lukechilds
/
lightning
mirror of https://github.com/lukechilds/lightning.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity
Browse Source

docs: Update the repro-build docs to the new docker-based system 

Changelog-Added: New reproducible build system now uses docker: try it at home with `doc/REPRODUCIBLE.md`!
bump-pyln-proto
Christian Decker 4 years ago
committed by Rusty Russell
parent
70cbdbb363
commit
210734f1b6
1 changed files with 218 additions and 71 deletions
Whitespace
Show all changes Ignore whitespace when comparing lines Ignore changes in amount of whitespace Ignore changes in whitespace at EOL
Unified View
Diff Options
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File
  1. 289
      doc/REPRODUCIBLE.md

289
doc/REPRODUCIBLE.md
View File

@ -1,113 +1,260 @@
# Rusty's Unreliable Guide to The Terrible World of Reproducible Builds # Reproducible builds for c-lightning
This document describes the steps involved to build c-lightning in a
reproducible way. Reproducible builds close the final gap in the lifecycle of
open-source projects by allowing maintainers to verify and certify that a
given binary was indeed produced by compiling an unmodified version of the
publicly available source. In particular the maintainer certifies that the
binary corresponds a) to the exact version of the and b) that no malicious
changes have been applied before or after the compilation.
c-lightning has provided a manifest of the binaries included in a release,
along with signatures from the maintainers since version 0.6.2.
The steps involved in creating reproducible builds are:
- Creation of a known environment in which to build the source code
- Removal of variance during the compilation (randomness, timestamps, etc)
- Packaging of binaries
- Creation of a manifest (`SHA256SUMS` file containing the crytographic
hashes of the binaries and packages)
- Signing of the manifest by maintainers and volunteers that have reproduced
the files in the manifest starting from the source.
The bulk of these operations is handled by the [`repro-build.sh`][script]
script, but some manual operations are required to setup the build
environment. Since a binary is built against platorm specific libraries we
also need to replicate the steps once for each OS distribution and
architecture, so the majority of this guide will describe how to set up those
starting from a minimal trusted base. This minimal trusted base in most cases
is the official installation medium from the OS provider.
Note: Since your signature certifies the integrity of the resulting binaries,
please familiarize youself with both the [`repro-build.sh`][script] script, as
well as with the setup instructions for the build environments before signing
anything.
[script]: https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/blob/master/tools/repro-build.sh
# Build Environment Setup
The build environments are a set of docker images that are created directly
from the installation mediums and repositories from the OS provider. The
following sections describe how to create those images. Don't worry, you only
have to create each image once and can then reuse the images for future
builds.
## Base image creation
Depending on the distribution that we want to build for the instructions to
create a base image can vary. In the following sections we discuss the
specific instructions for each distribution, whereas the instructions are
identical again once we have the base image.
### Debian / Ubuntu and derivative OSs
For operating systems derived from Debian we can use the `debootstrap` tool to
build a minimal OS image, that can then be transformed into a docker
image. The packages for the minimal OS image are directly downloaded from the
installation repositories operated by the OS provider.
We cannot really use the `debian` and `ubuntu` images from the docker hub,
mainly because it'd be yet another trusted third party, but it is also
complicated by the fact that the images have some of the packages updated. The
latter means that if we disable the `updates` and `security` repositories for
`apt` we find ourselves in a situation where we can't install any additional
packages (wrongly updated packages depending on the versions not available in
the non-updated repos).
The following will create that base image:
```bash
sudo debootstrap bionic bionic
sudo tar -C bionic -c . | sudo docker import - bionic
```
1. The reproducible build system currently only supports Ubuntu 18.04.1. `bionic` in this case is the codename for Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. The following
2. It requires manual steps. table lists the codenames of distributions that we currently support:
3. The input is a source zipfile, the output is a .tar.xz.
## Step 1: Creating a Build Machine | Distribution Version | Codename |
|----------------------|----------|
| Ubuntu 18.04 | bionic |
| Ubuntu 20.04 | focal |
Download the Ubuntu Desktop ISO image for 18.04.1. I got it from Notice that you migh not have `debootstrap` manifests for versions newer than
http://old-releases.ubuntu.com/releases/18.04.1/ubuntu-18.04.1-desktop-amd64.iso your host OS. If one of the `debootstrap` command above complains about a
script not existing you might need to run `debootstrap` in a docker container
itself:
The `sha256sum` of this file should be ```bash
`5748706937539418ee5707bd538c4f5eabae485d17aa49fb13ce2c9b70532433`. sudo docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/build ubuntu:20.04 \
bash -c "apt update && apt-get install -y debootstrap && debootstrap focal /build/focal"
sudo tar -C focal -c . | sudo docker import - focal
```
Do a standard install, but make sure to *uncheck* 'Download updates Verify that the image corresponds to our expectation and is runnable:
while installing Ubuntu' in the installer (or simply deprive it of a
network connection as I do below). I did the following to install under kvm:
qemu-img create ubuntu-18.04.01.raw 10G ```bash
kvm -m 2G -cdrom ~/Downloads/ubuntu-18.04.1-desktop-amd64.iso ubuntu-18.04.01.raw -nic none sudo docker run bionic cat /etc/lsb-release
```
Which should result in the following output for `bionic`:
```text
DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu
DISTRIB_RELEASE=18.04
DISTRIB_CODENAME=bionic
DISTRIB_DESCRIPTION="Ubuntu 18.04 LTS"
```
You can choose a 'Minimal installation': it shouldn't matter. ## Builder image setup
Once the installation is over, it'll want to restart. Then make sure you Once we have the clean base image we need to customize it to be able to build
disable updates: c-lightning. This includes disabling the update repositories, downloading the
build dependencies and specifying the steps required to perform the build.
1. Left-click on the bottom left 9-dots menu For this purpose we have a number of Dockerfiles in the
2. Type "update" [`contrib/reprobuild`][repro-dir] directory that have the specific
3. Click on the "Software & Up.." box icon. instructions for each base image.
4. Click on the "Updates" tab at the top of that app.
5. Uncheck "Important security updates", "Recommended updates" and
"Unsupported updates". You'll have to re-enter your password.
6. Hit "Close".
7. If asked, hit "Reload".
If you didn't have a network connection, you'll want to add one for We can then build the builder image by calling `docker build` and passing it
the next steps; for me, this meant powering off the build machine and restarting: the `Dockerfile`:
kvm -m 2G ubuntu-18.04.01.raw -nic user ```bash
sudo docker build -t cl-repro-bionic - < Dockerfile.bionic
```
And then ran `sudo apt-get update` after I'd logged in. Since we pass the `Dockerfile` through `stdin` the build command will not
create a context, i.e., the current directory is not passed to `docker` and
it'll be independent of the currently checked out version. This also means
that you will be able to reuse the docker image for future builds, and don't
have to repeat this dance every time. Verifying the `Dockerfile` therefore is
sufficient to ensure that the resulting `cl-repro-<codename>` image is
reproducible.
## Step 2: Create the Source Zipfile The dockerfiles assume that the base image has the codename as its image name.
Create the source zip that the Build Machine will need, using
./tools/build-release.sh zipfile [repro-dir]: https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/tree/master/contrib/reprobuild
For testing (ie. when you're not on a proper released version), you
can use --force-version=, --force-mtime= and even --force-unclean.
The will place a file into `release/`, eg. `clightning-v0.7.0rc2.zip`. # Building using the builder image
### Example Finally, after this rather lengthy setup we can perform the actual build. At
this point we have a container image that has been prepared to build
reproducibly. As you can see from the `Dockerfile` above we assume the source
git repository gets mounted as `/repo` in the docker container. The container
will clone the repository to an internal path, in order to keep the repository
clean, build the artifacts there, and then copy them back to
`/repo/release`. We can simply execute the following command inside the git
repository (remember to checkout the tag you are trying to build):
If you are on the git commit v0.7.0rc2 (1dcc4823507df177bf11ca60ab7da988205139b1): ```bash
``` sudo docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/repo -ti cl-repro-bionic
$ sha256sum release/clightning-v0.7.0rc2.zip
3c980858024b8b429333e7ee5a545c499ac6c25d0f1d11bb45fafce00c99ebba release/clightning-v0.7.0rc2.zip
``` ```
## Step 3: Put the Zipfile Onto The Build Machine The last few lines of output also contain the `sha256sum` hashes of all
artifacts, so if you're just verifying the build those are the lines that are
of interest to you:
You can upload it somewhere and download it into the machine, or ```text
various virtualization solutions or a USB stick for a physical machine. ee83cf4948228ab1f644dbd9d28541fd8ef7c453a3fec90462b08371a8686df8 /repo/release/clightning-v0.9.0rc1-Ubuntu-18.04.tar.xz
94bd77f400c332ac7571532c9f85b141a266941057e8fe1bfa04f054918d8c33 /repo/release/clightning-v0.9.0rc1.zip
```
I simply started a server on my host, like so: Repeat this step for each distribution and each architecture you wish to
sign. Once all the binaries are in the `release/` subdirectory we can sign the
hashes:
cd release && python3 -m http.server --bind 127.0.0.1 8888 # (Co-)Signing the release manifest
Inside my KVM build machine I did: The release captain is in charge of creating the manifest, whereas
contributors and interested bystanders may contribute their signatures to
further increase trust in the binaries.
wget http://10.0.2.2:8888/clightning-v0.7.0rc2.zip The release captain creates the manifest as follows:
```bash
cd release/
sha256sum *v0.9.0* > SHA256SUMS
gpg -sb --armor SHA256SUMS
```
## Step 4: Do the Build Co-maintainers and contributors wishing to add their own signature verify that
the `SHA256SUMS` and `SHA256SUMS.asc` files created by the release captain
matches their binaries before also signing the manifest:
1. `unzip clightning-v0.7.0rc2.zip` ```bash
2. `cd clightning-v0.7.0rc2` cd release/
3. `tools/repro-build.sh` (use the same `--force-mtime` if testing). gpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc
It will download the packages needed to build, check they're identitcal to the sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS
versions we expect, install them then build the binaries and create a tar.xz file. cat SHA256SUMS | gpg -sb --armor > SHA256SUMS.new
4. The output will be in that top-level directory. ```
### Example: Then send the resulting `SHA256SUMS.new` file to the release captain so it can
be merged with the other signatures into `SHASUMS.asc`.
If you built from our example zipfile: # Verifying a reproducible build
```
$ sha256sum clightning-v0.7.0rc2-Ubuntu-18.04.tar.xz
c9b4d9530b9b41456f460c58e3ffaa779cdc1c11fb9e3eaeea0f364b62de3d96 clightning-v0.7.0rc2-Ubuntu-18.04.tar.xz
```
You can verify the reproducible build in two ways:
## Step 5: Get the Built Result Off the Build Machine - Repeating the entire reproducible build, making sure from scratch that the
binaries match. Just follow the instructions above for this.
- Verifying that the downloaded binaries match match the hashes in
`SHA256SUMS` and that the signatures in `SHA256SUMS.asc` are valid.
Again, there are many ways, but for my KVM settings the simplest was: Assuming you have downloaded the binaries, the manifest and the signatures
into the same directory, you can verify the signatures with the following:
On the host: ```bash
gpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc
```
nc -l -p 8888 > clightning-v0.7.0rc2-Ubuntu-18.04.tar.xz And you should see a list of messages like the following:
```text
gpg: assuming signed data in 'SHA256SUMS'
gpg: Signature made Fr 08 Mai 2020 07:46:38 CEST
gpg: using RSA key 15EE8D6CAB0E7F0CF999BFCBD9200E6CD1ADB8F1
gpg: Good signature from "Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>" [full]
gpg: Signature made Fr 08 Mai 2020 12:30:10 CEST
gpg: using RSA key B7C4BE81184FC203D52C35C51416D83DC4F0E86D
gpg: Good signature from "Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>" [ultimate]
gpg: Signature made Fr 08 Mai 2020 21:35:28 CEST
gpg: using RSA key 30DE693AE0DE9E37B3E7EB6BBFF0F67810C1EED1
gpg: Good signature from "Lisa Neigut <niftynei@gmail.com>" [full]
```
On the guest: If there are any issues `gpg` will print `Bad signature`, it might be because
the signatures in `SHA256SUMS.asc` do not match the `SHA256SUMS` file, and
could be the result of a filename change. Do not continue using the binaries,
and contact the maintainers, if this is not the case, a failure here means
that the verification failed.
nc -q0 10.0.2.2 8888 < clightning-v0.7.0rc2-Ubuntu-18.04.tar.xz Next we verify that the binaries match the ones in the manifest:
```bash
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS
```
## Step 5: Tell the World Producing output similar to the following:
```
sha256sum: clightning-v0.9.0-Fedora-28-amd64.tar.gz: No such file or directory
clightning-v0.9.0-Fedora-28-amd64.tar.gz: FAILED open or read
clightning-v0.9.0-Ubuntu-18.04.tar.xz: OK
clightning-v0.9.0.zip: OK
sha256sum: WARNING: 1 listed file could not be read
```
You can find my example artifacts on https://ozlabs.org/~rusty/clightning-repro Notice that the two files we downloaded are marked as `OK`, but we're missing
if you want to see why your build produced a different result from mine. one file. If you didn't download that file this is to be expected, and is
nothing to worry about. A failure to verify the hash would give a warning like
the following:
```text
sha256sum: WARNING: 1 computed checksum did NOT match
```
Happy hacking! If both the signature verification and the manifest checksum verification
Rusty. succeeded, then you have just successfully verified a reproducible build and,
assuming you trust the maintainers, are good to install and use the
binaries. Congratulations! 🎉🥳

Write Preview
Loading…
Cancel
Save