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bolt: Updated the BOLT specification to the latest version 

This is mainly just copying over the copy-editing from the
lightning-rfc repository.

[ Split to just perform changes after the UNKNOWN_PAYMENT_HASH change --RR ]

Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Rusty Russell <@rustyrussell>
plugin-timeout-inc
Christian Decker 6 years ago
committed by Rusty Russell
parent
c3e96e058e
commit
94eb2620dc
10 changed files with 126 additions and 137 deletions
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  1. 2
      Makefile
  2. 4
      closingd/closingd.c
  3. 165
      common/bolt11.c
  4. 13
      common/key_derive.c
  5. 18
      common/keyset.c
  6. 10
      common/test/run-bolt11.c
  7. 7
      connectd/handshake.c
  8. 2
      gossipd/routing.c
  9. 13
      hsmd/hsmd.c
  10. 29
      onchaind/onchaind.c

2
Makefile
View File

@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ CCANDIR := ccan
# Where we keep the BOLT RFCs
BOLTDIR := ../lightning-rfc/
BOLTVERSION := 914ebab9080ccccb0ff176cb16b7a6ba21e23bbe
BOLTVERSION := 3fef98d10695462edecc63cba05e4a96374f4664
-include config.vars

4
closingd/closingd.c
View File

@ -287,8 +287,8 @@ static uint64_t receive_offer(struct crypto_state *cs,
/* BOLT #2:
*
* The receiving node:
* - if the `signature` is not valid for either variant of close
* transaction specified in [BOLT #3](03-transactions.md#closing-transaction):
* - if the `signature` is not valid for either variant of closing transaction
* specified in [BOLT #3](03-transactions.md#closing-transaction):
* - MUST fail the connection.
*/
tx = close_tx(tmpctx, cs, channel_id,

165
common/bolt11.c
View File

@ -150,8 +150,8 @@ static void decode_p(struct bolt11 *b11,
{
/* BOLT #11:
*
* A payer SHOULD use the first `p` field that it did not skip as the
* payment hash.
* A payer... SHOULD use the first `p` field that it did NOT
* skip as the payment hash.
*/
if (*have_p) {
unknown_field(b11, hu5, data, data_len, 'p', data_length);
@ -160,9 +160,10 @@ static void decode_p(struct bolt11 *b11,
/* BOLT #11:
*
* A reader MUST skip over unknown fields, an `f` field with unknown
* `version`, or a `p`, `h`, or `n` field that does not have
* `data_length` 52, 52, or 53 respectively. */
* A reader... MUST skip over unknown fields, OR an `f` field
* with unknown `version`, OR `p`, `h`, or `n` fields that do
* NOT have `data_length`s of 52, 52, or 53, respectively.
*/
if (data_length != 52) {
unknown_field(b11, hu5, data, data_len, 'p', data_length);
return;
@ -211,10 +212,10 @@ static void decode_h(struct bolt11 *b11,
}
/* BOLT #11:
*
* A reader MUST skip over unknown fields, an `f` field with unknown
* `version`, or a `p`, `h`, or `n` field that does not have
* `data_length` 52, 52, or 53 respectively. */
*
* A reader... MUST skip over unknown fields, OR an `f` field
* with unknown `version`, OR `p`, `h`, or `n` fields that do
* NOT have `data_length`s of 52, 52, or 53, respectively. */
if (data_length != 52) {
unknown_field(b11, hu5, data, data_len, 'h', data_length);
return;
@ -288,10 +289,10 @@ static char *decode_n(struct bolt11 *b11,
data_length);
/* BOLT #11:
*
* A reader MUST skip over unknown fields, an `f` field with unknown
* `version`, or a `p`, `h`, or `n` field that does not have
* `data_length` 52, 52, or 53 respectively. */
*
* A reader... MUST skip over unknown fields, OR an `f` field
* with unknown `version`, OR `p`, `h`, or `n` fields that do
* NOT have `data_length`s of 52, 52, or 53, respectively. */
if (data_length != 53)
return unknown_field(b11, hu5, data, data_len, 'n',
data_length);
@ -307,9 +308,9 @@ static char *decode_n(struct bolt11 *b11,
/* BOLT #11:
*
* `f` (9): `data_length` variable, depending on version. Fallback on-chain
* address: for bitcoin, this starts with a 5-bit `version` and contains a
* witness program or P2PKH or P2SH address.
* `f` (9): `data_length` variable, depending on version. Fallback
* on-chain address: for Bitcoin, this starts with a 5-bit `version`
* and contains a witness program or P2PKH or P2SH address.
*/
static char *decode_f(struct bolt11 *b11,
struct hash_u5 *hu5,
@ -325,9 +326,10 @@ static char *decode_f(struct bolt11 *b11,
/* BOLT #11:
*
* For bitcoin payments, a writer MUST set an `f` field to a
* valid witness version and program, or `17` followed by a
* public key hash, or `18` followed by a script hash. */
* for Bitcoin payments... MUST set an `f` field to a valid
* witness version and program, OR to `17` followed by a
* public key hash, OR to `18` followed by a script hash.
*/
if (version == 17) {
/* Pay to pubkey hash (P2PKH) */
struct bitcoin_address pkhash;
@ -489,21 +491,18 @@ struct bolt11 *bolt11_decode(const tal_t *ctx, const char *str,
/* BOLT #11:
*
* The human-readable part of a Lightning invoice consists of two
* sections:
* 1. `prefix`: `ln` + BIP-0173 currency prefix (e.g. `lnbc` for bitcoin
* mainnet, `lntb` for bitcoin testnet and `lnbcrt` for bitcoin
* regtest)
* 1. `amount`: optional number in that currency, followed by an optional
* `multiplier` letter
*/
* The human-readable part of a Lightning invoice consists of two sections:
* 1. `prefix`: `ln` + BIP-0173 currency prefix (e.g. `lnbc` for Bitcoin mainnet,
* `lntb` for Bitcoin testnet, and `lnbcrt` for Bitcoin regtest)
* 1. `amount`: optional number in that currency, followed by an optional
* `multiplier` letter. The unit encoded here is the 'social' convention of a payment unit -- in the case of Bitcoin the unit is 'bitcoin' NOT satoshis.
*/
prefix = tal_strndup(tmpctx, hrp, strcspn(hrp, "0123456789"));
/* BOLT #11:
*
* A reader:
* - MUST fail if it does not understand the `prefix`
*/
* A reader...if it does NOT understand the `prefix`... MUST fail the payment.
*/
if (!strstarts(prefix, "ln"))
return decode_fail(b11, fail,
"Prefix '%s' does not start with ln", prefix);
@ -514,13 +513,13 @@ struct bolt11 *bolt11_decode(const tal_t *ctx, const char *str,
/* BOLT #11:
*
* - If the `amount` is empty:
* - if the `amount` is empty:
* */
amountstr = tal_strdup(tmpctx, hrp + strlen(prefix));
if (streq(amountstr, "")) {
/* BOLT #11:
*
* - SHOULD indicate if amount is unspecified
* - SHOULD indicate to the payer that amount is unspecified.
*/
b11->msatoshi = NULL;
} else {
@ -540,8 +539,9 @@ struct bolt11 *bolt11_decode(const tal_t *ctx, const char *str,
/* BOLT #11:
*
* MUST fail if `amount` contains a non-digit or is followed by
* anything except a `multiplier` in the table above
* if `amount` contains a non-digit OR is followed by
* anything except a `multiplier` (see table above)... MUST fail the
* payment.
**/
amount = strtoull(amountstr, &end, 10);
if (amount == ULLONG_MAX && errno == ERANGE)
@ -553,22 +553,22 @@ struct bolt11 *bolt11_decode(const tal_t *ctx, const char *str,
/* BOLT #11:
*
* - If the `multiplier` is present:
* - MUST multiply `amount` by the `multiplier`
* value to derive the amount required for payment
**/
* if the `multiplier` is present... MUST multiply
* `amount` by the `multiplier` value to derive the
* amount required for payment.
*/
b11->msatoshi = tal(b11, u64);
*b11->msatoshi = amount * m10 / 10;
}
/* BOLT #11:
*
* The data part of a Lightning invoice consists of multiple sections:
*
* 1. `timestamp`: seconds-since-1970 (35 bits, big-endian)
* 1. zero or more tagged parts
* 1. `signature`: bitcoin-style signature of above (520 bits)
*/
* The data part of a Lightning invoice consists of multiple sections:
*
* 1. `timestamp`: seconds-since-1970 (35 bits, big-endian)
* 1. zero or more tagged parts
* 1. `signature`: Bitcoin-style signature of above (520 bits)
*/
if (!pull_uint(&hu5, &data, &data_len, &b11->timestamp, 35))
return decode_fail(b11, fail, "Can't get 35-bit timestamp");
@ -651,9 +651,10 @@ struct bolt11 *bolt11_decode(const tal_t *ctx, const char *str,
struct sha256 sha;
/* BOLT #11:
*
* A reader MUST check that the SHA-2 256 in the `h` field
* exactly matches the hashed description.
*
* A reader... MUST check that the SHA2 256-bit hash
* in the `h` field exactly matches the hashed
* description.
*/
if (!description)
return decode_fail(b11, fail,
@ -668,13 +669,14 @@ struct bolt11 *bolt11_decode(const tal_t *ctx, const char *str,
/* BOLT #11:
*
* A writer MUST set `signature` to a valid 512-bit secp256k1
* signature of the SHA2 256-bit hash of the human-readable part,
* represented as UTF-8 bytes, concatenated with the data part
* (excluding the signature) with zero bits appended to pad the data
* to the next byte boundary, with a trailing byte containing the
* recovery ID (0, 1, 2 or 3).
*/
* A writer...MUST set `signature` to a valid 512-bit
* secp256k1 signature of the SHA2 256-bit hash of the
* human-readable part, represented as UTF-8 bytes,
* concatenated with the data part (excluding the signature)
* with 0 bits appended to pad the data to the next byte
* boundary, with a trailing byte containing the recovery ID
* (0, 1, 2, or 3).
*/
if (!pull_bits(NULL, &data, &data_len, sig_and_recid, 520, false))
return decode_fail(b11, fail, "signature truncated");
@ -688,13 +690,12 @@ struct bolt11 *bolt11_decode(const tal_t *ctx, const char *str,
&b11->sig, &sig);
/* BOLT #11:
*
* A reader MUST check that the `signature` is valid (see the `n`
* tagged field specified below).
*...
* A reader MUST use the `n` field to validate the signature instead of
* performing signature recovery if a valid `n` field is provided.
*/
*
* A reader... MUST check that the `signature` is valid (see
* the `n` tagged field specified below). ... A reader...
* MUST use the `n` field to validate the signature instead of
* performing signature recovery.
*/
if (!have_n) {
if (!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(secp256k1_ctx,
&b11->receiver_id.pubkey,
@ -757,9 +758,8 @@ static void push_varlen_field(u5 **data, char type, u64 val)
/* BOLT #11:
*
* `f` (9): `data_length` variable, depending on version.
*
* Fallback on-chain address: for bitcoin, this starts with a 5-bit `version`
* `f` (9): `data_length` variable, depending on version. Fallback
* on-chain address: for Bitcoin, this starts with a 5-bit `version`
* and contains a witness program or P2PKH or P2SH address.
*/
static void push_fallback_addr(u5 **data, u5 version, const void *addr, u16 addr_len)
@ -811,9 +811,9 @@ static void encode_f(u5 **data, const u8 *fallback)
/* BOLT #11:
*
* For bitcoin payments, a writer MUST set an `f` field to a valid
* witness version and program, or `17` followed by a public key hash,
* or `18` followed by a script hash.
* for Bitcoin payments... MUST set an `f` field to a valid
* witness version and program, OR to `17` followed by a
* public key hash, OR to `18` followed by a script hash.
*/
if (is_p2pkh(fallback, &pkh)) {
push_fallback_addr(data, 17, &pkh, sizeof(pkh));
@ -880,16 +880,13 @@ char *bolt11_encode_(const tal_t *ctx,
/* BOLT #11:
*
* A writer:
* - MUST encode `prefix` using the currency it requires
* for successful payment
* - If it requires a specific minimum amount for successful payment:
* - MUST include that `amount`
* - MUST encode `amount` as a positive decimal integer
* with no leading zeroes
* - SHOULD use the shortest representation possible by
* using the largest multiplier or omitting the multiplier
*/
* A writer:
* - MUST encode `prefix` using the currency required for successful payment.
* - if a specific minimum `amount` is required for successful payment:
* - MUST include that `amount`.
* - MUST encode `amount` as a positive decimal integer with no leading 0s.
* - SHOULD use the shortest representation possible, by using the largest multiplier or omitting the multiplier.
*/
if (b11->msatoshi) {
char postfix;
if (*b11->msatoshi % MSAT_PER_BTC == 0) {
@ -911,18 +908,18 @@ char *bolt11_encode_(const tal_t *ctx,
/* BOLT #11:
*
* 1. `timestamp`: seconds-since-1970 (35 bits, big-endian)
* 1. zero or more tagged parts
* 1. `signature`: bitcoin-style signature of above (520 bits)
* 1. `timestamp`: seconds-since-1970 (35 bits, big-endian)
* 1. zero or more tagged parts
* 1. `signature`: Bitcoin-style signature of above (520 bits)
*/
push_varlen_uint(&data, b11->timestamp, 35);
/* BOLT #11:
*
* If a writer offers more than one of any field type, it MUST
* specify the most-preferred field first, followed by
* less-preferred fields in order.
*/
* if a writer offers more than one of any field type,
* it... MUST specify the most-preferred field first, followed
* by less-preferred fields, in order.
*/
/* Thus we do built-in fields, then extras last. */
encode_p(&data, &b11->payment_hash);

13
common/key_derive.c
View File

@ -11,13 +11,14 @@
*
* These pubkeys are simply generated by addition from their base points:
*
* pubkey = basepoint + SHA256(per_commitment_point || basepoint) * G
* pubkey = basepoint + SHA256(per_commitment_point || basepoint) * G
*
* The `localpubkey` uses the local node's `payment_basepoint`; the
* `remotepubkey` uses the remote node's `payment_basepoint`; the
* `local_delayedpubkey` uses the local node's `delayed_payment_basepoint`; the
* `local_htlcpubkey` uses the local node's `htlc_basepoint`; and the
* `remote_delayedpubkey` uses the remote node's `delayed_payment_basepoint`.
* The `localpubkey` uses the local node's `payment_basepoint`;
* the `remotepubkey` uses the remote node's `payment_basepoint`;
* the `local_htlcpubkey` uses the local node's `htlc_basepoint`;
* the `remote_htlcpubkey` uses the remote node's `htlc_basepoint`;
* the `local_delayedpubkey` uses the local node's `delayed_payment_basepoint`;
* and the `remote_delayedpubkey` uses the remote node's `delayed_payment_basepoint`.
*/
bool derive_simple_key(const struct pubkey *basepoint,
const struct pubkey *per_commitment_point,

18
common/keyset.c
View File

@ -7,22 +7,20 @@ bool derive_keyset(const struct pubkey *per_commitment_point,
const struct basepoints *other,
struct keyset *keyset)
{
/* BOLT #3:
/* BOLT #3:
*
* ### `localpubkey`, `remotepubkey`, `local_htlcpubkey`,
* `remote_htlcpubkey`, `local_delayedpubkey`, and
* `remote_delayedpubkey` Derivation
* ### `localpubkey`, `remotepubkey`, `local_htlcpubkey`, `remote_htlcpubkey`, `local_delayedpubkey`, and `remote_delayedpubkey` Derivation
*
* These pubkeys are simply generated by addition from their base points:
*
* pubkey = basepoint + SHA256(per_commitment_point || basepoint) * G
*
* The `localpubkey` uses the local node's `payment_basepoint`; the
* `remotepubkey` uses the remote node's `payment_basepoint`; the
* `local_delayedpubkey` uses the local node's
* `delayed_payment_basepoint`; the `local_htlcpubkey` uses the local
* node's `htlc_basepoint`; and the `remote_delayedpubkey` uses the
* remote node's `delayed_payment_basepoint`.
* The `localpubkey` uses the local node's `payment_basepoint`;
* the `remotepubkey` uses the remote node's `payment_basepoint`;
* the `local_htlcpubkey` uses the local node's `htlc_basepoint`;
* the `remote_htlcpubkey` uses the remote node's `htlc_basepoint`;
* the `local_delayedpubkey` uses the local node's `delayed_payment_basepoint`;
* and the `remote_delayedpubkey` uses the remote node's `delayed_payment_basepoint`.
*/
if (!derive_simple_key(&self->payment,
per_commitment_point,

10
common/test/run-bolt11.c
View File

@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ int main(void)
*
* Breakdown:
*
* * `lnbc`: prefix, lightning on bitcoin mainnet
* * `lnbc`: prefix, Lightning on Bitcoin mainnet
* * `1`: Bech32 separator
* * `pvjluez`: timestamp (1496314658)
* * `p`: payment hash
@ -176,12 +176,12 @@ int main(void)
/* BOLT #11:
*
* > ### Please send $3 for a cup of coffee to the same peer, within 1 minute
* > ### Please send $3 for a cup of coffee to the same peer, within one minute
* > lnbc2500u1pvjluezpp5qqqsyqcyq5rqwzqfqqqsyqcyq5rqwzqfqqqsyqcyq5rqwzqfqypqdq5xysxxatsyp3k7enxv4jsxqzpuaztrnwngzn3kdzw5hydlzf03qdgm2hdq27cqv3agm2awhz5se903vruatfhq77w3ls4evs3ch9zw97j25emudupq63nyw24cg27h2rspfj9srp
*
* Breakdown:
*
* * `lnbc`: prefix, lightning on bitcoin mainnet
* * `lnbc`: prefix, Lightning on Bitcoin mainnet
* * `2500u`: amount (2500 micro-bitcoin)
* * `1`: Bech32 separator
* * `pvjluez`: timestamp (1496314658)
@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ int main(void)
* * `xysxxatsyp3k7enxv4js`: '1 cup coffee'
* * `x`: expiry time
* * `qz`: `data_length` (`q` = 0, `z` = 2; 0 * 32 + 2 == 2)
* * `pu`: 60 seconds (`p` = 1, `u` = 28; 1 * 32 + 28 == 60)
* * `pu`: 60 seconds (`p` = 1, `u` = 28; 1 * 32 + 28 == 60)
* * `aztrnwngzn3kdzw5hydlzf03qdgm2hdq27cqv3agm2awhz5se903vruatfhq77w3ls4evs3ch9zw97j25emudupq63nyw24cg27h2rsp`: signature
* * `fj9srp`: Bech32 checksum
*/
@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ int main(void)
*
* Breakdown:
*
* * `lnbc`: prefix, lightning on bitcoin mainnet
* * `lnbc`: prefix, Lightning on Bitcoin mainnet
* * `20m`: amount (20 milli-bitcoin)
* * `1`: Bech32 separator
* * `pvjluez`: timestamp (1496314658)

7
connectd/handshake.c
View File

@ -109,10 +109,9 @@ static inline void check_act_three(const struct act_three *act3)
{
/* BOLT #8:
*
* 1 byte for the handshake version, 33 bytes for the ephemeral
* public key encrypted with the `ChaCha20` stream cipher, 16 bytes
* for the encrypted public key's tag generated via the AEAD
* construction, and 16 bytes for a final authenticating tag.
* 1 byte for the handshake version, 33 bytes for the
* compressed ephemeral public key of the initiator, and 16
* bytes for the `poly1305` tag.
*/
BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(act3->v) == 1);
BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(act3->ciphertext) == 33 + 16);

2
gossipd/routing.c
View File

@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@ u8 *handle_channel_update(struct routing_state *rstate, const u8 *update TAKES,
/* BOLT #7:
*
* - if the `timestamp` is unreasonably far in the future:
* - MAY discard the `channel_announcement`.
* - MAY discard the `channel_update`.
*/
if (timestamp > time_now().ts.tv_sec + rstate->prune_timeout) {
status_debug("Received channel_update for %s with far time %u",

13
hsmd/hsmd.c
View File

@ -1459,12 +1459,13 @@ static struct io_plan *handle_sign_invoice(struct io_conn *conn,
/* BOLT #11:
*
* A writer MUST set `signature` to a valid 512-bit secp256k1
* signature of the SHA2 256-bit hash of the human-readable part,
* represented as UTF-8 bytes, concatenated with the data part
* (excluding the signature) with zero bits appended to pad the data
* to the next byte boundary, with a trailing byte containing the
* recovery ID (0, 1, 2 or 3).
* A writer... MUST set `signature` to a valid 512-bit
* secp256k1 signature of the SHA2 256-bit hash of the
* human-readable part, represented as UTF-8 bytes,
* concatenated with the data part (excluding the signature)
* with 0 bits appended to pad the data to the next byte
* boundary, with a trailing byte containing the recovery ID
* (0, 1, 2, or 3).
*/
/* FIXME: Check invoice! */

29
onchaind/onchaind.c
View File

@ -1297,11 +1297,10 @@ static void handle_mutual_close(const struct bitcoin_txid *txid,
/* BOLT #5:
*
* A mutual close transaction *resolves* the funding transaction output.
* A closing transaction *resolves* the funding transaction output.
*
* In the case of a mutual close, a node need not do anything else, as
* it has already agreed to the output, which is sent to its specified
* `scriptpubkey`
* In the case of a mutual close, a node need not do anything else, as it has
* already agreed to the output, which is sent to its specified `scriptpubkey`
*/
resolved_by_other(outs[0], txid, MUTUAL_CLOSE);
@ -2015,14 +2014,10 @@ static void handle_their_cheat(const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
if (matches_direction(matches, htlcs) == LOCAL) {
/* BOLT #5:
*
* - MUST *resolve* the _local node's offered HTLCs_
* in one of three ways:
* * spend the *commitment tx* using the payment
* revocation private key.
* * spend the *commitment tx* using the payment
* preimage (if known).
* * spend the *HTLC-timeout tx*, if the remote node
* has published it.
* - MUST *resolve* the _local node's offered HTLCs_ in one of three ways:
* * spend the *commitment tx* using the payment revocation private key.
* * spend the *commitment tx* once the HTLC timeout has passed.
* * spend the *HTLC-success tx*, if the remote node has published it.
*/
out = new_tracked_output(&outs, txid,
tx_blockheight,
@ -2044,12 +2039,10 @@ static void handle_their_cheat(const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
NULL);
/* BOLT #5:
*
* - MUST *resolve* the _remote node's offered HTLCs_
* in one of two ways:
* * spend the *commitment tx* using the payment
* revocation key.
* * spend the *commitment tx* once the HTLC timeout
* has passed.
* - MUST *resolve* the _remote node's offered HTLCs_ in one of three ways:
* * spend the *commitment tx* using the payment revocation private key.
* * spend the *commitment tx* using the payment preimage (if known).
* * spend the *HTLC-timeout tx*, if the remote node has published it.
*/
steal_htlc(out);
}

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