For the moment, there's no way to remove an in-progress HTLC before
it's timed out. The other side can remove it with a routefail, but
you can't push for it to be removed.
We may add that later, but by definition it's only a polited request, and
normally we should rely on timeouts.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We don't have to accept an HTLC they offer; we might not be able to
route it, or it might offer insufficient payment.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This gets truncated for on-chain transactions (thus, rounding may
contribute to fees).
This also means we currently have an upper bound of 0.04 BTC per HTLC;
this can be increased later if required.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
For open transactions, locktime is a delay we require on the other
side's to-self commit transaction outputs to ensure we can cut them
off if necessary.
For HTLCs, it's an absolute expiry time.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Proposing an HTLC follows the same sequence as proposing a normal
update. There's also requests to complete and remove HTLCs.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Both sides elect a commitment fee, and the lowest is chosen. That means
you can't game the other side (but if you offer too low, then can error
out of course).
Fees are split 50-50 if possible: originally the whole fee has to be
paid by the (single) funder. Neither side can withdraw funds which
would make them unable to pay fees.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Most complex change was gather_updates(), which handles all the "what
is the current state of the channel" logic for our dumb test utils.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is a major change; instead of creating a mutual anchor (funding)
transaction, each side creates its own. We use escape transactions in
case anything goes wrong; these will be revoked later.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Alpha has segregated witnesses, so txid doesn't include the inputs.
That means we can create the first commit transaction before we sign
the anchor tx.
Bitcoin will need to do this differently: presumbly via new sipops
(a OP_CHECKSIG2VERIFY I imagine).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
I had each side using the other side's hash secret. That's a very
dumb idea, since it means you can steal from a unilateral close!
A's secret applies to A's commit transaction: it needs the
secret and B's final signature to steal funds, and that should
never happen (since A doesn't have the B's final signature, and
once A has given B the secret, they never broadcast the commit tx).
This makes the update a 4 step dance, since you need the new
revocation hash to make the other side's TX to sign.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We need to pay to this from two places: on their side, it's a simple
payment, on our side, it's a complex timeout-or-mutual-or-hval script,
which doesn't lend itself to arbitrary scripts.
Use P2SH, of course.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
DER encoding introduces problems for non-canonical encodings; we should
do that only at the lightning<->bitcoin interface.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Rusty Russell