As per lightning-rfc commit b8469aa758a1a7ebbd73c987be3e5207b778241b
("re-protocol: don't hand signature to non-funding side initially.")
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We still need to watch the anchor output in this case: that's what
makes us handle the commit transcction we broadcast.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We already removed the on-chain states, now we remove the "clearing" state
(which wasn't fully implemented anyway).
This turns into two smaller state machines: one for clearing, which
still allows HTLCs to be failed and fulfilled, and one for mutual
close negotiation which only allows close_signature messages.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Previous to this, we kept the remote side's 'struct channel_state'
backwards: peer->remote.commit->cstate.side[OURS] was their HTLCs,
and [THEIRS] was our HTLCs. This made some things easier, but was
horrible for readability.
This inverts things so we keep track of the remote side's state from
our point of view: [OURS] is ours, [THEIRS] is theirs. Which makes
much more sense.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
As per lightning-rfc commit 8ee09e749990a11fa53bea03d5961cfde4be4616,
we remove the acks from the protocol now they're no longer needed (and
all the infrastructure).
We also place the commit number in the commit_info where it logically
belongs, removing it from the peer struct.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
From BOLT#2 (rev 8ee09e749990a11fa53bea03d5961cfde4be4616):
Thus each node (conceptually) tracks:
...
3. Two *unacked changesets*: one for the local commitment (their proposals) and one for the remote (our proposals)
4. Two *acked changesets*: one for the local commitment (our proposals, acknowledged) and one for the remote (their proposals, acknowledged).
(Note that an implementation MAY optimize this internally, for
example, pre-applying the changesets in some cases).
In our case, we apply the unacked changes immediately into
staging_cstate, and save them in an unacked_changes array. That array
gets applied to staging_cstate as soon as it's acked (we only allow
one outstanding update_commit, so we only need one array).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
While useful for testing, it doesn't make sense to have an explicit commit
command; we should commit whenever there are outstanding changes.
We have a 10ms timer to allow limited batching, however.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Currently this mean --bitcoin-poll; we're going to change the other time
options to block heights anyway.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is just generally good practice. All our other txs are single-input,
so we've not needed to permute inputs before.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
They would sometimes fail under load, if using valgrind. Retry
properly rather than relying on random sleeps. Also, takes "make
check" running time here from 1m31.864s to 1m16.872s.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We use dev-disconnect to convince one node the other has disconnected
(but not vice versa), to get deterministic behaviour. We do this with
one HTLC outstanding, to test the HTLC timeout path.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Once we see an on-chain tx, we ignore the state machine and handle it
as per the onchain.md draft. This specifies a *resolution* for each
output, and we're done when they're irrevocable.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It's not quite true: if we offer the anchor, we have a commitinfo
without their signature yet. So make it a pointer again. Since we
always allocate struct commit_info with talz, it starts as a NULL
pointer.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is called when an HTLC times out, and we need to send it back to
ourselves. We also adjust the locktime, since in practice we should
refuse an HTLC less than our locktime.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We don't report conflicts, just depths. So we report 0 if it's in a
main chain which loses to another, otherwise it's always positive.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Since bitcoind doesn't propagate non-main chains, there's little point
trying to be smart when we see them. This simplifies things immensely.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It's primitive, but we re-broadcast any txs not included in the main
chain every time the tip moves. We only track transactions we are
watching, but that turns out to cover every transaction we generate
anyway.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This can fail. Real cases include both sides dumping their commitment
txs in testing (only one can succeed).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Rusty Russell