It usually means we're missing something, but there's no way to ask what.
Simply start a broad scid probe.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This should give more reliable results, though it risks us getting
suckered into always consulting the same peer.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We assume that the time for gossip propagation is < 10 minutes, so by
going back that far from last gossip we won't miss anything,
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It's simple: if we wouldn't accept the timestamp we see, don't put
the channel in the stale_scid_map.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Just try to choose another. Under Travis, this causes many failures due
to slowness (they only get 10 seconds in -dev mode).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We eliminate the "need peer" states and instead check if the
random_peer_softref has been cleared.
We can also unify our restart handlers for all these cases; even the
probe_scids case, by giving gossip credit for the scids as they come
in (at a discount, since scids are 8 bytes vs the ~200 bytes for
normal gossip messages).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Build up a map of short_channel_ids which we have old info for (only
if peer supports gossip_query_ex).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This asks peers to append the timestamps or checksums: if it has
gossip_query_ex support, it will, otherwise it's ignored.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If the peer supports `gossip_query_ex` we can use query_flags to simply
request the node_announcements when probing for nodes, rather than
getting everything. If a peer doesn't support `gossip_query_ex` then
it's harmless to add it.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We pick some nodes which don't seem to have node_announcements and we
ask a channel associated with them. Again, if this reveals more
node_announcements, we probe for twice as many next time.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If we have any unknown short_channel_ids, we ask a random peer for
those channels. Once it responds, we probe again for a small random
range in case more are missing, again enlarging if we find some.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Instead of a linear array which is fairly inefficient if it turns out
we know nothing at all.
We remove the gossip_missing() call by changing the api to
remove_unknown_scid() to include a flag as to whether the scid turned
out to be real or not.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Once we've finished streaming gossip from the first peer, we ask a
random peer (maybe the same one) for all short_channel_ids in the last
6 blocks from the latest channel we know about.
If this reveals new channels we didn't know about, we expand the probe
by a factor of 2 each time.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The seeker starts by asking a peer (the first peer!) for all gossip
since a minute before the modified time of the gossip store.
This algorithm is enhanced in successive patches.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Since we have to validate, there can be a delay (and peer might
vanish) between receiving the gossip and actually confirming it, hence
the use of softref.
We will use this information to check that the peers are making progress
as we start asking them for specific information.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We often want a pointer which will turn to NULL if the pointed-to thing is
freed. This is possible with tal objects, so create it.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is the modified-time of the file. We have to store it internally
since we overwrite the gossip file with compaction on startup.
This means the "are we behind on gossip?" heuristic is no longer inside
gossip_store.c, which is cleaner.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It sometimes fail with a bad_gossip error because the sending node
might not have found out about the channel when it gets a
channel_update. Make sure the whole network knows everything before
we start.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We completely rework test_node_reannounce: it's assumes we always ask for
all gossip and that assumption will be broken in future patches too.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
I have seen some strange flakiness (under VALGRIND), which I have
traced down to dev-disconnect "+" not working as expected. In
particular, the message is not sent out before closing the fd.
This seems to fix it on Linux, though it's so intermittant that it's hard
to be completely sure.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This patch adds a channel_id parameter to allow for specifying
channels that are lacking a short_channel_id.
Useful in the case where a peer has 1) multiple channels (ONCHAIN etc)
and 2) a channel where the funding transaction hasn't been
broadcast/mined.
this is unnecessary, and actually severely limits the functionality
of `wally_tx_add_input`, which will expand the allocated input
length if there's not enough room for the additional input
```external/libwally-core/src/transaction.c
if (tx->num_inputs >= tx->inputs_allocation_len) {
/* Expand the inputs array */
struct wally_tx_input *p;
p = realloc_array(tx->inputs, tx->inputs_allocation_len,
tx->num_inputs + 1, sizeof(*tx->inputs));
...
tx->inputs = p;
tx->inputs_allocation_len += 1;
```
This splits maybe_create_hsm_secret() in two parts (either encrypted
or in clear) for clarity, and adds an encryption detection in load_hsm().
There are actually three cases if an encryption key is passed:
- There is no hsm_secret => just create it and store the encrypted seed
- There is an encrypted hsm_secret => the provided key should be able to
decrypt the seed, if the wrong key is passed libsodium will nicely error
and hsmd will exit() to not throw a backtrace (using status_failed() as for
other errors) at the face of an user who mistyped its password.
- There is a non-encrypted hsm_secret => load the seed, delete the
hsm_secret, create the hsm_secret, store the encrypted seed.
Add a new startup option which will, if set, prompt the user for a
password to derive a key from. This key will later be used to encrypt
and/or decrypt `hsm_secret`.
This was made a noarg option even if it would have been preferable to
let the user the choice of how to specify the password. Since we have
to chose, better to not let the password in the commands history.
According to the doc (https://download.libsodium.org/doc):
"sodium_init() initializes the library and should be called before
any other function provided by Sodium. [...]
the function ensures that the system's random number generator has
been properly seeded.".
Rusty Russell
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