lightning BOLT 8: |
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Extract and expand to 64 bytes using HMAC-SHA256, |
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with info field set to a zero length string as per BOLT8 |
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Return as two 32 byte fields. |
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""" |
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#Extract |
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prk = hmac.new(salt, msg=ikm, digestmod=hashlib.sha256).digest() |
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assert len(prk) == 32 |
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#Expand |
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info = b"" |
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T0 = b"" |
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T1 = hmac.new(prk, T0 + info + b"\x01", digestmod=hashlib.sha256).digest() |
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T2 = hmac.new(prk, T1 + info + b"\x02", digestmod=hashlib.sha256).digest() |
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assert len(T1 + T2) == 64 |
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return T1, T2 |
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def act1_initiator_message(hs, epriv, epub): |
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hs.update(epub) |
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ss = get_ecdh(epriv, hs.responder_pub) |
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ck2, temp_k1 = get_bolt8_hkdf(hs.ck, ss) |
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hs.ck = ck2 |
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c = aead_encrypt(temp_k1, 0, hs.h, b"") |
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#for next step if we do it |
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hs.update(c) |
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msg = hs.handshake_version + epub + c |
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assert len(msg) == 50 |
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return msg |
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def privkey_to_pubkey(priv: bytes) -> bytes: |
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return ecc.ECPrivkey(priv[:32]).get_public_key_bytes() |
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def create_ephemeral_key() -> (bytes, bytes): |
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privkey = ecc.ECPrivkey.generate_random_key() |
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return privkey.get_secret_bytes(), privkey.get_public_key_bytes() |
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class LNTransport: |
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def __init__(self, privkey, remote_pubkey, reader, writer): |
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self.privkey = privkey |
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self.remote_pubkey = remote_pubkey |
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self.reader = reader |
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self.writer = writer |
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def send_bytes(self, msg): |
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l = len(msg).to_bytes(2, 'big') |
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lc = aead_encrypt(self.sk, self.sn(), b'', l) |
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c = aead_encrypt(self.sk, self.sn(), b'', msg) |
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assert len(lc) == 18 |
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assert len(c) == len(msg) + 16 |
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self.writer.write(lc+c) |
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async def read_messages(self): |
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read_buffer = b'' |
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while True: |
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rn_l, rk_l = self.rn() |
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rn_m, rk_m = self.rn() |
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while True: |
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if len(read_buffer) >= 18: |
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lc = read_buffer[:18] |
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l = aead_decrypt(rk_l, rn_l, b'', lc) |
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length = int.from_bytes(l, 'big') |
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offset = 18 + length + 16 |
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if len(read_buffer) >= offset: |
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c = read_buffer[18:offset] |
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read_buffer = read_buffer[offset:] |
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msg = aead_decrypt(rk_m, rn_m, b'', c) |
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yield msg |
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break |
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try: |
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s = await self.reader.read(2**10) |
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except: |
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s = None |
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if not s: |
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raise LightningPeerConnectionClosed() |
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read_buffer += s |
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async def handshake(self): |
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hs = HandshakeState(self.remote_pubkey) |
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# Get a new ephemeral key |
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epriv, epub = create_ephemeral_key() |
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msg = act1_initiator_message(hs, epriv, epub) |
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# act 1 |
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self.writer.write(msg) |
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rspns = await self.reader.read(2**10) |
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if len(rspns) != 50: |
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raise HandshakeFailed("Lightning handshake act 1 response has bad length, are you sure this is the right pubkey? " + str(bh2u(self.pubkey))) |
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hver, alice_epub, tag = rspns[0], rspns[1:34], rspns[34:] |
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if bytes([hver]) != hs.handshake_version: |
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raise HandshakeFailed("unexpected handshake version: {}".format(hver)) |
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# act 2 |
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hs.update(alice_epub) |
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ss = get_ecdh(epriv, alice_epub) |
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ck, temp_k2 = get_bolt8_hkdf(hs.ck, ss) |
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hs.ck = ck |
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p = aead_decrypt(temp_k2, 0, hs.h, tag) |
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hs.update(tag) |
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# act 3 |
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my_pubkey = privkey_to_pubkey(self.privkey) |
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c = aead_encrypt(temp_k2, 1, hs.h, my_pubkey) |
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hs.update(c) |
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ss = get_ecdh(self.privkey[:32], alice_epub) |
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ck, temp_k3 = get_bolt8_hkdf(hs.ck, ss) |
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hs.ck = ck |
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t = aead_encrypt(temp_k3, 0, hs.h, b'') |
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self.sk, self.rk = get_bolt8_hkdf(hs.ck, b'') |
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msg = hs.handshake_version + c + t |
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self.writer.write(msg) |
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# init counters |
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self._sn = 0 |
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self._rn = 0 |
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self.r_ck = ck |
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self.s_ck = ck |
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def rn(self): |
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o = self._rn, self.rk |
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self._rn += 1 |
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if self._rn == 1000: |
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self.r_ck, self.rk = get_bolt8_hkdf(self.r_ck, self.rk) |
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self._rn = 0 |
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return o |
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def sn(self): |
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o = self._sn |
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self._sn += 1 |
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if self._sn == 1000: |
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self.s_ck, self.sk = get_bolt8_hkdf(self.s_ck, self.sk) |
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self._sn = 0 |
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return o |
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